

The CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW

CONTINUING

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(Founded at the University of Toronto in 1896)

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CHURCH, SCHOOLS, AND POLITICS IN MANITOBA, 1903-12*

G. R. COOK

ONE of the chief staples of political controversy during the Laurier administration was the problem of church-state relations, and more particularly the separate school question. Since Sir Wilfrid himself was a Roman Catholic and drew heavily on his native province for political support, he was an easy target for those who constituted themselves the guardians of English-Canadian Protestant virtue. They repeatedly charged him with undue susceptibility to clerical influence, despite the well-known fact that he and his party had openly opposed the demands of the Church hierarchy in settling the Manitoba school question in 1896. In 1905 the critics of the Liberal Government found opportunities on two separate occasions to accuse the administration of subservience to Roman Catholic wishes. The first occurred in connection with the autonomy bills and is well known to students of Canadian political history. A request from Manitoba for an extension of its boundaries provided the occasion for the second round of charges.

A representative of the Manitoba Government set the stage for the second controversy by charging that Sir Wilfrid in co-operation with the Apostolic Delegate, Mgr Sbaretti, was attempting to re-institute separate schools in Manitoba in return for extension of its boundaries. This incident deserves more attention than it has yet received for it provides some interesting illustrations of a number of the features of Canadian political history. First, it shows how far the Manitoba schools question was from being "settled" in 1896-7. At the same time it makes clear that despite the promptings and even threats of Mgr Sbaretti, Sir Wilfrid had no intention of deviating from the conciliatory stand he had taken on this question in 1896. Once again in these events Laurier the political craftsman is displayed to good advantage, explaining, temporizing, placating. Finally, the frictions between federal and provincial political parties can be studied against the background of a highly sensitive religious and racial question. By carrying the related events through to 1912, it is possible to show that Premier Borden was able to succeed in uniting

*The author would like to thank the Humanities Research Council and the Committee to administer the Rockefeller Grant at the University of Toronto for grants which made this study possible.

the interests of Dominion and provincial parties and to settle this thorny question after Sir Wilfrid had failed.

Though the subject of the school question as an issue in Manitoba politics has been investigated,¹ and the facts surrounding the boundary controversy recently set out,² very little attention has been paid to the rôle played by Mgr Sbaretti and the Manitoba Catholics in making the school question a constant irritant to Laurier and the Liberal party in Manitoba. Perhaps the subject has been somewhat overlooked because after 1905 it was never again allowed to erupt into federal politics during the Laurier term of office. Nevertheless the Manitoba school situation remained a problem of considerable political magnitude for Laurier and Borden, until the latter was able to work out an acceptable boundary settlement in 1912.³

The roots of the problem are found in the settlement of 1896. After Mgr Merry del Val's arrival in Canada in that year, the Papacy on his advice issued an encyclical instructing all Catholics to accept the Laurier-Greenway settlement. It was not to be looked upon as a final settlement, but rather as the only possibility in the circumstances, and a point of departure for future improvements. Thus from the Catholics' viewpoint the question was by no means settled, and therefore a potential source of future trouble. The arrival of a new Apostolic Delegate in 1902 heralded a new stage in the school controversy. Desiring to turn all his efforts to the well-being and prosperity of the Catholics of Canada, both from a spiritual and a temporal viewpoint, Mgr Sbaretti was not content to let the matter rest.⁴

In the spring of 1903 the Prime Minister supplied Mgr Sbaretti with a statement on the school situation as it then existed in Manitoba. He reviewed the question from its inception in the nineties, emphasizing the position taken by the bishops in Quebec in the 1896 election, in order to make clear the danger involved in allowing the question to become one of political controversy. He added that constant efforts were being made to settle the problem of the Winnipeg Catholics by bringing them under the city school board,

¹W. L. Morton, "The Manitoba Schools and Canadian Nationalism, 1890-1916," *Canadian Historical Association Report*, 1946, 51-9.

²W. L. Morton, *Manitoba: A History* (Toronto, 1957), 273-329.

³O. D. Skelton, *Life and Letters of Sir Wilfrid Laurier* (2 vols., Toronto, 1921), II, 242; Morton, *Manitoba*, 292; R. Rumilly, *Histoire de la Province de Québec* (26 vols., Montreal, 1940-55), XII, 28. The charge made by Rogers is noted by each of these authors. The failure to give the question any detailed consideration is particularly curious in the case of Skelton whose biography was based on extensive use of the Laurier Papers.

⁴P.A.C., Laurier Papers, 246, Mgr Sbaretti to Laurier, Nov. 30, 1902.

thus releasing them from the burden of double taxation. Standing in the way of success, however, was one serious obstacle—Archbishop Langevin of St. Boniface. Laurier wrote:

Bien que Sa Grandeur soit douée d'un grand nombre des qualités très estimables, je ne crois pas qu'elle ait aucune de celles qui pourraient en faire un négociateur heureux. De plus, si je dois exprimer toute ma pensée, je suis convaincu que Sa Grandeur n'a jamais accepté de bonne grâce la législation de 1897, et n'a jamais sincèrement fait aucun effort pour la faire accepter à Winnipeg. Avec sa Grandeur, le résultat serait douteux; avec un autre, je serais certain du succès.⁵

Sir Wilfrid thus made his position clear; he was prepared to work for the betterment of the Catholic's position in Manitoba, but only through the method which he called "la politique de conciliation." But he was afraid that the greatest stumbling block to his conciliatory methods would be the doughty Archbishop of St. Boniface.

As a practical politician who believed that his "sunny ways" would ultimately achieve more for his Catholic fellow countrymen than uncompromising demands that excited racial and religious passions, Laurier naturally had little sympathy for a man of Archbishop Langevin's temperament. This western prelate fully subscribed to the Catholic belief in the necessity of denominational schools for the proper education of Catholic children.⁶ But Archbishop Langevin was not merely a Catholic. Equally important was his French-Canadian origin, and he seems to have made little or no distinction between his religion and his nationality. He once warned his parishioners, "Sauver le français, c'est sauver une grande force catholique; l'anglais dans notre pays est une force pour l'hérésie."⁷ Holding such views as these Mgr Langevin found little but frustration in Laurier's compromises.

During the spring of 1903 negotiations were set afoot in Winnipeg in an effort to settle the problem of the Catholic school children there. Laurier appealed to his supporters in Winnipeg to give their co-operation in bringing the matter to a successful conclusion, but although they were apparently willing to be of assistance, "the belief that Mr. Roblin has been working the thing up for supposedly political ends is the chief obstacle in the way of a peaceful settlement."⁸ Here was really the crux of the problem in Manitoba: neither party trusted the other enough to attempt a settlement. The pawn

⁵*Ibid.*, 268, Laurier to Mgr Sbarette, May 30, 1903.

⁶H. A. Rommen, *The State in Catholic Thought* (London, 1945), chap. xv.

⁷A. G. Morice, *Vie de Mgr Langevin* (St. Boniface, 1919), 383.

⁸Laurier Papers, 262, Laurier to J. W. Daffoe, April 26, 1903, and reply, May 2, 1903.

in this political game was the Catholic minority. When the negotiations in Winnipeg failed, all Sir Wilfrid could do after meeting a delegation of Catholics from Winnipeg was to appeal again to his Manitoba followers to make concessions.⁹

In the autumn of the same year the Apostolic Delegate himself visited Manitoba. He discussed the vexing school question with Premier Roblin and returned to Ottawa optimistic that a new settlement could be obtained provided the matter was kept on a non-partisan basis. Premier Roblin, so the Apostolic Delegate reported, was ready to open negotiations with Clifford Sifton and had indicated his willingness to enact any agreed changes "provided of course that the Government of Ottawa will be party in the arrangement." Though Sifton was absent in England the Prime Minister indicated his own willingness to give his "personal support to any measure that he [Roblin] will submit to the Legislature . . . and I will use my influence with my friends to the same end."¹⁰

Whether Sir Wilfrid ever asked Sifton to carry out this mission is not clear, but on finding that the substitution of Senator Dandurand was unacceptable to Mgr Sbarette, he wrote personally to the Manitoba Premier. He made no commitment on his own behalf other than indicating his interest and concern in the matter, but he asked Roblin to inform him as to "the character and extent of the legislation which you contemplate." There was no offer of direct co-operation here and Roblin's refusal to "further consider the matter, at least for the moment" showed that he did not intend to venture out on a limb alone.¹¹ Nevertheless this approach represents Laurier's consistent position. He held that the responsibility for the school situation rested with the provincial authorities and though he would appeal to his followers to co-operate in any equitable solution, the federal government itself could not interfere in the matter.

This attitude did not win Mgr Sbarette's approval. He was irritated because Laurier had not complied with his suggestion that Sifton be sent to negotiate with the Manitoba Government, and in writing to Premier Roblin the Apostolic Delegate felt that Sir Wilfrid had misrepresented the whole situation. As a result of his refusal to commit himself to any action, Laurier had probably let a golden opportunity for a settlement slip from his grasp.¹² In his letter to Roblin, Laurier had referred to a "new opening" in the school question, and this seriously alarmed the Catholic official:

⁹*Ibid.*, 264, Laurier to J. W. Dafoe, Aug. 14, 1903.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 288, Mgr Sbarette to Laurier, Oct. 29, 1903, and reply, Oct. 29, 1903.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 303, Laurier to R. P. Roblin, Jan. 27, 1904, and reply, Feb. 5, 1904.

¹²*Ibid.*, Mgr Sbarette to Laurier, Feb. 5, 1904.

In your letter there is mention of a *new opening* of the School Question. I really do not understand how a question which never was closed could be re-opened. I am obliged to say that neither the Catholics nor the hierarchy of Canada, nor the Holy See considered the question closed. And the fact that you yourself promised the Archbishops of Canada, my predecessor and myself, that the central Government would not give the school money and property to the Government of Manitoba until the question is settled to the satisfaction of the Catholics, shows that you considered the question being very far from closed.¹³

In his reply to this magisterial lecture the Prime Minister politely pointed out that "new opening" meant "new development," an explanation which Mgr Sbaretti accepted with ill grace.¹⁴ It is noteworthy that Sir Wilfrid offered no denial of the promises referred to in the Papal Delegate's letter.

In March, 1904, Mgr Sbaretti began pressing for a statement of explicit guarantees for the rights of the minority in the Northwest Territories. After he had exacted from the Prime Minister the promise that the minority would not lose its school rights when the area was given provincial status he again turned to Manitoba.¹⁵ His initial request was that as the *sine qua non* to the inclusion of any part of the Northwest Territories in Manitoba, the province should be obliged to maintain separate schools in the new territory. His objective however was made clear when he asked for a specific assurance that "... you will take the opportunity to settle the school question of Manitoba by exacting the re-establishment of the schools in return for the extension of the territory and the giving of the administration of the public lands."¹⁶ This demand represents the core of the position that Mgr Sbaretti was to occupy during the remainder of his term in Canada. Laurier's answer was indefinite but it was obvious that he was not anxious to make any explicit statement on the question. He begged off by claiming that he had not had time to think the subject out "and for the present ... would not undertake a binding engagement or even express a mature opinion."¹⁷

Temporizing was unsatisfactory to Mgr Sbaretti. He felt that Sir Wilfrid's repeated declarations that the school settlement could best be achieved through joint action on the federal and provincial levels meant that his own proposition should be acceptable. But the method, he said, was unimportant; the objective must take first

¹³*Ibid.*, Mgr Sbaretti to Laurier, Feb. 8, 1904.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 304, Laurier to Mgr Sbaretti, Feb. 10, 1904, and reply, Feb. 11, 1904.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 307, Laurier to Mgr Sbaretti, March 7, 1904.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 312, Mgr Sbaretti to Laurier, April 7, 1904.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, Laurier to Mgr Sbaretti, April 11, 1904.

place. Still, if the Prime Minister did not have an alternative method to offer he felt it was desirable that the one suggested should be carefully considered and a definite agreement reached. Nevertheless Sir Wilfrid refused to be rushed.¹⁸ He offered some encouragement to the Papal Delegate, though in doing so he only infuriated the churchman. He agreed that if any portion of the Northwest Territories where separate schools existed was transferred to Manitoba, these schools would be protected. But even this concession he qualified by stating that if the territory contained no Catholics and no existing separate schools "the case would present another aspect and would suggest a different conclusion."¹⁹

The two men now entered a difficult phase of their debate and signs of serious strain began to appear. The Papal Delegate, a man with a single cause at heart, pressed his argument with all the logic of the schools in which he had been trained and sometimes in language which suggests that diplomacy was not his strongest characteristic. He was understandably exasperated by the Prime Minister who, in his awareness that Manitoba Roman Catholics were not the only interest group he had to satisfy, would sometimes seem to accept all the premises of an argument yet still ignore the most obvious conclusion. The suggestion that there might not be any Catholic in the territories seemed totally irrelevant to Mgr Sbaretti; there was a principle at stake which could not be measured in numbers. Furthermore there was the future to consider, a future which might see a large-scale influx of Roman Catholics into the territory.²⁰ Laurier's methods, evolved in an awareness of the limitations of logic in the governance of men, could only be anathema to one completely convinced of the righteousness of his cause. Sir Wilfrid wrote on one occasion: "I recognize the force and logic of your argument. Still I would like to reserve judgment for further consideration, as the result of all experience in constitutional government has demonstrated that a close adherence to logic may lead into practical difficulties. Let me add that before coming to any definite conclusion, I will again discuss the matter with Your Excellency."²¹

The church official's reaction showed a complete lack of sympathy with Laurier's difficulties. "Practical difficulties" to the Premier were those involved in governing a country divided on racial and religious lines. The only difficulties recognized by Mgr Sbaretti were those of

¹⁸*Ibid.*, Mgr Sbaretti to Laurier, April 13, 1904, and reply, April 16, 1904.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, Laurier to Mgr Sbaretti, April 22, 1904.

²⁰*Ibid.*, Mgr Sbaretti to Laurier, April 24, 1904.

²¹*Ibid.*, Laurier to Mgr Sbaretti, May 4, 1904.

Catholics who had been deprived of their separate schools. It was obvious to the clear, analytical mind of the man trained in exegetical exercises that "practical difficulties are not created by a law establishing Separate Schools, but were and are created by the want or abrogation of such a law."²²

Here, for the moment, the debate rested. Clearly no common ground had been established. While the Papal Delegate quite naturally considered the problem strictly from the viewpoint of his Church, Laurier, though interested in promoting the cause of justice for his fellow Catholics, was convinced that a political decision required a careful balancing of a variety of forces. To him the matter was far more complex than Mgr Sbaretti was prepared to recognize. For reasons of constitutional propriety and political expediency, direct federal interference in Manitoba educational arrangements was impossible.

The decision of the Laurier Government in 1905 to give provincial status to the Northwest Territories naturally stimulated Manitoba's desire to fulfil her manifest northward destiny. At the same time the announcement that the Manitoba legislature had unanimously resolved in favour of boundary extension again brought the school question sharply to the Apostolic Delegate's attention. Fresh from successfully obtaining from the Government certain guarantees respecting minority rights in the new provinces, he now felt the moment to be propitious for a similar agreement to cover any territorial grants made to Manitoba.²³ His attitude had not softened in any way, and he still refused to consider the question in relation to the Government's political position. His proposal was blunt:

It is my conviction that the actual demand of Manitoba offers an opportunity to settle the School Question in that Province to the satisfaction of Catholics. What the Province asks is within the jurisdiction of the Dominion Parliament. The Dominion Parliament is not obliged to cede the territory, the Dominion Government can use such a demand as a lever to bring Manitoba to ameliorate the position of the Catholics in the Province—much more, since the Roblin Government claims to be friendly to the Catholics of the Province, this would afford an opportunity of proving its friendliness.²⁴

To this maximum demand he added what was apparently an acceptable minimum. If the suggested bargain proved unacceptable, at least the existing separate schools could be preserved by inserting

²²*Ibid.*, Mgr Sbaretti to Laurier, May 6, 1904.

²³*Ibid.*, 246, Mgr Sbaretti to Laurier, March 1, 1904, and reply, March 7, 1904; *ibid.*, 359, Mgr Sbaretti to Laurier, March 13, 1905.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 352, Mgr Sbaretti to Laurier, Jan. 21, 1905.

in the legislation providing for transfer a clause prohibiting the application of the Manitoba School Act in the new territory. The Prime Minister made no commitment to either proposition. He answered briefly that his desire for a short session of Parliament coupled with the large amount of necessary business already on the agenda would make it impossible to deal with the Manitoba request.²⁵ When the Manitoba delegates arrived in Ottawa Mgr Sbarette again wrote to Sir Wilfrid asking him if he could not at least "insinuate to these delegates that an amelioration of the condition of the Catholics in Manitoba with regard to the schools would remove difficulties."²⁶ The Prime Minister apparently made no written reply to this suggestion, but he certainly did not adopt it.

In the meantime the Canadian House of Commons was turning its attention to the autonomy bills. Already the charge that the educational provisions for the new provincial constitutions had been shaped by Mgr Sbarette was being aired.²⁷ Laurier was entering upon one of the most serious crises of his political career and it is inconceivable that he should have created further difficulties for himself by reopening the Manitoba school issue. There were others, however, not adverse to increasing the Premier's difficulties. Among these was Robert Rogers, a member of the Manitoba Government visiting Ottawa for the purpose of forwarding his province's boundary extension case. Rogers apparently felt that the federal government had more reasons than those made public for refusing the provincial request for territorial expansion. He had some further reasons to offer, and the fact that these reasons appeared to substantiate the charges that his fellow Conservatives were making about the relations between Laurier and Mgr Sbarette only made them more convincing. So Rogers unburdened himself of a lengthy statement which appeared in the *Ottawa Citizen* and other eastern papers on April 4, and provided material for debate in the House of Commons on the two following days.

The substance of Rogers' charge was that while he and his colleague, Colin Campbell, were waiting in Ottawa for Laurier's answer to the proposal for boundary changes they had been called into conference by the Papal Delegate. The latter presented them with an outline of certain changes which the Roman Catholic Church desired to have made in the Manitoba School Act. He then

²⁵*Ibid.*, Laurier to Mgr Sbarette, Feb. 17, 1905.

²⁶*Ibid.*, 355, Mgr Sbarette to Laurier, Feb. 17, 1905.

²⁷Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1905, II, 4010; *Canadian Annual Review*, 1905, 71-4.

implied that if these requests were accepted, boundary extension would be expedited.²⁸ To Rogers the meaning of this request was obvious:

What more natural conclusion can be arrived at than that Sir Wilfrid is simply killing time and making pretexts in order that the polite invitation of Mgr. Sbaretti could be acted upon by Manitoba?

In this way of course, Sir Wilfrid thinks he can secure a political advantage for his friends in this province. This is a palpable political trick, which he is quite capable of undertaking with a view to forcing the local government to do something which would be resented by the people and by this means he hopes to reinstate his Liberal friends in power here. . . . I deny the right of Sir Wilfrid and Monseigneur Sbaretti to mix up the matter of separate schools with that of extension of our boundaries, and I am sure that in doing so they do not reflect the wishes of either the Roman Catholics or the Protestants in the Province. . . .²⁹

Rogers had more to add to the indictment, for as a skilful politician he was aware of the use that could be made of this issue in Manitoba political warfare.³⁰ He documented his charges by reaching back to the school controversy of 1896 and the negotiations which brought Mgr Merry del Val to Canada. He cited a letter in which Charles Russell, the Canadian government's legal representative in London, had pointed out to the authorities at Rome regarding the Laurier-Greenway settlement: "We do not solicit His Holiness to sanction as perfect the concessions obtained, but that in his wisdom he will be pleased to regard them as the beginning of justice." What other conclusion was possible but that the scheme set afoot by Laurier and Mgr del Val in 1896 was now to be carried to its conclusion by Laurier and Mgr Sbaretti?³¹

Naturally the Conservative Opposition found such sensational claims by an influential member of the Manitoba Conservative Government convincing proof of a Laurier-Sbaretti conspiracy. The *Hamilton Spectator* called Laurier "a puppet in the hands of a foreign Dignitary who makes and unmakes Provinces as he pleases."³² The Government's critics were also able to adduce other evidence to support Rogers' charges. They pointed out that the *North West Review*, the journal of the English-speaking Catholics in Manitoba, and *Le Soleil*, an avowed organ of the Liberals in Quebec, had both argued that so long as Manitoba maintained its iniquitous school

²⁸Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1905, II, 3835.

²⁹*Ibid.* That Robert Rogers was using this information in a by-election campaign is no doubt worth mention (Morton, *Manitoba*, 292).

³⁰Morton, "The Manitoba Schools and Canadian Nationalism," 51-9.

³¹Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1905, II, 3837.

³²*Canadian Annual Review*, 1905, 97.

legislation it would deservedly remain the smallest western province.³³

Here certainly was grape-shot for a full-scale Opposition broadside on the Government's entire record on the Manitoba schools and more especially on its relations with the Roman Catholic Church. The chief contention was that the Papal Delegate had been sent to Canada in answer to a petition from the Laurier Government. His purpose, as W. F. MacLean put it, was to act as "an appanage of the Grit machine . . . the policeman with the big stick to discipline the Bishops and the clergy of the Roman Catholic Church. . . ." Since in interfering with matters of politics and government he had overstepped his jurisdiction, the Government must take the responsibility and have him recalled as it had had Lord Dundonald recalled.³⁴ This was a charge that stung.

Laurier's reply was that the charge of collusion between the Papal Delegate and himself had not "a shadow or tittle of truth in it." Furthermore he denied that his Government had invited the Apostolic Delegate to Canada in 1896: he had come on the invitation of a number of Roman Catholics, some of whom were members of the Government, to settle some difficulties that had arisen in the Roman Catholic Church, and not for any political purpose.³⁵

Mgr Sbarette was equally categorical in his denial of the charges made by "Bob" Rogers, or at least of the implications that had been drawn. In a public statement issued on April 6, he admitted having had an interview with Colin Campbell, the Manitoba Attorney General, but denied that the second minister was present. The subject of the discussion had been the Manitoba School Act, particularly its effect on Catholics in Winnipeg and Brandon. He admitted that he had suggested certain changes to remedy the situation that the Catholics in these centres found themselves in. He continued:

I urged my request on the ground of fairness and justice and, referring to the object of his mission to Ottawa, I remarked from the point of view of the Manitoba Government some action on these lines would be politically expedient and tend to facilitate the accomplishment of his object; inasmuch as Catholics in any territory which might be annexed to Manitoba would naturally object to losing the right to Separate Schools and to be subjected to the educational conditions which existed in Manitoba. . . .

The Federal Government had absolutely no knowledge of it. It was a private conversation and simply intended to express a suggestion and a desire that the

³³Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1905, II, 3940 and 3942.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 3863-986.

³⁵*Ibid.*, 3837-46.

condition of the Catholics in the respects mentioned should be improved. Any other assumption or interpretation is altogether unfounded. . . .³⁶

In the face of these denials it appeared that the Manitoba Minister had laboured mightily and brought forth a mouse. The members of the federal Opposition, with the fruitful field of the autonomy bills still stretching before them, dropped the Manitoba incident. In Manitoba, however, Premier Roblin's supporters continued to claim that Laurier's ambition was to force separate schools on the province until the day the Liberal Government left office.³⁷

Thus the evidence supports the conclusion that Rogers' charge in 1905 was baseless. Laurier had at no time encouraged the Papal Delegate in his belief that the proposed boundary extension afforded an opportunity to gain school concessions for the Catholics in Manitoba. In fact, as he had informed Mgr Sbaretti, he was not even prepared to consider the Manitoba boundary question in 1905. He explained to the House of Commons that Quebec, Ontario, and Saskatchewan were interested in the territory requested by Manitoba and they would have to be consulted.³⁸ That there was need for consultation is made evident by the fact that one Ontario member of the Laurier Government, Postmaster General Mulock, had made known his opposition to any division of territory that denied Ontario a port on Hudson Bay.³⁹ Thus the claim of Premier Roblin's biographer that the "circumstantial evidence" indicates that Laurier "would have made good Sbaretti's implied promise"⁴⁰ does not conform to the evidence. In discussing the matter with Mgr Sbaretti Laurier went no further than to agree to consider the suggestion, while at the same time offering strong objections to it. At no time did he hold out any hope that he would follow the Papal Delegate's suggestions, but rather discouraged this belief. There was justice in the exclamation of the Manitoba Liberal editor who wrote: "The Rogers' manifesto was as deliberate an attempt to dupe and gull the public as was ever played by a card-sharper or thimble rigger at a fair."⁴¹

The controversy which resulted from his intervention in the

³⁶*Canadian Annual Review*, 1905, 95-6.

³⁷Laurier Papers, 648, Laurier to J. W. Dafoe, Oct. 25, 1910; *Manitoba Free Press*, June 21, 1911.

³⁸Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1905, I, 1429-31.

³⁹Ontario, Public Archives, Whitney Papers, R. L. Borden to James Whitney, April 27, 1905.

⁴⁰H. R. Ross, *Thirty-five Years in the Limelight: Sir Rodmond P. Roblin and His Times* (Winnipeg, 1936), 126.

⁴¹*Manitoba Free Press*, April 7, 1908.

Manitoba boundary negotiations did not weaken Mgr Sbaretto's determination to press for the redress of Catholic educational grievances in Manitoba. The Papal Delegate knew his duty well and intended to pursue the school question with the persistence that was now all too familiar to Sir Wilfrid. Early in 1906 Mgr Sbaretto began new negotiations with school officials in Winnipeg. He soon appealed to Sir Wilfrid for help, claiming that "The Free Press and the Liberal party are trying to make political capital" out of the school question.⁴² Laurier immediately wrote to the newspaper's editor asking him "not to allow another school question to develop in Manitoba," and appealing for his assistance in the negotiations which were then in progress. The reply from Winnipeg gave little hope for success. Lack of confidence in Premier Roblin and Archbishop Langevin made the Manitoba Liberals reluctant to show their hand in the politically explosive educational question.⁴³ The negotiations failed.

In November, 1906, a conference was called in Ottawa among the governments interested in the disposition of the territory of Keewatin. Preparatory to the conference Laurier had consulted his Manitoba supporters, but they apparently had been unable to decide whether boundary extension would aid or deter the party interest in the province.⁴⁴ As the Apostolic Delegate was visiting Rome when the proposed conference was announced, his secretary wrote to remind Laurier of the Church's interest in the proceedings.⁴⁵ On the day the conference opened, Mgr Sbaretto informed Laurier that Cardinal Merry del Val and the authorities at Rome felt that the boundary negotiations offered an excellent opportunity to reopen the school question.⁴⁶

The conference had ended in disagreement over the territorial division before Laurier was able to find time to reply to the prelate. He now took the occasion to make explicit his views on the problems arising from Manitoba's territorial ambitions. The school question, he said, must be recognized as taking secondary place to the primary consideration which was Manitoba's just claim to a large portion of the territory of Keewatin. To attach any conditions to the transfer of these lands to Manitoba would at once place the minority in "a very invidious position," the position of opposing the almost unanimous

⁴²Laurier Papers, 402, Mgr Sbaretto to Laurier, Feb. 21, 1906.

⁴³*Ibid.*, 404, Laurier to J. W. Daffoe, Feb. 28, 1906, and reply, March 19, 1906.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 435, Laurier to E. Brown, Nov. 14, 1906.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 430, Rev. Alfred Sinnott to Laurier, Oct. 20, 1906.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 435, Mgr Sbaretto to Laurier, Nov. 11, 1906.

will of Manitoba. The existing school laws must apply to any new territory acquired by the province. Finally, he denied that the annexation of Keewatin to the Northwest Territories in 1905 had any bearing on the school question. This temporary arrangement had been made by his government for strictly administrative purposes.⁴⁷ Mgr Sbarette was unconvinced. He insisted that the attachment of Keewatin to the Northwest Territories brought the former area under the school laws of the territories which provided for separate schools. The Premier saw immediately that the adoption of this view would be an invitation to disaster. His critics would eagerly grasp the opportunity to attack him for having "purposely delayed the consideration of Manitoba's application for the purpose of altering the conditions then existing, and forcing upon Manitoba a restriction as to its power of legislation in matters of education."⁴⁸ Such evident duplicity would make his continuance in office impossible and abruptly end his usefulness to the Roman Catholics in Canada. In short Sir Wilfrid had decided that the school question could not be allowed to complicate the boundary extension negotiations. The door to further discussion remained ajar, as always, but the Premier's conviction was firm and unshakable. In this microcosmic conflict of empire and papacy, Sir Wilfrid was determined not to travel to Canossa.

In Manitoba as long as the boundary question remained unsettled the Roblin Government faced an Opposition that was seriously handicapped. Though it has been suggested that Laurier refused to offer Manitoba acceptable terms for boundary extension because his provincial allies did not want Roblin to obtain credit for the settlement,⁴⁹ the fact is that by 1907 the Manitoba Liberals wanted the question settled. They were finally convinced that a generous agreement would benefit their cause, if only by removing the matter from the realm of controversy.⁵⁰ Laurier was not to be rushed, however, and expressed the hope to the provincial party leader "that you will agree with me that there is no hurry" for a settlement.⁵¹

Whether the Prime Minister was temporizing because of the continued insistence of the Papal Delegate's demands is impossible to ascertain, but Mgr Sbarette was certainly far from convinced that Manitoba could not be forced to modify its school laws. He

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 438, Laurier to Mgr Sbarette, Dec. 10, 1906.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, 443, Mgr Sbarette to Laurier, Jan. 15, 1907, and reply, Feb. 2, 1907.

⁴⁹Ross, *Roblin*, 119.

⁵⁰Laurier Papers, 450, J. W. Dafoe to Laurier, Jan. 7, 1907; *ibid.*, Rev. Geo. Bryce to Laurier, Feb. 22, 1907; *ibid.*, 442, E. Brown to Laurier, Jan. 7, 1907.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 442, Laurier to E. Brown, Jan. 11, 1907.

refused to retreat from the position that it was the duty of the Laurier Government "to guarantee the said rights and I do not see how the Federal Government can fail to accomplish these obligations toward the minority,..."⁵²

In June, 1907, Laurier visited Mgr Sbaretti in Rome, but the changed surroundings failed to alter the views of either party.⁵³ Back in Ottawa in the autumn, however, the discussion moved on to a new level. Mgr Sbaretti was now temporarily willing to drop the discussion of abstract rights and duties, and to explore political considerations. This was the heart of the matter. The prelate argued that Sir Wilfrid's prestige would easily extinguish the sparks of opposition that would be generated if Manitoba were forced to modify her school laws. Similar sparks in 1905 had been prevented from bursting into a general conflagration. That Mgr Sbaretti's ability to estimate the combustibility of the school issue was limited by his zeal to win justice for the members of his church was evident from a new plan he put forward to protect the Keewatin Catholics. Since the school laws in Saskatchewan and Ontario were favourable to the minority, Keewatin should be divided between these two provinces and the boundaries of Manitoba left unchanged.⁵⁴

Sir Wilfrid knew that such a solution was unjust and impossible. Manitoba's right to the territory on its northern boundary was unquestionable. In a revealing reply Laurier offered an assessment of his strength and a statement of his first duty:

I have already, and at some length, given you the reasons which in my humble judgment render such action absolutely impossible. In our conversation last Sunday evening I again repeated them, and I must once more express my conviction that not only do I not think that even with the authority which I may have in the House, I could carry such a measure, but to attempt it would rouse such an agitation as would prove most dangerous to the welfare of this community. It was evident to me last Sunday that on this point I failed to convince Your Excellency. Your letter now makes this very plain.⁵⁵

The futile reiteration of arguments seemed to be growing tiresome to Sir Wilfrid. He wished to conclude the discussion. The school question was completely divorced from the boundaries and must be regarded as a separate issue. Now he would not even consider renewed negotiations with the Manitoba Government for he was convinced that "even with no opposition facing him, Mr. Roblin

⁵²*Ibid.*, 451, Mgr Sbaretti to Laurier, Jan. 11, 1907.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 465, Laurier to Mgr Sbaretti, June 1, 1907.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 475, Mgr. Sbaretti to Laurier, Aug. 27, 1907.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, Laurier to Mgr Sbaretti, Aug. 28, 1907.

would not undertake the task because opposition from within his party would crush him."⁵⁶

Yet Sir Wilfrid probably knew Mgr Sbaretti well enough to realize that this lengthy and completely unambiguous statement would not be convincing. The Speech from the Throne in December announced that Manitoba would be offered expanded boundaries. Before the House of Commons debated the question, Laurier informed the Papal Delegate that no limitation on Manitoba's jurisdiction over education was to be included in the proposed resolution. Mgr Sbaretti's reaction was one of "extreme displeasure."⁵⁷ When R. W. Scott, one of Laurier's Catholic colleagues, urged the Papal Delegate to accept the Prime Minister's view, he received an equally peremptory reply stating that the difference between the Government and the Church arose from judging the question by "a different criterion." He was left in no doubt as to which was the correct criterion.⁵⁸

The Government had settled on its policy. Although the weight of the Archbishop of Toronto was added in support of Mgr Sbaretti's opinion,⁵⁹ the Minister of Justice was instructed to prepare a resolution regarding the boundary extension which made no mention of the school question.⁶⁰ It is interesting to note that there was apprehension and suspicion in Manitoba Liberal circles about the intentions of the Prime Minister in the boundary matter. J. W. Dafoe, no doubt recalling the 1905 troubles, felt that the enigmatic Sir Wilfrid should be impressed with the extreme danger of attempting to force educational changes on Manitoba as part of a boundary extension deal. "It is impossible to see just what would happen should any such colossal blunder be made, but it would be an unrelieved disaster for Liberalism," he warned.⁶¹

The resolution setting out the terms offered to Manitoba for boundary extension, which left the financial terms unspecified, passed the House of Commons in July, 1908.⁶² No further action resulted, however, since Manitoba was not satisfied with the terms offered, although Premier Whitney thought that the territorial offer to Manitoba was generous.⁶³ The Roblin Government's demand for

⁵⁶*Ibid.*

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 495, Laurier to Mgr Sbaretti, Dec. 16, 1907, and reply, Dec. 16, 1907.

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 496, R. W. Scott to Mgr Sbaretti, Dec. 30, 1907; P.A.C., R. W. Scott Papers, 1, Mgr Sbaretti to R. W. Scott, Jan. 3, 1908.

⁵⁹Laurier Papers, 505, Archbishop McEvay to Laurier, Feb. 17, 1908.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 521, Laurier to A. B. Aylesworth, June 11, 1908.

⁶¹P.A.C., Sifton Papers, J. W. Dafoe to Sir Clifford Sifton, July 7, 1908.

⁶²Canada. House of Commons, *Debates*, 1907-8, VII, 12822.

⁶³Whitney Papers, James Whitney to Robert Rogers, July 16, 1908.

financial "equality" with the other western provinces was unacceptable to Ottawa.⁶⁴

Despite this failure Laurier decided early in 1909 to move from resolution to definite legislation in the Manitoba dispute. This was the cue for the Papal Delegate to make a new entrance. Negotiations were again afoot with the Manitoba Government and he requested more time. His mood was imperious: "If my hope is realized it may be subject to the reasonable condition that these amendments be asked for by you, and I do not see how you could possibly refuse to make a request which would be granted."⁶⁵

A distinct note of irritation now appeared in Laurier's attitude to the indomitable churchman's demands. In the first place the Prime Minister thoroughly distrusted Premier Roblin who was reported to have charged in a recent speech that Laurier intended to force Manitoba to re-establish separate schools.⁶⁶ Such demagoguery destroyed all hope for a negotiated agreement. What really stirred his anger, however, was Mgr Sbaretti's threat that if the Liberal Government did not meet the Church's requests, it would be "denounced" by Catholics. Laurier obviously resented the suggestion that he could be coerced: "The expression 'the Catholics' is rather vague, and I do not know exactly what it means, but without probing it in any way let me assure Your Excellency, that if my co-religionists withdraw from me the support with which they have hitherto honoured me, I will be quite ready to accept the defeat of the Government and to hand over to Mr. Borden the responsibility of administering this country."⁶⁷

It is probable that Sir Wilfrid felt some relief when Mgr Sbaretti left Canada early in 1910. Certainly the Prime Minister's stoic patience had been stretched almost to the limit at times in the years of dispute over the Manitoba school question. The reminders that he received during the closing period of the Liberal administration of the Church's continued interest in the Manitoba minority were indeed mild compared with Mgr Sbaretti's impatient demands.⁶⁸

Though Mgr Sbaretti had spoken to Laurier on behalf of all the Manitoba Catholics, this group was not in fact a united family.

⁶⁴*Canada, Sessional Papers*, no. 110a. For a critical analysis of the financial aspect of the whole question see J. W. Maxwell, *Federal Subsidies to Provincial Governments* (Cambridge, 1923), 128 ff.

⁶⁵Laurier Papers, 560, Mgr Sbaretti to Laurier, Feb. 14, 1909.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 554, D. A. Ross to Laurier, Jan. 11, 1909.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, 560, Laurier to Mgr Sbaretti, Feb. 16, 1909.

⁶⁸*Ibid.*, 650, Rev. Alfred Sinnott to Laurier, Nov. 14, 1910, and reply, Nov. 15, 1910.

Between the English-speaking Catholics in Manitoba and the hierarchy led by Mgr Langevin, there was little filial attachment. Many of the English Catholics felt that their failure to be released from the burden of double school taxation was chiefly due to the intransigence and impolitic behaviour of the St. Boniface Archbishop. In 1905 one group of non-French Catholics had publicly disapproved of their Archbishop's views on school policy.⁶⁹ This was a heresy which Mgr Langevin explained by the fact that the Irish Catholics were English speaking.⁷⁰ In the spring of 1909 when Laurier and Mgr Sbaretti were in the midst of their controversy, a leader of the Irish Catholic community in Winnipeg interviewed the Papal Delegate in an effort to explain the difficulties of the Catholic Church in Manitoba. Though Laurier was fully informed of the substance of the interview he probably had no part in initiating the mission. The chief complaint was that the Archbishop, who was regarded as the Catholic spokesman by Protestant Manitoba, was injuring the Church's cause in pressing extreme demands. Further harm was done by the fact that the St. Boniface prelate had allied himself to the Roblin Government because of an abiding distrust and even hatred of Sir Wilfrid. A simple, but far-reaching, solution was proposed: "I have pointed out to Your Excellency the necessity of appointing an English speaking Bishop in Winnipeg. Let us have a wise, prudent and conciliatory Churchman in Winnipeg and I confidently believe that the school trouble will be a thing of the past. Peace and harmony will reign where discord and bigotry now exist."⁷¹ Finally he warned against supporting the suggestion of the Archbishop that the boundary extension plan offered an opportunity to exact school concessions from the Manitoba Government. Public opinion in Manitoba would never agree to such a proposal. Whatever Mgr Sbaretti may have thought of this outspoken criticism of his Manitoba colleague, the proposed change in the hierarchy was not approved.

During the autumn of 1910 Laurier visited the West to feel the political pulse of the embattled prairie farmer. In Winnipeg a delegation of English-speaking Catholics asked him to approach the Roblin Government on their behalf. Sir Wilfrid's reply was that there had been no new indication that the provincial government was prepared to offer any solution to the school difficulties. On the contrary the question had been constantly treated as a political football in a game with rules so arbitrary that he dared not par-

⁶⁹Rumilly, *Histoire*, XII, 44.

⁷⁰Morice, *Mgr Langevin*, 275.

⁷¹Laurier Papers, 563, J. K. Barrett to Mgr Sbaretti, Feb. 28, 1909.

ticipate in it.⁷² Later in the year a representative of the same group reported to Laurier that, "The English speaking Catholics have thrown Archbishop Langevin, bag and baggage, overboard and have taken all their interests into their own hands." The Archbishop was accused of propagating the gospel according to Bourassa in Manitoba. In complete disgust, the English Catholics had devised a new approach to the school question. The plan was to form a bi-partisan committee to interview the Manitoba party leaders. Their offer would be to accept the Manitoba School Act, including a compulsory attendance clause, provided they were allowed to have Catholic teachers in their schools. Laurier was asked to obtain the support of his friends in the province in carrying out the plan.⁷³ The President of the Manitoba Liberal Association, who was aware of the English Catholics' plan, offered little hope of success. Since it was impossible to place any faith in the Roblin Government he could not see "how the Liberals in the House could make any arrangement before the concrete proposition was placed before them."⁷⁴ On the rocks of suspicion the new plan was wrecked.

The frustrations of the non-French Catholics in Manitoba apparently reached such a peak by the end of 1910 that they felt it necessary to make another appeal to higher authority. Since no successor had been appointed to replace Mgr Sbarette in Canada, a delegate of the Irish Catholics in Winnipeg journeyed to Washington to place their case before the Apostolic Delegate to the United States, Mgr Falconio. The Archbishop of St. Boniface and his priests, Mgr Falconio was told, were undermining the welfare of the Church in Manitoba by espousing the cause of French-Canadian nationalism. The indictment was severe:

Can Your Excellency realize what this means for the Church? While assiduously labouring to maintain this narrow nationalism in which Christ and his Church hold only a nominal priority, the Catholics in all other races are neglected and ignored. The whole national movement of which the Archbishop of St. Boniface is a leader, is not concerned in the interests of religion but is its deadly enemy. Two strong factors are its controlling motives—namely, political and national domination, and the Archbishop of St. Boniface is a past master in both these objects.⁷⁵

A request was made for the immediate despatch of a new Apostolic Delegate to Canada to avoid "anarchy and schism." Clearly the Roman Catholic Church was not the monolithic edifice that many

⁷²*Ibid.*, Winnipeg Delegation Re: Separate Schools, Sept. 4, 1910.

⁷³*Ibid.*, 654, J. K. Barrette to Laurier, Dec. 2, 1910. At the Eucharistic Conference in September, 1910, Mgr Langevin characterized as "le grand blessé de l'Ouest," had definitely identified himself with Henri Bourassa. (Rumilly, *Histoire*, XV, 111.)

⁷⁴Laurier Papers, 658, Frank Fowler to Laurier, Dec. 30, 1910.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 668, J. K. Barrette to The Most Reverend D. Falconio, March 1, 1911.

Protestants believed. It too had its divisions, and in Manitoba it was a bitter division.

When the campaigning for the 1911 election began, none of these questions which troubled the waters of Manitoba political and religious life had been settled. Manitoba remained the "postage stamp province"; the Winnipeg Catholics had obtained no relief from their burdensome tax load; Archbishop Langevin still reigned at St. Boniface. The events of the 1911 reciprocity election are well known. Manitoba returned eight supporters for the new Borden Government, a fact which caused Sir Wilfrid to comment bitterly: "Manitoba does not disappoint me because it is always the same in that province. It always shouts one way and votes the other."⁷⁶ This rancorous remark was not entirely justified. True, Manitoba farmers had "shouted" in chorus with other western farmers for a lower tariff, but the general treatment of Manitoba by the Liberal administration was not beyond reproach. The one large question which the Liberals had failed to answer was that concerning the boundaries. These remained unextended, and some Manitobans no doubt suspected that this fact was somehow connected with the ever present school question. It was only natural that in the election campaign the Conservatives, fearing the unpopularity of their stand on the trade question, should attempt to turn the minds of voters to issues on which the Liberals were more vulnerable. Mr. Borden, on his western tour during the spring recess of 1911, devoted at least one full speech in Manitoba to the boundary question. He promised a generous settlement if Manitobans gave him their support.⁷⁷ That it continued to be an issue throughout the campaign is suggested by the editorial page of the *Manitoba Free Press*. Although this Liberal journal attempted to keep attention focused on reciprocity, on several occasions it had to grapple with local Conservatives who were attempting to cloud the issue by introducing the boundary question.⁷⁸ It cannot be claimed that the boundary dispute was of primary importance in the 1911 election in Manitoba, but certainly it was a secondary issue capable of influencing doubtful voters. Manitobans had in the boundary question a legitimate grievance which the Liberals had been unable to redress. Sir Wilfrid had successfully staved off the demands of Mgr Sbarette only to be outmanœuvred by the Roblin-Rogers combination.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, 691, Laurier to Dr. J. H. King, Sept. 23, 1911.

⁷⁷*Manitoba Free Press*, June 21, 1911.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, Aug. 22, 1911 and Sept. 1, 1911. See also speech by Laurier, in Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1911-12, 111, 4359, in which he states that the Conservatives emphasized the boundary question in the 1911 election campaign in Manitoba.

It now remained for the new Conservative Government to prescribe a cure for the inferiority complex suffered by the diminutive western province. The new Government was soon made sharply aware of the pressures which had caused its predecessor to stumble in attempting to settle the boundary question. Indeed the composition of Borden's cabinet and party made the Keewatin problem an early test of the freshman Prime Minister's political skill. Two members of the cabinet, Frank Cochrane of Ontario and Robert Rogers of Manitoba, had come directly from the provincial cabinets most concerned about the territorial division. Prime Minister Borden owed a considerable debt of gratitude to the premiers of both these provinces for the position he now held, and could not afford to disappoint either of them. A consideration of no less importance was the fact that his Quebec supporters led by F. D. Monk, but inspired by the Nationalist promptings of Henri Bourassa, were keenly sensitive to the claims of the Catholic minority in Keewatin.⁷⁹

The haste with which Premier Roblin despatched his emissaries to Ottawa after the election to discuss boundary extension caused Premier Whitney some consternation.⁸⁰ The Ontario Premier's position was awkward. He felt that Premier Roblin was breaking faith with him in pressing the federal authorities to settle the question without first consulting Ontario. He had reason to be disgruntled, for under the Laurier régime he had agreed to a request from Robert Rogers to refrain from pressing for a settlement because Manitoba felt the time inopportune.⁸¹ His objective now was the same as it had been earlier—the port on Hudson Bay which the 1908 resolution had denied Ontario. In an election year it was important that this concession be granted as the local Liberal Opposition was asking embarrassing questions. The Ontario Premier was no amateur in the game of politics, and knew how to bargain for what he wanted:

You know very well that Ontario is not looking for territory [he told Frank Cochrane], and we are willing to do almost anything to avoid trouble and get a port. The matter has now arrived at such a stage that our political opponents accuse us of neglecting our duty, and although I shall be sorry to do so, yet if necessary I shall feel compelled to call on every one of the seventy-two government supporters from Ontario to take an active and individual part in assisting us in this matter.⁸²

⁷⁹See Heath McQuarrie, "The Formation of Borden's First Cabinet," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XXIII (Feb., 1957), 90-104, for an excellent discussion of the groups represented in Borden's cabinet.

⁸⁰Whitney Papers, James Whitney to Frank Cochrane, Nov. 17, 1911.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, James Whitney to Sir Lomer Gouin, Dec. 30, 1910, and James Whitney to Frank Cochrane, Dec. 14, 1911.

⁸²*Ibid.*, James Whitney to Frank Cochrane, Jan. 12, 1912, and James Whitney to R. L. Borden, Jan. 18, 1912.

Whitney was further disconcerted by the apparently unfounded claim of Robert Rogers, in November, 1911, that the question was settled. This bombshell burst right in the midst of the Ontario provincial election contest.⁸³ Borden knew that Whitney as well as Roblin had to be given satisfaction. Lengthy negotiations between Ottawa and Queen's Park resulted in a neat compromise which gave Ontario a right-of-way to build a railway to the ports of Churchill and Nelson in Manitoba territory.⁸⁴

Thus two of the interested parties had been appeased, but the third, the Keewatin minority and its parliamentary spokesmen, presented a more difficult problem. Mgr Langevin petitioned Borden to safeguard Catholic schools in Keewatin so that these rights would not be lost when Manitoba acquired the territory.⁸⁵ Bishop Charlebois of Keewatin made a similar plea, but the Prime Minister made no commitments.⁸⁶

The legislation providing for the territorial transfer came down to the House of Commons in February, 1912. Like Laurier's 1908 resolution it omitted any reference to the educational question. In the debate which ensued the Conservative-Nationalist alliance which had been so carefully forged in the 1911 election showed its first signs of strain. The official Liberal position was an attack on the financial terms. Sharpest criticism of the legislation, however, came from some of Borden's own supporters led by P. E. Lamarche, a Conservative of distinct Nationalist leanings. Lamarche expressed strong disapproval of the Government's failure to provide constitutional guarantees for Catholic schools in Keewatin. At the same time his ridicule of the Liberals' record on the Manitoba school question made it clear that he was deserting his allies without joining the enemy.⁸⁷ F. D. Monk, speaking for the Government, replied to the French-Canadian critics by declaring that the federal authorities could not force Manitoba to provide guarantees for separate schools which had no legal existence prior to the transfer.⁸⁸ Yet a faint spark of hope for the minority was ignited by the Prime Minister and two of the French-Canadian ministers, Monk, and L. P. Pelletier. Each of these speakers emphasized the view that the

⁸³*Ibid.*, James Whitney to Frank Cochrane, Jan. 12, 1912; *Manitoba Free Press*, Nov. 22, 1911.

⁸⁴Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1911-12, II, 3528.

⁸⁵P.A.C., Borden Papers, OCA 43, Archbishop Langevin to Borden, Jan. 29, 1912.

⁸⁶*Ibid.*, Borden to Archbishop Langevin, Feb. 3, 1912; Bishop Charlebois to Borden, Jan. 31, 1912, and reply, Feb. 14, 1912.

⁸⁷Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, 1911-12, II, 4406.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, 4417.

Manitoba Government could be depended upon to deal justly with the Catholic minority.⁸⁹

This was a vague promise, but events were moving in Manitoba in a way which seemed to give it substance. It was during the spring of 1912 that the Manitoba legislature adopted certain changes in the School Act which came to be known as the Coldwell amendments. Though these modifications were not free from ambiguity, they appeared to offer some relief to the Roman Catholics by permitting the separation of Protestant and Catholic children in the larger schools.⁹⁰ The origin of these amendments has always been a "mystery,"⁹¹ but a clue is found in a letter written by the Archbishop of St. Boniface to Col. Alphonse Audet, a Conservative party organizer in Montreal, who no doubt was in close touch with Borden's French-Canadian supporters. Mgr Langevin, on the advice of Audet, had proposed certain amendments to the School Act to Roblin and Rogers, and his suggestions had found acceptance. It had been agreed that the number of scholars required before a petition for a Catholic teacher could be presented should be reduced from forty to twenty-five. In addition the clause which prohibited the separation of pupils on religious lines was to be indirectly repealed. Mgr Langevin was jubilant, for this was only the beginning: "Roblin et ses partisans ont accepté cette dernière rédaction des clauses; mais il est bien entendu avec mes catholiques moi-même et Roblin que c'est un simple commencement de restauration de nos droits scolaires."⁹² Though disappointed by the performance of Monk and the French Conservatives in the Keewatin settlement, he was nevertheless very pleased that a gain had been made for his flock through these changes. The fact that this agreement was made and carried out at least partially vitiates the repeated claim made by Laurier and the Manitoba Liberals that the Roblin Government was insincere in its promises to the Manitoba Catholics.

More than merely providing a clue to the mystery of the Coldwell amendments Mgr Langevin's revelation seems to suggest the method by which the leaders of the Conservative party were able to maintain the support of the Quebec wing. Though the Keewatin legislation briefly disturbed party cohesion, the Coldwell amendments helped to set matters right. The key man in these events must have been Robert Rogers who could exert his influence at both

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 4420, 4444, 4492.

⁹⁰Morton, "The Manitoba Schools and Canadian Nationalism," 55.

⁹¹Morton, *Manitoba*, 325.

⁹²Archbishop Langevin to Colonel Alphonse Audet, 31 mars 1912 in L. Groulx, ed., "Correspondance Langevin-Audet," *Revue d'Histoire de l'Amérique Française*, I, (1947) 2, 277.

Ottawa and Winnipeg. Another incident which suggests that there was hard work being done to prevent any public breach in the Conservative ranks over the Manitoba school question was a banquet held in Winnipeg on April 12, 1912. Here again one suspects the hand of Rogers working to provide a public exhibition of Conservative party solidarity. The purpose of the celebration was to honour Premier Roblin for his successful settlement of the boundary extension question. In attendance were five notable French-Canadian politicians, led by the Nationalists, P. E. Lamarche, M.P., and Armande Lavergne. Dr. Eugene Paquet, M.P., J. H. Rainville, M.P. and Louis Coderre, M.P. filled out the complement.⁹³ The ghost of racial disharmony which had raised its ugly head in the Keewatin debate had been successfully excluded from the feast.

Thus the schism in the Borden coalition which had threatened as a result of the Manitoba school question had been averted. Premier Borden had successfully dealt with the first crisis of his administration and maintained racial harmony within his party, a task which was to become increasingly difficult for him. But while national unity had been preserved a price had to be paid, as is not an infrequent result when this principle is invoked in Canadian politics. As events transpired the long-suffering minority in Manitoba gained little from this compromise,⁹⁴ and their rights were soon further limited by a new educational enactment under the Norris Liberal administration.⁹⁵ In looking at the position of the minority at the end of these years it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that their interests ranked second to the exigencies of party politics. This was the despairing conclusion of the journal of the English-speaking Catholics in Manitoba: "The treatment that has been meted out to us in the last 22 years at the hands of this or that political party is guarantee enough that the future holds very little for us. When one party is willing to enact legislation to restore our Catholic schools, the other invariably refuses to fall in line and the efforts and good will of the first are thereby paralysed."⁹⁶

In justice to the politicians involved in these events, it should be added that it was the illiberality of the majority of the people in Manitoba that made this political game possible. Faced with an electorate which refused to accept cultural duality, the politicians readily succumbed to the temptation to sacrifice minority rights on the altar of political success.

⁹³Ross, *Roblin*, 132; Rumilly, *Histoire*, XVII, 95.

⁹⁴*Canadian Annual Review*, 1913, 562-3.

⁹⁵Morton, *Manitoba*, 351.

⁹⁶*North West Review*, March 2, 1912.

THE CREATION OF A MYTH: "CANADIAN" ENLISTMENTS IN THE NORTHERN ARMIES DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

ROBIN W. WINKS

IT is commonplace to speak of Canadian-American relations in terms of an "unguarded frontier" in "a century of peace." Under the impact of the growing liberal interpretation of history it has become a textbook cliché that these two nations have been "good neighbours" for nearly a hundred and fifty years. Although Colonel C. P. Stacey demonstrated in 1950 that this tradition could not stand the test of historical scholarship,¹ many of the historical interpretations which have drawn their inspiration from this mythological century still remain to be challenged.

While it is admitted by many scholars that the "century of peace" was marred by several inharmonious incidents, these incidents frequently are viewed as exotic exceptions to an otherwise placid scene. Even the period of the American Civil War, which ended with Congressional abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 owing to Northern hostility to British North America, is said to be a time in which ultimate proof may be found that British North America looked with favour on the Federal Union. A number of writers have contended that, despite the evident anti-British feeling manifested by the Yankee, the British North American did not return this hostility, and that he remained, except for a short period of time, pro-Northern throughout the war. That the British North American was pro-Northern, and by inference therefore unjustly treated by the North in the matter of the reciprocity treaty, has wide acceptance. That the treatment was unjust follows from the contention that the British North American remained pro-Northern even when being vilified by Northern newspapers. In turn, this contention is supported—or the contrary argument that British North America was anti-Northern is refuted—in the words of the Canadian historian George Parkin, by the "presence of forty thousand soldiers of Canadian blood in the armies of the North."² Quite obviously, if this number of Canadians fought with the North, "because they believed their cause was just," as Wilfrid Bovey

¹"The Myth of the Unguarded Frontier, 1815-1871," *American Historical Review*, LVI (Oct., 1950), 1-18.

²*Sir John A. Macdonald* (Toronto, 1912), 99.

would have it,³ there is a strong case for the contention that British North America was pro-Northern during the war, thereby standing by the American nation in its hour of peril.

It is impossible to declare with any exactness how much public opinion in the British North American provinces favoured either the North or the South during the Civil War. The generally accepted pattern is that the North had the sympathy of the provinces during the secession crisis and for the first months of Lincoln's administration,⁴ and most sources, contemporary and scholarly, agree that public opinion began to change by early summer of 1861 because of Lincoln's failure to declare a war on slavery. The Northern loss at Bull Run quickened the current and the *Trent* affair produced a period of anti-Northern sentiment. There is disagreement as to whether public opinion, always highly mercurial, returned to its original pro-Northern position by 1863, following the enunciation of the Emancipation Proclamation. The only scholarly study of the subject concluded that this was the case,⁵ while a number of semi-popular Canadian writers have contended that public opinion thereafter was "almost universally with the south."⁶ The present writer

³"Confederate Agents in Canada during the American Civil War," *Canadian Historical Review*, II (March, 1921), 57.

⁴Thomas H. Raddall, *Halifax: Warden of the North* (London, 1950), 204, for Nova Scotia; Gertrude Gunn, "New Brunswick Opinion on the American Civil War" (Master's thesis, University of New Brunswick, 1956), 184-6, for that province; James M. Callahan, *American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations* (New York, 1937), 270, for the Canadas; and L. E. F. English, Curator of The Newfoundland Museum, St. John's, to writer, Feb. 17, 1956.

⁵Helen G. Macdonald, *Canadian Public Opinion on the American Civil War* (New York, 1926), *passim*, deals with all of British North America save the far west and Newfoundland, despite the title. This work makes use of some two dozen British North American newspapers as its chief source. Most of the British, Canadian, and American diplomatic correspondence and many of the collections of the letters of statesmen apparently were not available to Miss Macdonald. A recent study of this same period—David Fred Hill, "Some Aspects of the Rise of Canadian Nationalism, 1858-1865: A Study of Public Opinion with Special Reference to the Influence of the United States" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California, 1955)—accepts Macdonald's conclusions as "established" (175 n.7). and on the basis of some two dozen Canadian (not Maritime) newspapers attempts to support her conclusions. See also Louisa W. Peat, *Canada: New World Power* (New York, 1945), 53, and A. P. Cockburn, *Political Annals of Canada* (Toronto, 1905), 378.

⁶The wording is Joseph W. Bailey's, *Loring Woart Bailey: The Story of a Man of Science* (Saint John, 1925), 38. Others who support this contention include Hector W. Charlesworth, *Candid Chronicles: Leaves from the Note Book of a Canadian Journalist* (Toronto, 1925), 10; W. H. Atherton, *Montreal, 1534-1914* (Montreal, 1914), II, 210; A. M. Ross, *Recollections and Experiences of an Abolitionist, from 1855 to 1865* (Toronto, 1875), 125; and John Buchan, ed., *British America* (Boston 1923), 109. One writer has professed to find that the intensity of feeling varied according to proximity to the American border (Mabel Burkholder, *The Story of Hamilton* (Hamilton, 1938), 143). In 1864 Samuel Medary, editor of the *Columbus*

would contend that this pattern is in error in several important particulars.

Public opinion cannot be classified so exactly. The human desire to find a label and even a statistic for every sentiment conspires against impartiality. From the sources now available, newspapers, diaries, private letters, and public speeches, the present writer would contend only that, contrary to previous findings, general public opinion probably was somewhat more anti-Northern than anti-Southern, that a major portion of the British North American press was outspoken in its anti-Northern sentiments, and that to the Northern states at the time British North America must have seemed predominantly pro-Southern since the conservative press, which disliked Yankee ways, was—with the notable exception of the *Toronto Globe*—more vocal than the liberal press. It is a sophomorphism of diplomatic history to point out that what the American people believed to be true of the provinces was of greater practical importance at the time than what may have been the actual truth. If, as has been contended by many scholars, only the dress circle of British society was pro-Southern while the gallery favoured the more democratic North, it must be remembered that "the children of the gods" do not hold the socially influential tickets.

In the course of questioning previous assertions that the British North American was pro-Northern, it is necessary to examine the validity of the assertion that several thousand "Canadians" served with the Northern armies. Having concluded from other evidence that the former assertion is incorrect, the author would attempt to demonstrate in this paper that the latter assertion, which is the basic foundation stone for the "pro-Northern view," is not capable of proof and is highly doubtful. In so doing he hopes that he may demonstrate how an historical myth can grow through accretion and through uncritical acceptance of scholarly apparatus, so that it will be possible to entertain large doubts concerning the Canadian contention that the American Civil War represents the greatest British North American military effort prior to World War I.

There is no general agreement on how many British North Americans served with the Northern armies. The most commonly accepted figures are the previously cited forty thousand,⁷ forty-eight

(O.) *Crisis*, an anti-Lincoln paper, claimed that 75 per cent of all Canadians sympathized with the South (Nov. 23, 1864).

⁷This figure is quoted as proof of Canadian friendship in Fred Landon, "Canadian Opinion of Southern Secession, 1860-61," *Canadian Historical Review*, I (Sept., 1920), 266; Landon, "The Fugitive Slave Law and the Detroit River Frontier,"

thousand,⁸ or fifty-three thousand,⁹ with various other estimates ranging from one hundred thousand¹⁰ to somewhat less than forty thousand.¹¹ In the citing of these figures there is considerable confusion in the use of the terms "Canadian" and "British North American," although most writers appear to mean the latter while speaking in terms of the former. To separate those writers who use both terms correctly, the former referring only to men from the two

Detroit Historical Society, *Bulletin*, VII (Nov., 1950), 7-8; and Jean C. Schwab, "Migration between Canada and the United States with Particular Reference to Professional and Intellectual Classes" (Master's thesis, McGill, 1932), 9. The same figure also is given in Samuel E. Moffett, *The Americanization of Canada* (New York, 1907), 82; Landon, *Western Ontario and the American Frontier* (New Haven, 1941), 255; Oscar D. Skelton, *Life and Times of Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt* (Toronto, 1920), 32; Pierre Sébilleau, *Le Canada et la Doctrine de Monroe* (Paris, 1937), 70; G. P. deT. Glazebrook, *A Short History of Canada* (Oxford, 1950), 146; Parkin, *Sir John A. Macdonald*, 99; and others. Ella Lonn, *Foreigners in the Confederacy* (Chapel Hill, 1940), 209, says the figure is an exaggeration.

⁸See, for example, Bovey, "Confederate Agents in Canada," 57; Hye Bossin, "The Lincolnian Heritage," *Canadian Film Weekly*, XIX (Feb. 3, 1954), 4; Bossin, "Mr. Lincoln's Forgotten Friend," *ibid.*, XXI (Feb. 8, 1956), 4; and Macdonald, *Canadian Public Opinion*, 80.

⁹Benjamin Apthorp Gould, *Investigations in the Military and Anthropological Statistics of American Soldiers* (New York, 1869), 27, is the original authority for the figure. It is quoted in Ella Lonn, *Foreigners in the Union Army and Navy* (Baton Rouge, 1951), 57, with caution; in John B. Brebner, *North Atlantic Triangle* (New Haven, 1945), 161; Marcus L. Hansen and Brebner, *The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples* (New Haven, 1940), 146; and Edward W. Thomson, *Old Man Savarin and Other Stories: Tales of Canada and Canadians* (New York, 1917), 197. In round numbers the figure is cited in George Gale, *Historic Tales of Old Quebec* (Quebec, 1920), 49.

¹⁰Charlesworth, *Candid Chronicles*, 10-11.

¹¹Speaking in Detroit in 1865 Joseph Howe said 50,000, in Joseph A. Chisholm, ed., *Speeches and Public Letters of Joseph Howe* (Halifax, 1909), II, 453; Sir Richard Cartwright says "between forty and fifty thousand," in *Reminiscences* (Toronto, 1911), 24; Hye Bossin says that 50,000 served and 18,000 died, in *In the Spirit of Abraham Lincoln* (Hamilton, 1954), 1; E.-Z. Massicotte, says 40,000 enlisted and 18,000 died, in "Les Canadiens et la Guerre de Sécession," *Bulletin des recherches historiques*, XLII (Sept., 1936), 538; Fred Landon says "thousands," in "Canadian Opinion of Abraham Lincoln," *Dalhousie Review*, II (Oct., 1922), 330; and W. F. Raney cites 40-50,000, in "Recruiting and Crimping in Canada for the Northern Forces, 1861-5," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, X (June, 1923), 32, n. 52. Thomas Raddall says that 10,000 Nova Scotians alone served for the North (Halifax, 208).

See also Edouard Fecteau, *French Contributions to America* (Methuen, Mass., 1945), 118; Lionel A. Lapointe, "Les Canadiens-français et le guerre de Sécession," *Bulletin des recherches historiques*, XLII (Nov., 1936), 684; Emil Falardeau, "Les Canadiens-français et la guerre de Sécession," *ibid.*, XXXII (Sept., 1926), 566; Alexandre Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine* (Worcester, 1911), 414; Fournet Desrosiers, *La Race française en Amérique* (Montreal, 1910), 218; Patrick Theriault, *Histoire du Madawaska* (Quebec, 1920), 254; and J. M. Gibbon, *Canadian Mosaic: The Making of a Modern Nation* (New York, 1939), 15.

Canadas and the latter to men from all of the British provinces, from those who use them interchangeably is an impossible task. Imprecision in expression seems to accompany imprecision in the use of statistical data, and uncritical acceptance of statistics walks hand in hand with uncritical acceptance of undocumented assertions.¹² An examination of the source of these statistics is in order.

I

In February, 1865, two months before the end of the Civil War, l'abbé Hercule Beaudry, parish priest of St-Constant, Canada East, a village a few miles south of Montreal, delivered a funeral oration at the dedication of a memorial in Montreal to the French Canadians who had died while serving in the Northern armies. In his address Father Beaudry declared that forty thousand "Canadiens-français" had fought under the American flag and that fourteen thousand were buried in that foreign land.¹³ He did not give any source for the figure which he cited¹⁴ nor did he distinguish between residents or even citizens, of French descent, of the United States.

The fact that the abbé was speaking exclusively of the French-Canadian people, and that he probably intended to include those who lived in the United States as well as those who lived in the British provinces, was dropped from sight. So, too, was the fact that his oration was made during an emotional occasion when it would be quite natural to exaggerate a figure which would embody a quantitative measurement of patriotism and courage in the minds of many of his listeners. The abbé could have had no firm foundation upon which to base what was undoubtedly an estimate, for it was not until 1869 that any detailed analysis of enlistment in the

¹²What may be one example of this type of thought appears in Jay Monaghan, *Diplomat in Carpet Slippers* (Indianapolis, 1945), 398, where the author states that President Lincoln knew that Canada was pro-Northern because he knew of thirty-five thousand Canadian enlistments. It is difficult to see how Lincoln could have known of such enlistments, even if they had taken place, for enlistment figures were not available until after his death. In addition, his Secretary of State, William H. Seward, was receiving daily reports from consuls and other agents in British North America which almost unanimously agreed that sentiment in their areas was anti-Northern.

¹³"Blondel," "Les Canadiens-français et la guerre de sécession américaine," *Bulletin des recherches historiques*, XXXII (July, 1926), 439; Pierre-Georges Roy, *ibid.*, XLII (Sept., 1936), 538.

¹⁴The present writer has been unable to ascertain Beaudry's source of information. Nor has Gabriel Nadeau of the Massachusetts Department of Health, who has attempted to verify Beaudry's figure, been successful (Nadeau to writer, Rutland, Mass., July 24, 1956).

Northern armies was released. Nevertheless, Beaudry's speech was given wide publicity, and through its repetitions in the Canadian press, it eventually was transmuted into something quite different: a popular legend that forty thousand "Canadians" had served in the Northern armies.

In February, 1865, the people of British North America again were worried that Federal troops might invade the provinces. The situation was more tense than at any time since the *Trent* affair, for the Civil War at last was clearly nearing its end. For two years the people of the North had been subjected to ineffectual but annoying Confederate raids originating on British North American soil. The deposition of the Confederate prisoners captured by Canadian authorities following the St. Albans raid of the previous autumn was still in doubt, and an urge to retaliate against Canada was evident along parts of the border, as well as in the principal Northern newspapers. Prime Minister John A. Macdonald was sufficiently fearful of an American attack to take the precaution of sending a special detective force into the border communities of Canada West to watch for Fenian activity. Under these circumstances it is natural that the abbé's patriotic guess work would be translated into an exact statistic which would purport to show the people of the North that "Canadians" had been, in fact, so sympathetic to the Union cause as to send fourteen thousand of their sons to death defending it.

John A. Macdonald apparently appropriated Beaudry's statistic, possibly because of its value as propaganda. In 1904 the British historian Goldwin Smith, who had renounced Oxford for Cornell and then Toronto, wrote to a friend that Macdonald had told him at an unspecified time that he had ascertained the extent of British North American enlistment in the Northern armies. According to Smith's recollection, Macdonald had said that forty thousand British Canadians had served the North. However, Macdonald apparently did not tell Smith how he obtained his figure,¹⁵ for Smith did not pass a citation of source on to his friend, something which, as an historian, he probably would have done had he been in possession of such information. There is no record of any inquiries from Canadian officials concerning Civil War enlistments in the

¹⁵Arnold Haultain, ed., *A Selection from Goldwin Smith's Correspondence* (New York, 1913), 414; Smith to [Charles Frederic] Moberly Bell, Toronto, Sept. 2, 1904. Smith, then eighty-one, also cited, as proof of Macdonald's statement, the fact that a substantial portion of the American pension list came to Canada.

Adjutant-General's records in Washington,¹⁶ and even if Macdonald had attempted to get such information from the United States he could not have obtained an accurate estimate, as will be demonstrated shortly. Even yet no nationality statistics concerning enlistments in the Northern armies which can make any claim to accuracy have been compiled, and the general figures which were released in 1898 came after Macdonald's death. There were no means by which any records in the provinces could have been compiled, for all who enlisted with the North were violating the British Foreign Enlistment Act, and they were unlikely to publicize their enlistment beyond the extent which gossip would naturally provide.

Smith came to Toronto to live in 1871, the year of the negotiations for the Treaty of Washington, in which Macdonald played a prominent part. Macdonald could not have told Smith of such enlistments until 1871, but it is quite possible that he did so at that time, for the two men were thrown into contact at several public functions. The Prime Minister quite rightfully could fear that his known anti-American sentiments during the Civil War would react against him in the negotiations in Washington. Smith, widely known for his pro-American views, as well as for his voluminous writing for the magazine press, was an excellent broadcasting device to send abroad the information that Canada had supported the North, and Macdonald may well have used him for this purpose in order to strengthen his bargaining position at Washington. When the clouds of World War I were forming, Smith's correspondence was published, thus making public Macdonald's assertion.

Between 1906 and 1920 the Beaudry-Macdonald statistic was elevated to the dignity of recorded history. In 1906, while delivering a highly emotional, "blood-is-thicker-than-water" speech to the Canadian Club of Toronto, Andrew Carnegie, of British birth, declared that there could be no Canadian-American quarrel, the renewed reciprocity controversy to the contrary, since "Canada" had sent forty-two thousand men into the Civil War.¹⁷ While

¹⁶United States, National Archives, State Department, Consular Dispatches, Toronto, 1865-71, Index; *ibid.*, Quebec; *ibid.*, Montreal; War Department: Dept. of the East, XC, 1865; *ibid.*, Gen'l. Info. Recs., Index to Canada; *ibid.*, "Passports"; *ibid.*, Foreign Affairs, Notes from the British Legation, Index, 1861-71; *ibid.*, Notes to the British Legation.

¹⁷Carnegie was introduced to the meeting by Goldwin Smith. Where the noted industrialist found two thousand men to add to the figure which Smith probably gave him he did not say, although they may have represented an allowance for the South. Again, this was a crucial and emotional time in Canadian-American relations, for the reciprocity issue was very much in the news. See Carnegie, "Anglo-American Relations," in Canadian Club of Ottawa, *Addresses*, 1903-09, pp. 97-9.

Carnegie omitted this statistic in a similar speech to the Canadian Club of Ottawa, and while he omitted to explain how he obtained his figure, it would appear that it is a slight modification of the Beaudry-Macdonald statistic. Thereafter, in 1920, two noted Canadian historians, Oscar Skelton¹⁸ and Fred Landon,¹⁹ the latter then and since Canada's leading authority on the Civil War, cited this figure without reference to a source. Since Arnold Haultain's edition of the correspondence of Goldwin Smith preceded the works of Skelton and Landon into print, they presumably obtained their information from Smith. All subsequent references to this figure have been taken from Landon or Skelton, despite the fact that neither documented his statement. Thus, the structure upon which this statistic, and its concomitant implication that British North America was pro-Northern during the Civil War, a conclusion which Landon makes explicit elsewhere by using precisely this figure,²⁰ when traced back through the secondary works which have used it, is found to be supported by a funeral oration delivered on an emotional occasion before the war was over and by a statement remembered in old age of what a shrewd and publicity-conscious politician had said.²¹

The second commonly accepted statistic, that of forty-eight thousand who served, of whom eighteen thousand died, is based upon even flimsier evidence. A number of textbooks have used this figure, as have several general or popular histories of Canada. One such history, Stephen Leacock's account for the House of Seagram, while admittedly not a scholarly history, is typical of these. Leacock asserts that "at least 50,000 British-Americans" served the North.²² As his reference, he cites a monograph by Helen Macdonald, which, upon being checked, says not 50,000 but 48,000.²³ Miss Macdonald, in turn, cites an article by Wilfrid Bovey. A check of this article, which is replete with errors, shows that after recounting the sorry tale of crimping along the border during the war, Colonel Bovey wishes, as he confesses, to find "a relief" in the contemplation of the

¹⁸Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt, 321.

¹⁹"Canadian Opinion of Southern Secession," 266.

²⁰*Ibid.*, and "The Fugitive Slave Law," 7-8.

²¹Miss Macdonald incorrectly infers that Smith's paraphrase is a direct quotation, and adds that John A. Macdonald "surely possessed sufficient data," which is citation by authority. She cites this figure to support her contention that George Brown was successful in arousing "considerable Northern sympathy" through his *Toronto Globe*, but sympathy and enlistment are two different things.

²²*Canada: The Foundations of Its Future* (Montreal, 1941), 145.

²³Macdonald, *Canadian Public Opinion*, 80. Miss Macdonald is in error as to Bovey's name.

forty-eight thousand Canadians who enlisted with the North. Bovey asserts this as a fact, however, without any indication of his source.²⁴ Thus, a second statistic is found to be unsupported by documentary evidence.²⁵

This charge cannot be brought against the third commonly cited statistic, however. It would, at first glance, appear to have official support, and it has the virtue of an exactness which will win credence where an obvious estimate will not. This figure, 53,532, is derived from the work of a prominent mathematician and astronomer, Benjamin Apthorp Gould. In his *Investigations in the Military and Anthropological Statistics of American Soldiers*, published in New York by the United States Sanitary Commission in 1869, Gould presented this figure in terms of "British North Americans" who served in the Federal armies.

Gould's statistic has been cited frequently in the standard secondary works, and it is, of course, possible that Macdonald used this figure, reduced to forty thousand to eliminate the other provinces, rather than Beaudry's estimate, as his source. Gould, who was the actuary to the Sanitary Commission from July, 1864, to the end of the war, based his estimates on such meagre evidence, however, as to leave his conclusions virtually useless. No records of birthplace or parentage were kept when men first enlisted in the armies. Not until the war was well along was information concerning the state of one's birth requested on enlistment forms. When such information at last was requested, many recruiting agents filled in the forms with haphazard guesses of their own. Sometimes, in order to fill state or town quotas or in connection with state and county aid, this information was changed or falsified by the recruiter.²⁶ Gould could have obtained little accurate information concerning nativity from such records. In addition, inter-departmental rivalry led to the

²⁴Bovey, "Confederate Agents in Canada," 57.

²⁵These figures seem not to have been compared with the available statistics for total enlistments. Casting the figure of forty-eight thousand who served and eighteen thousand who died against the admittedly inaccurate totals in Frederick Phisterer, *Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States* (New York, 1883), one finds that while 7 per cent of the Northern forces were "Canadian," 17 per cent of the Northern dead were of this nationality, an unlikely assertion. In addition, while roughly 10 per cent of all Northern soldiers died during the war, the figures would contend that 40 per cent of the "Canadians" who served died. It seems most unlikely that the "Canadian" death rate would run four times higher than the Northern death rate.

²⁶See J. D. O'Connell, letter to the editor, *New York Sun*, Dec. 13, 1896, "Bogus Statistics Regarding the Union Troops," for an account by one of Gould's assistants.

closing of the records of the Surgeon-General's office and later of the records of the Adjutant-General to Gould.²⁷

To overcome this handicap and the general inadequacy of the records, Gould sent questionnaires to one thousand officers, asking them to estimate the nativities of their respective regiments. The questionnaires were answered by such generalizations as, "¼ American, other ¼ Irish, and German, and a few English and Scotch." Only three hundred and fifty of the officers answered, and on the basis of a ratio which he established from these vague replies, Gould established a ratio for all other regiments upon the assumption that it would remain constant. Applying this ratio to total enlistments Gould arrived at the interesting statistic that 2.65 per cent of the total Northern forces were "Canadian," a term which he did not define in this case. This, he said, indicated 53,532 men.²⁸

The lack of scientific accuracy in this method needs no further comment. When he released his figures Gould, who felt that he was not qualified for his post, added that they were based on "inferences" and called attention to their many inaccuracies.²⁹ However, the encyclopaedias, almanacs, after-dinner speeches, newspapers, and articles in which these statistics were quoted apparently omitted Gould's lines of caution. This was true despite the fact that when Frederick Phisterer, who had far more data available than did Gould, published his *Statistical Record* in 1883, he declared that, "To give the number of individual persons who served in the army during the war is not practicable" and that it was "not practicable to ascertain" the total number of deaths.³⁰

There have been, of course, several other figures offered to fill the statistical vacuum which man, like nature, apparently abhors. Joseph Howe, British North American Fisheries Commissioner during most of the Civil War and a former Prime Minister of Nova Scotia, was also among the colonial politicians who derived a figure on enlistment from some unstated source and turned it to propagandistic advantage. While speaking before the assembled delegates to the Detroit Convention on reciprocity in 1865, Howe declared that fifty thousand British North Americans had served for the blue and that his own son was among them. This figure also received considerable prominence in the press, although it did not achieve the

²⁷George C. Comstock, "Benjamin Apthorp Gould," in *National Academy of Sciences, Memoirs*, XVII (1924), 162.

²⁸Gould, *Investigations*, 27.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 5.

³⁰Phisterer, *Statistical Records*, 11, 70.

popular acceptance of the other statistics.³¹ Howe's speech was an extremely effective effort to persuade the anti-reciprocity American delegations to support renewal of the treaty. Emotion conveniently overcame Howe as he mentioned his son's service, the assembled delegates cheered him to the echo, and as he spoke of the fifty thousand Canadians who served, they stood on their chairs to give him an ovation. The speech, the finest he ever made, swayed the convention and resulted in an unexpected resolution in favour of renewal of the treaty.³²

Finally, another such figure, which has had some degree of acceptance, must be examined. In 1893 at a meeting of French-Canadian Civil War veterans held in Montreal, a former member of the Tenth Vermont Regiment, Jean-Baptiste Rouillard, who for ten years had been an outspoken *annexioniste*, spoke of his experiences in the Battle of Winchester. To support his contention that French Canadians were pro-Northern during the Civil War, despite abundant evidence in the urban centres of Canada East to the contrary, Rouillard said that forty-three thousand French Canadians served in the Northern armies.³³ He did not distinguish between French Canadians from British North America and French Canadians from the United States, and he did not tell his audience how he obtained his information. Thereafter the meeting became increasingly emotional as author-poet Rémi Tremblay recited his poem, "*Le Drapeau du 14^e*," dedicated to his former regiment. Rouillard's figure has since appeared in print as though its accuracy were unquestioned.

In 1896 the United States Record and Pension Office issued two brief memoranda, both of which generally have been overlooked

³¹P.A.C., Howe Papers, Vol. A, Howe to wife Sarah, Halifax, Dec. 10, 1865; *ibid.*, Vol. 4, Bruce to Howe, July 19, 1865, 39-41, and July 25, 1865, 43-5; *ibid.*, Lyons to Howe, Sept. 14, 1865, 58-61; *ibid.*, Vol. 8, Howe to Bruce, July 15, 1865, 591-5; *ibid.*, Memorandum by Howe's son, n.d., pp. 232-51. Library of Congress, Chandler Papers, 3, Seward to Chandler, Aug. 8, 1865. P.A.C., John A. Macdonald Papers, 191, Brydges to Macdonald, Montreal, private, July 17, 1865, 60-9; *ibid.*, 258, Rose to Macdonald, July 15, 1865, 8-10. Consular Dispatches, Quebec, II, Gurley to Seward, no. 13, July 19, 1865, 54-5; Consular Dispatches, Montreal, VII, Potter to Seward, no. 218, June 26, 1865, and no. 226, July 31, 1865; *ibid.*, VIII, Potter to Seward, no. 233, Aug. 13, 1865, and no. 234, Aug. 23, 1865.

Toronto *Leader*, July 22, 1865; New York *Tribune*, July 18, 20, 1865; Detroit *Free Press*, Aug. 6, 22, 1865; New York *Times*, July 17-22, 1865; Chicago *Tribune*, July 24, 27, Aug. 3, 4, 1865; Toronto *Globe*, July 14, 21, 1865; *The Times* (London), Aug. 1, 1865.

³²The speech is printed in full in George Fenety, *Life and Times of the Hon. Joseph Howe* (Saint John, 1896), 314-35, and is quoted in Chisholm, ed., *Speeches and Letters of Joseph Howe*, II, 453.

³³Rouillard, *Annexion, Conférence, L'Union continentale* (Montreal, 1893), 16.

by historians. One,³⁴ relating to deserters, declared that published statements showing the percentage of deserters by nativity were entitled to no credence whatever.³⁵ The second,³⁶ relating to the nativity of soldiers, added that, "No compilation has ever been made by this [War] Department showing the nativity of the whole number of men accepted for military service during the late civil war."

However, as a rough figure for comparative purposes, the latter memorandum listed the nativity of 343,754 drafted men, recruits and substitutes, examined by the several boards of enrolment during the war, as taken from the records of the Provost-Marshall-General's Bureau. "British America" was accorded 15,507, and this included all examined, both accepted and rejected. A second figure also was offered, on the basis of medical statistics, which was compiled from the records of the same bureau in 1875 by Colonel J. H. Baxter, Chief Medical Purveyor of the army. Of 501,068 men examined by the boards of enrolment subsequent to September 1, 1864, he arrived at the figure of 21,645 for British America. Of the total, but 338,248 were accepted in the army, and this figure was not broken down into nativities. The memorandum concluded that "no satisfactory or reliable deductions can be made by applying the ratios obtained from either of these compilations to the total number of men serving in the army."

II

Another area of confusion is in the use of the term "Canadian." In particular, if one uses the term "French Canadian" in the sense which Beaudry very possibly meant, his statistic may quite well be accurate. His original reference must have been to the French Canadians *in toto*, including those who were United States citizens. It probably did not refer exclusively to residents of British North America. The French Canadians, determined to maintain *survivance* whether they live in the United States or in Canada East, have tended to view themselves as an international unit. Cultural survival rather than assimilation has been their goal. The French Canadian who came to live in the United States did not, as a rule, take out

³⁴"Memorandum Relative to the Nativity of Deserters in the United States Army during the War of the Rebellion," in National Archives, War Records, Record Group 94, Statistics, Gen'l. Info. Recs., "Nationality of Soldiers," no. 1362.

³⁵The Presque Isle (Me.) *Loyal Sunrise* complained that too many French Canadians deserted on the battlefield (Jan. 25, 1865).

³⁶"Memorandum Relative to the Nativity of Soldiers in the United States Army during the War of the Rebellion," in National Archives, War Records, R.G. 94.

American citizenship during the nineteenth century.³⁷ Thus, although many of the French Canadians had been living in New England for several years, they still were viewed as "French-Canadian" rather than "American" or "Yankee" both by themselves and by their recruiting officers. The British North American provinces can hardly be given credit for furnishing men who came to the United States to work long before the Civil War and who were, like most Northerners, conscripted into the army. In this respect it is especially interesting to note how many of the French Canadians were said to have "joined" the army in 1863—a heavy draft year.

Most of the French Canadians who enlisted probably were from New England, not from British North America. Canada East generally was pro-Southern in its outlook and while many young Canadians undoubtedly did come to the United States specifically to enlist in the armies, most of the alleged forty thousand or more "Canadians" who enlisted probably were third and even fourth generation French-Canadian Americans. Again, no accurate figures on French-Canadian, or "Franco-American," enlistments are available, and a close study of the enlistment records themselves does not help the researcher. The officers who made the lists were often ill-educated in English and knew nothing of French, so that spellings on the forms do not reveal whether a recruit was of French descent or not. "Vertefeuille" was recorded as "Greenleaf," "Courtemanche" as "Shortsleeve," "Larivière" as "Rivers," and "Lucier" as "Lucia."³⁸ Even where the French names were correctly recorded, French-Canadian, Belgian, and Swiss recruits were sometimes mixed in the same battalion, making an accurate count of French names almost impossible.³⁹

That French-Canadian historians have spread their nets wide in order to support *abbé* Beaudry or Rouillard may be seen by an examination of some of the names which they have gathered to bolster the number. These include six brothers who had lived in New York since 1853;⁴⁰ many who came to the United States after the rebellion of 1837, who considered themselves more American than British certainly;⁴¹ and such prominent personages as Calixa

³⁷See Mason Wade, "The French Parish and *Survivance* in Nineteenth Century New England," *Catholic Historical Review*, XXXVI (July, 1950), 180.

³⁸Miss Lienne Tétrault, who is compiling a list of French-Canadian enlistments from Southbridge, Massachusetts, furnished the writer with these examples from records relating to Southbridge and to Danielson, Connecticut (Tétrault to writer, Southbridge, Aug. 9, 1956).

³⁹See Bessie L. Pierce, *A History of Chicago* (New York, 1940), II, 258.

⁴⁰Falardeau, "Les Canadiens-français et la guerre de Sécession," 566.

⁴¹Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine*, 11. See also the list compiled by

Lavallée, the French-Canadian musician who wrote the Canadian anthem, "O Canada!," who was born in Verchères, Canada East, but who was a resident of Providence, Rhode Island, when he enlisted and who died in Boston.⁴² The French-Canadian press even speculated on whether Confederate General G. T. Beauregard might be a French Canadian.⁴³ Edmond Mallet, the most famous French Canadian to serve the North, became a major in the New York Volunteers, was wounded at Cold Harbor, and lived to become an Indian agent, a local historian, and a leader of the French-Canadian nationalist movement. But Mallet had lived in New York since he was five and could hardly speak French.⁴⁴ It is to men of this type, not to French Canadians from the British provinces, to whom the figures may accurately apply.⁴⁵ This would hardly support the contention that Canada East was pro-Northern, however.

Even if one were to assume that half the number of alleged British North American enlistments took place, it would be unwise to conclude from such an assumption that the provinces, as a whole, were pro-Northern during the Civil War. It must be remembered that many of the British North Americans who were in the Northern armies had been the victims of crimping and that many served only because of the high bounties involved and not because they favoured the Northern cause as such. It is interesting to note, in this respect, that a large number of Canadian youths entered the Northern armies in March, 1865, when it was obvious to all that the war soon would be over.⁴⁶ This was shrewdness equal to that of the Yankees, for the Canadians would receive a handsome bounty and probably would not reach a battlefield in time to see action.⁴⁷

Robert Prévost, "Les Canadiens-Français à la guerre de sécession," *Fall River Independent*, Feb. 19, 1938.

⁴²Eugene Lapierre, *Calixa Lavallée, Musicien National du Canada* (Montreal, 1937), 49-74.

⁴³Quebec *Courrier de Canada*, quoted in Barrie *Northern Advance*, Sept. 4, 1861.

⁴⁴Belisle, *Histoire de la presse franco-américaine*, 409-12; Lapointe, "Les Canadiens-français et la guerre de Sécession," 684; Worcester (Mass.) *La Presse*, July 13, 1929.

⁴⁵A glance at Thomas W. Higginson, *Massachusetts in the Army and Navy during the War of 1861-65* (2 vols., Boston, 1895-6), which contains lists of war dead, shows a large number of names which indicate French-Canadian extraction. A more extended list of such names appears in the *Record of the Massachusetts Volunteers of the Office of the Adjutant-General of that state*. See also Lonn, *Foreigners in the Army and Navy*, 1, 156-8, 236, 256, 417, 439-41, 578 n. 10, and 579.

⁴⁶Macdonald Papers, McMicken Reports, 1864-5, 2 vols., *passim*.

⁴⁷This is not to imply that there were not many British North Americans who enlisted out of a sincere idealism. During the course of research for this article, the

Many French Canadians also enlisted because of the bounties, a practice which became so prevalent as to force the three leading Roman Catholic bishops of Canada East, the Bishops of Three Rivers, St.-Hyacinthe, and Quebec, to issue letters to the parish priests instructing them to warn their followers against enlistment.⁴⁸ There were several cases of professional bounty-jumping as well. General H. B. Carrington, at one time in command of the Great Lakes' frontier, reported that British Canadians would enlist, desert, and enlist again, and that to stop this practice he had court-martialed and shot Canadians who had each collected three bounties. Windsor, Canada West, in particular, was a centre of bounty-jumping groups,⁴⁹ and the Canadian constable at Fort Erie had two sons who, with his aid, frequently sold themselves.⁵⁰

The outbreak of the Civil War had caught a number of migrant Canadian labourers in both the South and the North. Many Canadians came to the United States for seasonal work, especially in the Maine woods and brickyards, and some of them may have been crimped or forced to join the army because of lack of funds.⁵¹ There also were some migratory labourers in the South, especially in the ports, and a number of these may well have entered Southern service. A group of French-Canadian families who went to New Bedford, Massachusetts, to work in a cotton factory, and a second group which went to Potosi, Missouri, to labour in the mines, were left destitute, for example, and they may have turned to enlistment as a way out of their financial crisis.⁵² The presence of unwilling

writer has received many letters from Canadians telling of grandfathers or other relatives who served with the North from a desire to fight for a "just cause."

⁴⁸*Montreal Gazette*, Feb. 20, 1864. Also cited in Macdonald, *Canadian Public Opinion*, 133.

⁴⁹James M. Callahan, "The Northern Lake Frontier during the Civil War," *American Historical Association, Annual Report*, I (1896), 358.

⁵⁰*Coderich Huron Signal*, April 23, 1862; P.A.C., G Series, no. 20C, E. H. Wilton to Ft. Erie, May 9, 1864, enc. in Wilton to Monck, Montreal, no. 11, 283, Jan. 19 [sic], 1864.

⁵¹Crimping was a vicious practice whereby the British North American virtually would be kidnapped and enlisted in the Northern armies, often while under the influence of drugs. See Raney, "Recruiting and Crimping in Canada," 21-33, and M. B. Hamer, "Luring Canadian Soldiers into Union Lines during the War between the States," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXVII (June, 1946), 150-62.

⁵²*Mobile Daily Advertiser and Register*, quoted in Ella Lonn, *Foreigners in the Confederacy*, 29; Nova Scotia, Legislative Assembly, *Journals*, 1864, 1866; Library of Congress, British Minister at Washington to Governor-in-Chief of Canada (photostats), 9, Monck to Burnley, Oct. 15, 1864; *ibid.*, 12, Lyons to Monck, no. 11,380, July 31, 1864; *ibid.*, 13, Burnley to Monck, no. 11,471, Oct. 10, and no. 11,480, Oct. 17, 1864.

soldiers who had been crimped, of men who enlisted to collect a large bounty, or of those who were forced to enlist owing to economic circumstances, would swell the numbers of British North Americans who served in the American armies but it would not indicate any devotion to the Northern cause.

Even among those who had entered service willingly, there were many cases, especially as it became evident that the war was real and not romantic, of efforts to revive forgotten claims to British citizenship in order to invoke Queen Victoria's proclamation of neutrality and thus to obtain release from the army. Some were not released in time and died in the field while others were seriously wounded. Those who returned to British North America, disillusioned with harsh army life, were not likely to carry back pro-Northern sentiments. The families of British North Americans who died in action probably felt no great warmth for the North.⁵³

Thus, the author contends, the myth of thousands of British North American enlistments in the Northern army lacks any sound basis outside the realm of wishful thinking, and the conclusions which have, in the past, been based on this ethereal structure must be submitted to re-examination. Such considerations should not overshadow the fact, however, that many British and French Canadians from the provinces did serve with the Federal troops. Some undoubtedly fought for the love of adventure, some fought as a private crusade against slavery, some fought because they originally had enlisted for the bounty and found that they liked the life, some fought because they had nothing else to do, and a few probably fought because they had too much else to do. It is certainly true that many colonials did serve the North, and their contribution should not be ignored nor their sincerity impugned. Many of these men are known to Canadian history in other capacities. Men like Edward W. Thomson,⁵⁴ Newton Wolverton,⁵⁵ H. C. Saint-

⁵³Another myth of interest is the report that many boys at Upper Canada College in Toronto left school to join the armies of both North and South. There was, in fact, no falling off of enrolment at the college during the war which would justify such a belief (H. E. Orr, Archivist of Upper Canada College, to writer, Toronto, July 30, 1956).

⁵⁴Thomson enlisted in the Pennsylvania cavalry at the age of sixteen. He saw Lincoln and later produced several poems with a Civil War theme, including at least one, "When Lincoln Died," which is still a moving poem (*When Lincoln Died, and Other Poems* (Boston, 1909), 24-30).

⁵⁵Wolverton was the leader of a group of Canadians who, when faced during the Trent crisis with the possibility of being soldiers in an enemy army, presented a petition for peace to Lincoln (A. N. Wolverton, *Dr. Newton Wolverton* (Privately printed, n.d.), 23-33).

Pierre,⁵⁶ Joseph-Caleb Paradis,⁵⁷ and Frederick Howe⁵⁸ served their adopted flag well and either fell on the battlefield or returned to render equal service to their homeland.⁵⁹ While the "myth of the forty thousand" may quantitatively be wrong, the exploits of a handful of men such as these could lend qualitative support to the figures. And perhaps, in the final analysis, it was just such men as these who, through their abilities, caused their images to be multiplied manifold. On such grains of truth do myths grow.

⁵⁶Saint-Pierre became judge and jurist in the Cour Supérieure de Montreal (*Toronto Globe*, Feb. 2, 1932; Jean-Jacques Lefebvre, Chief Archivist, Quebec, to writer, Montreal, April 12, 1956).

⁵⁷Paradis led a brilliant attack at the Battle of Rappahannock Station and fell, at the age of twenty-one, at Richmond ("Frater," "Un Oublié, Joseph-Caleb Paradis," *Bulletin des recherches historiques*, XLIV (March, 1938), 79).

⁵⁸Howe, the son of Joseph Howe, served well in Virginia and Maryland before being seriously wounded. See James A. Roy, *Joseph Howe: A Study in Achievement and Frustration* (Toronto, 1935), 248.

⁵⁹Some who enlisted were Negroes. As soon as Lincoln issued a proclamation permitting Negro enlistment in the army, forty young Negroes from the Elgin Settlement in Canada West volunteered to join the first Negro regiment, then being organized in Detroit. In all, seventy Negroes from the Buxton district enlisted. Late in 1862 George L. Stearns, who had been a friend of John Brown, was appointed, by Governor John A. Andrew of Massachusetts, chairman of a committee to raise a Massachusetts Negro regiment, and Stearns sought out recruits in Canada. He apparently was successful in obtaining enlistments, for among the thousand Negroes who were sent to camp at Readville, Massachusetts, in 1863, there were several from Canada West. See Annie S. Jamieson, *William King, Friend and Champion of Slaves* (Toronto, 1925), 174-5; Talbot Torrance, "Noble Friend of Freedmen," *Detroit Tribune*, July 10, 1892; P.A.C., King Papers, MSS, autobiography; Henry G. Pearson, *The Life of John A. Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts, 1861-1865* (Boston, 1904), II, 82; and Benjamin Quarles, *The Negro in the Civil War* (Boston, 1953), 9.

ANOTHER LOOK AT THE BATTLE OF LAKE ERIE

C. P. STACEY

THE history of the War of 1812 has to a considerable extent been written in purely tactical terms. Historians, particularly the authors of general histories, have dwelt upon what happened on the battlefield and have paid less attention to strategic considerations and still less to administrative considerations ("logistics"); though these things often, and indeed usually, determined the outcome of the individual engagements. The Battle of Lake Erie is a case in point.

In warfare on the Great Lakes the British, though far superior in naval strength at the outset, were at a serious administrative disadvantage. The lakes' Canadian shores afforded few of the resources necessary to the support of a naval establishment. A town like Kingston or Amherstburg, where vessels had been built and troops stationed for a considerable time, was likely to have small stocks of naval and military equipment in store, but such equipment was not produced in Canada to any extent. Guns and heavy anchors were not cast in Canada,¹ nor apparently were heavy cables produced, although some cordage was made at Amherstburg, the British naval station on Lake Erie,² and doubtless elsewhere.

That heavy equipment had to cross the Atlantic from Britain was not in itself an extremely serious disadvantage, for in spite of occasional losses to American or French privateers ocean transport for the British was relatively easy and reliable. The worst feature of the British situation was the extraordinary difficulty of the transport problem between tidewater and the theatre of operations on the lakes, and within that theatre itself. Just what the effect of the St. Lawrence rapids was appears in an account written from Kingston in 1814 by an officer who had lately made the trip up the river:

The travelling from Quebec to Montreal is either performed in the steam boat or by land either of which methods is expeditious the time being but two

¹Peter Kalm reported about 1749 that "cannon and mortars" were cast at the St. Maurice Forges (*Travels into North America*, III, 87-9, quoted in H. A. Innis, ed., *Select Documents in Canadian Economic History 1497-1783* (Toronto, 1929), 377), but there seems to have been no such activity early in the nineteenth century.

²"To purchase all the Cordage from Capt^a. Mills at Amherstburg as this tends greatly to promote the growth of hemp" (Memoranda by General Brock, c. February 1812, in William Wood, ed., *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812* (3 vols. in 4, Toronto, 1920-8), I, 289).

days, large vessels come up to Montreal which is situated at the head of the Navigation of the St. Lawrence, here the rapids commence and the only water carriage is in batteaux which are towed along shore where the current is strong, but generally rowed, three of the worst rapids are avoided by means of Canals with locks—if the rope breaks in passing these rapids the boat is lost and those on board perish, such accidents sometimes happen; a batteau is generally eight days in going from Montreal to Kingston, a distance of 200 miles, but if the wind blows fresh ahead they are much longer. All the Guns and Stores for the Ships of War must be brought up in these batteaux it is not an unusual thing for an hundred to arrive here together as they wait for a Convoy of Gun boats to protect them from the enemy. . . .³

In the winter, of course, land transport had to be resorted to; and although this was the season when the roads of Canada were most passable, Sir George Prevost reported that he had paid £1,000 for sending one large cable from Sorel to Kingston by land.⁴

The St. Lawrence was only the first leg of the British inland line of communication. It supported the naval squadron on Lake Ontario, but the establishments on the upper lakes were dependent on the precarious extension of it west of Kingston. The farther west a British garrison or a British warship, the longer and shakier was its line of supply. In Upper Canada roads were either non-existent or vile. Only by water could heavy stores be moved with any ease, and even troops on foot found movement by land difficult. General Drummond wrote from Niagara Falls in the autumn of 1814: "The disappointment I experienced at finding that half the 90th Regiment had been left to Struggle through the dreadful Roads betwixt Kingston and York at such a season, and at *such a Crisis*, was greater than I can express."⁵ The British could not afford to lose control of the lakes, for those waters were not only their frontier and their fighting front, but also their essential line of communication. From Montreal westwards they were, strategically, "formed to a flank."

Because of its position on this communication, Ontario was the most important of the lakes; and on it, by tremendous efforts, the British managed to hold their own. The control of the lake changed hands repeatedly as one side or the other commissioned new and more powerful ships. At the end of hostilities the British held it, thanks to their great new three-decker H.M.S. *St. Lawrence*. But they had lost Lake Erie once and for all on September 10, 1813,

³C. P. Stacey, ed., "Upper Canada at War, 1814: Captain Armstrong Reports," *Ontario History*, XLIX (Winter, 1956), 40.

⁴Public Archives of Canada, Q 131, pp. 39-40, Prevost to Bathurst, Feb. 14, 1815.

⁵Wood, *Documents*, III, 221-4, Drummond to Prevost, Oct. 20, 1814.

when their squadron under Commander R. H. Barclay was defeated and captured by a superior American squadron commanded by Master Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry. Much ink has been spilled about this bloody little battle, and particularly about the unedifying later controversy between Perry and his second in command, Elliott, the commander of the U.S.S. *Niagara*. But comparatively little has been written about a more important matter—the logistical process by which that superior American squadron was created and the victory made possible.

At the time when the United States declared war, in June, 1812, the British enjoyed complete naval control of Lake Erie, thanks to the Canadian force known as the Provincial Marine. They had there the *Queen Charlotte* of sixteen guns and the *General Hunter* of six; and during the summer of 1812 they added to their force the 10-gun schooner *Lady Prevost*.⁶ It is true that the Provincial Marine was not a real fighting navy. It was primarily a military transport service and was administered by the Army. Nevertheless, its armed vessels were capable of controlling the Great Lakes, and the control they exercised largely explains the British successes during the 1812 campaign, including General Brock's capture of Detroit. The only actual American naval vessel on the lakes at the outset was the brig *Oneida* on Lake Ontario, built in 1809. The brig *Adams* on Erie apparently belonged to the War Department, and though the Navy took her over she was still unarmed when captured by Brock's army at Detroit.⁷ Although Captain Isaac Chauncey, U.S.N., who had been appointed to command the American forces on the Great Lakes, succeeded in seizing control of Lake Ontario—with the *Oneida* and a group of converted merchant schooners—at the very end of the 1812 season of navigation, the contest for Erie began seriously only in 1813.⁸ Perry arrived at Presqu'Isle (Erie, Pennsylvania), to which the American base was transferred from Black Rock, near Buffalo; Barclay arrived at Amherstburg; and shipbuilding was pressed at both bases. When the rival commanders reached their stations, the Americans were already building two 20-gun brigs, the *Niagara* and *Lawrence*, the British a 19-gun ship, the

⁶*Ibid.*, I, 239, 246, 253–8. A statement signed by Barclay, accompanying a letter of July 16, 1813, gives *Queen Charlotte* eighteen guns, *Lady Prevost* twelve, and *Hunter* six (P.A.C., Q 122, p. 98).

⁷*American State Papers, Naval Affairs* (Washington, 1834), I, 202–3, 229, 247 ff.; A. T. Mahan, *Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812* (2 vols., London, 1905), I, 347.

⁸C. P. Stacey, "Commodore Chauncey's Attack on Kingston Harbour, November 10, 1812," *Canadian Historical Review*, XXXII (June, 1951), 126–38.

Detroit. These were the largest units engaged in the subsequent battle. Let us examine the process of fitting them for action.

At Amherstburg Barclay found "a general want of stores of every description."⁹ And to get stores from outside was next to impossible, for he was close to the extremity of that long and exposed line of communication that has been described. The normal communication with Amherstburg was by Lake Ontario and the Niagara River, stores being portaged around the gorge and the falls to Fort Erie, whence they were taken on again by water up Lake Erie. But the initial American operations of 1813 cut this line: Fort George, at the mouth of the Niagara, was captured on May 27. This threw the British back on the less satisfactory line overland from the head of Lake Ontario to Long Point on Lake Erie, the Grand River sometimes being used for the final stage.¹⁰ The American raid on York in April had had an even worse effect on Barclay's fortunes. Prevost wrote on July 20,

The Ordnance Ammunition and other Stores for the Service on Lake Erie had been deposited at York for the purpose of being transported to Amherstburg, but unfortunately were either destroyed or fell into the Enemy's hands when York was taken by them; & the subsequent interruption to the communication by their occupation of Fort George has rendered it extremely difficult to afford the supplies Cap^{tn}. Barclay requires, which are however in readiness to forward to him, whenever circumstances will admit of its being done with safety.¹¹

Commodore Chauncey reported gleefully from York that the Americans had found there twenty cannon from 6-pounders to 32's, and much shot and other munitions, "a great deal of which was put up in boxes and marked for Niagara and Malden [Amherstburg]":

The store which the enemy burned was filled with cables, cordage, canvas, tools, and stores of every kind for the use of this Lake and Lake Erie, supposed to be worth \$50,000. The loss of stores at this place will be an irreparable one to the enemy, for independent of the difficulty of transportation, the articles cannot be replaced in this country. . . . In fact I believe he has received a blow that he cannot recover. . . .¹²

So far as Lake Erie was concerned, this was scarcely an overstatement. The raid on York has usually been regarded as a rather

⁹Wood, *Documents*, II, 248-9, Barclay to Procter, June 29, 1813.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 243-5, Procter to McDouall, June 16, 1813. If the worst came to the worst the whole journey to Amherstburg could be made overland.

¹¹P.A.C., Q 122, pp. 92-4, No. 78, to Bathurst from Kingston. Quoted with minor inaccuracies in Mahan, *War of 1812*, II, 40.

¹²Chauncey to Secretary of the Navy, May 7, 1813 (Transcripts in P.A.C., MG 27/34). These transcripts are evidently from U.S. Navy Department records now in the National Archives, Washington.

nugatory operation; but though Chauncey's letter describing his intention of making it¹³ does not indicate that he knew the stores so urgently needed by Barclay were in the town, the raid's effect upon the situation on Lake Erie was so considerable as to give it very real significance. Barclay never did receive the guns for his flagship;¹⁴ and the *Detroit* went into action on September 10 armed with the cannon from the ramparts of Amherstburg's Fort Malden ("a more curiously composite battery," writes Admiral Mahan, "probably never was mounted"). Nor was this all. At Barclay's court martial testimony was given that "Sails and other articles" had to be taken from the *Queen Charlotte* to render the *Detroit* fit to take the lake; and that the matches and tubes provided at Amherstburg were so bad that throughout the action it was necessary to "fire pistols at the Guns to set them off."¹⁵

So much, very briefly, for British "logistical support." It is evident that Barclay's squadron had to be fitted out on the basis of the resources available at Amherstburg, and that these were very inadequate. Let us turn to the American side, where the picture was rather different.

One advantage which the British enjoyed at the beginning of the war was the fact that there were no American naval bases on the Great Lakes. Bases had to be created before there could be squadrons. So far as the resources for the purpose existed ready-made, they were to be found at the U.S. navy yards on the Atlantic seaboard; and the means of getting ordnance and stores from those yards to the chosen sites on the lakes became a matter of great importance. When Chauncey was appointed to the lake command, he sent the raw materials of his enterprise on from the New York navy yard, which he had lately commanded. He catalogued them for the Secretary of the Navy: "one hundred and forty ship-carpenters, seven hundred seamen and marines, more than one hundred pieces of cannon, the greater part of large caliber, with muskets, shot, carriages, etc. The carriages have nearly all been made, and the shot cast, in that time [three weeks]. Nay, I may say that nearly every article that has been sent forward has been made."¹⁶ Admiral Mahan, whose book on this war remains after half a century the

¹³*Ibid.*, Chauncey to Secretary of the Navy, March 18, 1813.

¹⁴"Do you wish the 10. 24 p^r. carronades intended for the Detroit to be sent on and to what Place?" (Wood, *Documents*, II, 282-3, Harvey from Four Mile Creek to Procter, Sept. 17, 1813.) These were weak weapons even if they had arrived in time.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 316-17.

¹⁶Mahan, *War of 1812*, I, 361-2.

best ever written about it, remarks that these words reflect the United States' lack of preparation for war. This is true; but the fact that these articles could be manufactured locally, and so rapidly, also reflects an American advantage over Canada. No such manufacture was possible in the British provinces.

It is fair to say that the New York area, with its navy yard and primitive yet considerable industrial resources, was a good source of the war material required by the U.S. Navy on Lake Ontario. Nor were the communications between New York and Sackets Harbor, the U.S. base on that lake, particularly difficult. There was water transport by the Hudson and Mohawk rivers as far as Rome, the only serious obstacle being overcome by a portage road. The roads from Rome to Sackets were so bad that they could not be used with any convenience in winter; but there was also the water route by a canal connecting with Wood Creek, which flowed into Oneida Lake, and on by the Oswego River into Lake Ontario.¹⁷ This had the disadvantage that the final leg of the communication, across the corner of Lake Ontario, was exposed to interruption by the British when they controlled the lake. They did attempt to cut it on several occasions, but never with very marked success.

As long as the American base for Lake Erie was at Black Rock, it too was dependent for logistical support upon New York and its navy yard, and upon the line of communication by the Hudson and the Mohawk, supplemented by a long land haul from the head of navigation on the Mohawk to the Niagara. Thirteen miles of this road was "intolerably bad."¹⁸ But the whole picture was changed when Chauncey moved the base from Black Rock to Erie in the winter of 1812-13. Erie had relatively good communications with Philadelphia through Pittsburgh. Now the Philadelphia navy yard, and the industrial resources of the Philadelphia area, could be applied to the support of the establishment on Lake Erie; and New York could concentrate on supporting those on Lakes Ontario and Champlain. By 1812 there were good roads between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh; and from Pittsburgh the Allegheny River and its tributary French Creek provided water transport to within 15 miles of Erie.¹⁹ That last fifteen miles had to be covered by road. Five years before the war a traveller reported the road was bad, but

¹⁷*Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, on the Subject of Public Roads and Canals* (Washington, 1808; printed by order of the Senate), 42-6.

¹⁸Mahan, *War of 1812*, I, 361.

¹⁹Neville B. Craig, *The History of Pittsburgh* (Pittsburgh, 1851), 288; *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury*, 59; Archer B. Hulbert, *The Paths of Inland Commerce* (New Haven, 1920), 53-6.

subsequently it seems to have improved.²⁰ Obviously this was not an ideal line of communication; but it was far superior to Barclay's from Amherstburg to Montreal—shorter, simpler, and less difficult. And it had the special advantage of not being exposed to interruption by the enemy at any point.

What today seems the most surprising of Perry's logistical advantages remains to be described. It has attracted little attention from historians, and is scarcely mentioned by Mahan. Many of the heaviest of Perry's vessels' fittings did not have to come from the seaboard: they were manufactured in Pittsburgh. The iron industry was already developing in western Pennsylvania. Pittsburgh's first foundry was erected in 1804, its first steamboat launched in 1811.²¹ The town was ready to grasp the opportunity offered by the war. The *Pittsburgh Directory for 1815* tells the story. Pittsburgh's population has increased from 4,740 to "upwards of 9,000" since 1810. "This great increase is to be attributed to the late war with Great Britain, which converted a great portion of the capital of the seaboard into manufactures, much of which was concentrated in this place." Among the town's industries is "An anvil and anchor factory, Capable of furnishing anvils and anchors of the largest size. Many of the anchors for Commodore Perry's squadron on lake Erie, were made at this Factory." Pittsburgh also possesses "three large and extensive Rope Walks, which make all kinds of ropes, twine and cordage. The principal part of the cordage for Perry's Fleet was made here. Two cables weighed each, about 4,000 lbs. and were 4½ inches in diameter." There were "three Foundries in Pittsburgh and one in Birmingham," and one of them was equipped for boring cannon.²² There were no such facilities as these in Upper Canada in 1813.

On April 10 Perry reported to Chauncey from Erie:

I have the honor to inform you, I have just now returned from Pittsburg. Most of the articles, we shall want can be procured there, such as anchors, rigging &c and cambooses by sending to Phila.^a for a pattern to cast by. . .

²⁰Seymour Dunbar, *A History of Travel in America* (4 vols., Indianapolis, 1915), I, 324, 334-8; Mahan, *War of 1812*, I, 375.

²¹Craig, *History of Pittsburgh*, 287-8. On the development of the iron industry in Pittsburgh at this period, see Catherine Elizabeth Reiser, *Pittsburgh's Commercial Development, 1800-1850* (Harrisburg, 1951), 18-20. The fact that at Erie "Iron and cordage may be procured with facility from Pittsburg" was a factor in Chauncey's decision to move the Lake Erie base from Black Rock. (National Archives, Record Group 45, Captains' Letters, Chauncey to Secretary of the Navy from Erie, Jan. 1, 1813.)

²²*Pittsburgh Directory for 1815* (Pittsburgh, 1815; republished, chiefly in facsimile, Pittsburgh, 1905), 2, 137, 139, 141.

The canvass must come from Phila.^a. I have written M^r. Thomson on the subject and for such other things as cannot be had at Pittsburg.

Most of the carpenters have at length arrived *without* their tools, which will probably be here in ten days. The *two* blacksmiths from Philadelphia have arrived. M^r. Brown does not expect much from them. . . . Many are the difficulties we have to encounter but we *will* surmount them all.²³

The guns that won the battle of Lake Erie, however, were not cast at Pittsburgh. As early as September 26, 1812, Chauncey had asked Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton to have forty-four 32-pounders "cast immediately" and sent on to Black Rock during the winter. Whether this request was actually the origin of the armament of the *Lawrence* and *Niagara* seems rather doubtful, as it was not until January 27 that the Secretary (now William Jones) told Chauncey that he would immediately contract at Washington for 32-pounder carronades to arm the two brigs which by then had been authorized for construction at Erie. Apparently however the carronades did not have to be cast, for early in February there are references to twenty of them lying, still unproved, at Henry Foxall's foundry near Georgetown in the District of Columbia, and fourteen others being at the Washington Navy Yard. During the next few weeks these were sent on by wagon to Pittsburgh en route to Erie. The few long guns required were obtained, it appears, wherever they could be found—from Lake Ontario and possibly from New York; the Secretary of the Navy undertook to obtain a couple of guns belonging to the War Department which were at Pittsburgh.²⁴

Perry, it may be noted, had nothing to do with planning the squadron or initiating the work on it; construction was well under way when he reached the Lakes. But his driving energy clearly had much to do with pushing the work to completion. Incidentally, he was no admirer of the men of Pittsburgh, for the optimistic promises made to him during his visit in April were not carried out. He complained to Chauncey on June 13 that although the anchors for the brigs had been promised by May 1 he now heard that they would not be finished before July 20. His comment was, "I make no comments on this abominable deception." But in due course all the essential stores and equipment reached Erie, and on July 23 Perry

²³National Archives, R.G. 45, Master Commandants' Letters. Cambooses (caboo-ses) signify cooking places, galley stoves.

²⁴P.A.C., MG 27/34, Chauncey to Secretary of the Navy, Sept. 26, 1812. For information concerning guns from the Washington area and Pittsburgh I have relied upon an abstract of official correspondence prepared by the Office of Naval Records and Library (now the Division of Naval History), a copy of which was kindly furnished me by the National Archives, Washington. This however contains no information from Perry's own letters.

wrote the Secretary of the Navy that both "sloops" were ready to go over the bar, "and the shot—the only thing that could have detained both of them—is now constantly arriving in considerable quantities." The shot had been cast at Pittsburgh, under the superintendence of Captain Abraham R. Woolley, Deputy Commissioner of Ordnance at Fort Fayette, the army post there, whose help Perry gratefully acknowledged.²⁵ The superior local resources of the United States had now done their work.

Of the manning of the rival squadrons only a word need be said here. Both were under-manned on the day of battle, but Perry's was evidently better off than Barclay's. The British commander described his crews as consisting of "not more than fifty British Seamen, the rest a mixt Crew of Canadians, and Soldiers, and who were totally unacquainted with such Service." This may have exaggerated his disadvantages, but the casualty list shows that of 135 officers and men killed and wounded 69 were soldiers of the 41st and Royal Newfoundland Regiments. Thirteen were "landsmen." The rest held naval ranks, and doubtless a proportion of them were men of the Provincial Marine.²⁶ Theodore Roosevelt in his *Naval War of 1812* suggested that Canadian "lake sailors, frontiersmen" were "the very best possible material."²⁷ A modern Canadian may perhaps be permitted to share Barclay's prejudice in favour of trained fighting men. As for Perry, he too had soldiers and landsmen among his crews; but letters written by him before the action refer to the arrival of three drafts of seamen totalling nearly 230 all ranks and ratings,²⁸ and it would seem that he had a rather larger proportion of naval personnel in his ships than his antagonist. Incidentally, both Barclay and Perry accused their superiors on Lake Ontario of sending them inferior men.

Why did the Americans win the Battle of Lake Erie? Because they had managed to create on the lake a stronger squadron than their opponents. The heavy metal won the day in an action which was as valiantly and as bitterly contested as any ever fought on fresh water or salt. Roosevelt computes the actual American broadside in the battle as 896 pounds against 459 for the British. (Mahan

²⁵P.A.C., MG 27/34, Perry to Chauncey, June 13, 1813, and to Secretary of the Navy, July 23 and April 21, 1813.

²⁶Wood, *Documents*, II, 276, 279–81.

²⁷New York, 1910, 278.

²⁸P.A.C., MG 27/34, to Secretary of the Navy, July 27 ("a sailing master, three midshipmen, and sixty-five men"), July 30 ("a master's mate, two midshipmen, and fifty-seven men"), and Aug. 11, 1813 ("Lieutenant Elliott . . . with nearly one hundred officers and men").

points out however that the precise weight of the British broadside is not known; a sailor as competent as Barclay would certainly have contrived to employ more than half of the *Detroit's* metal on the engaged side.) Barclay lost his one real chance of victory when, by relinquishing his blockade of Erie for a short time—a lapse on his part which has never been satisfactorily explained—he allowed Perry to get his brigs over the bar into the lake. In a stand-up fight between two squadrons so unevenly matched, nothing but mismanagement by the Americans could have given success to the British. In fact, the gallant Barclay very nearly did win—simply because the Americans attacked him in detail. But once the American commander shifted his flag from the shattered *Lawrence* and brought into close action the brig *Niagara*, hitherto merely on the fringe of the engagement, the game was up.

Roosevelt, relating these facts, remarks, "Captain Perry showed indomitable pluck, and readiness to adapt himself to circumstances; but his claim to fame rests much less on his actual victory than on the way in which he prepared the fleet that was to win it."²⁹ This is less than just to Perry. Actually, the preparation of the fleet was far from being all his work, as we have seen; much of the credit is due to Commodore Chauncey and Secretary Jones, and certainly that remarkable shipbuilder Noah Brown should not be forgotten.³⁰ On the other hand, at the crisis of the fight, when an engagement which ought never to have been in doubt was close to being lost through no fault of his, it was the young commander's energy and resolution that saved the day; but for him the outcome would have been different. There are good grounds, indeed, for Henry Adams' opinion, so different from Roosevelt's: "More than any other battle of the time, the victory on Lake Erie was won by the courage and obstinacy of a single man."³¹

This is a salutary reminder that there is more to warfare than heavy metal and big battalions; that wars after all are fought by men, and that mere physical power is useless unless directed with judgment and determination. Nevertheless, the Battle of Lake Erie was more a logistical than a tactical victory. Perry merely made

²⁹*The Naval War of 1812*, 274.

³⁰Howard I. Chapelle, *The History of the American Sailing Navy* (New York, 1949), 268-72. Cf. "The Remarkable Statement of Noah Brown," *Journal of American History*, VIII (1914), 103-8.

³¹*The War of 1812*, H. A. De Weerd, ed. (Washington, 1944), 69. This volume is an extract from the author's classic *History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison*.

good use of the superior weapon that was in his hands. If it had not been a superior weapon he would not have won.

The American squadron on Lake Erie, built "from scratch," was stronger than its British rival (which had in part existed before the war) because its builders were served by a line of communication which, though neither short nor easy, was shorter and easier than the British communication with Montreal and Quebec. Still more important, Perry's communications with the seaboard, as we have seen, were secure from interruption; whereas Barclay's were exposed to enemy action and were in fact interrupted in the spring of 1813 with dire effect. At the same time, the Americans were far superior in local resources. Canada produced almost nothing required for the outfitting of naval vessels except timber. The immediate source of armament and equipment for the British lake squadrons was the depots in the St. Lawrence ports; the ultimate source was Britain. But the United States, though in 1813 still industrially a child as compared with the British giant, was capable of casting its own guns, shot, and anchors and making its own cables. What is more, it was becoming capable of doing these things not only on the seaboard but also in the rising west, within comparatively easy reach of the theatre of operations on the upper lakes. However unappreciated by Perry, the lusty infant industries of Pittsburgh played a considerable part in his success. The growing industrial resources of the United States at large, combined with relatively energetic naval administration in Washington and on the lakes, were the unseen but solid foundations of the American victory on Lake Erie.

REVIEW ARTICLE

SOME RECENT BOOKS ON EARLY MODERN BRITISH HISTORY*

W. W. PIEPENBURG

In our own times no conscientious student of early modern British history cares to ignore the impressive tradition of political and constitutional analysis which was given to us by the great historians of the later nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries. During the last half-century, however, most of our traditional values have been seriously undermined, and it is not surprising that we now ask different questions about the familiar events of early modern British history than the great historians asked in the past. We are still as interested as they were in the development of the unique institutions of British society, but we try to explain changes in the actual functioning of institutions as a response to alterations in the structure and outlook of British society itself. In our own decade this new approach of the last quarter-century has matured, and not a year seems to pass without the appearance of a significant contribution to our knowledge of early modern British history. Some of these publications have decisively changed the whole character of our understanding of the past, and in this category the works of J. E. Neale must certainly be placed.

Elizabeth I and her Parliaments, 1584-1601, completes a two volume study which is not only a work of pioneer scholarship, but also a full reconstruction of the nature and significance of the relations between Crown and Parliament during a considerable portion of the so-called Tudor Absolutism. The complete structure of Neale's argument now emerges with dramatic clarity. The first volume established the way in which important constitutional issues arose by 1581 out of the relation of Puritanism to Parliament during the long security crisis. The second volume demonstrates how the impact of events up to 1589 intensified the constitutional crisis and enabled Parliament to develop energetically its ability to act, to propagandize, and to oppose. Neale concludes his work by showing that the gradual decline of the security crisis after 1588-9 altered the character of the relation between Crown and Parliament during the later years of the reign.

Neale's second volume opens with the reaction of the Parliament of 1584-5 to the cold war between Catholic and Protestant Europe. In its zeal for the Queen's safety this Parliament very nearly adopted the "tactics of rebellion." Its scheme for the succession in the event of Elizabeth's assassination was based on the notion of an interregnum during which Parliament would exercise sovereignty in the state and settle the succession. That such a proposal could actually be framed by councillors and M.P.'s is extraordinarily significant. Furthermore, Parliament attempted to make good the proposals for church reform which the Crown had suppressed in the Parliaments of 1576 and 1581. The Puritan campaign for reform was so highly organized

*For a list of books reviewed, see page 66.

by 1584 that Elizabeth was able to silence the House only with great difficulty, and during this crisis members in committee actually considered rejecting the Queen's command. They did not attempt to do so, but it is clear enough that the Commons was so well organized around its Puritan leadership that its activities paralysed the councillors in Commons and very nearly unnerved Elizabeth herself. It is not surprising that she considered the proceedings of this Parliament to be "dangerous to a kingly rule," or that Neale considers it to have been the most significant of her reign.

In the Parliament of 1586-7 the demand for church reform again occasioned conflict, this time also on the issue of free speech as the result of Wentworth's famous queries. And for the first time in Elizabeth's reign the Commons intruded on her management of foreign policy by attempting to force her to accept the sovereignty of the Netherlands. Their demands with respect to religion, parliamentary privileges, and foreign policy were more than Elizabeth was willing to pay for their support against Mary Stuart, and she had to silence this alarmingly insubordinate Commons on all three issues; indeed, she was forced into the extraordinary decision to dissolve Parliament at a time when the realm was facing the crucial test of 1588.

Even after the Armada had been dealt with successfully, the exultant mood of the next Parliament in 1589 led it into further clashes with the Crown. Encouraged by the continuing campaign of organized Puritanism and the Martinist controversy, Elizabeth again had to stop proceedings on religion in the Commons.¹ She was also forced by a threat of Commons legislation to reform the fiscal practices of the Board of the Greencloth, and very likely of the Exchequer too, a technique she repeated later in the famous monopoly dispute. Moreover, the attitude of the 1589 Parliament toward the Crown's proceedings was clearly indicated in the appointment by the Commons of its first standing committee on privileges. It is quite clear that by 1589 Parliament was rapidly growing toward institutional maturity, and that the Tudor constitution was resting on uncertain foundations—indeed, "on little more than the masterful nature and unique personality of an ageing Queen."

Time passes, however, and as the security crisis subsided after 1588, a new generation arose to whom the ideological struggles of the past were less real than they had been to the previous generation. Fewer issues arose, therefore, to occasion conflict between Crown and Parliament. Further religious reform, for example, was not the main issue in any of the last three Parliaments, and it was apparent that the campaign of Elizabeth and Whitgift against Puritan religious revolution had succeeded. The 1597-8 Parliament, with the Queen's hearty approval, initiated economic and social legislation—a significant step, according to Neale, in the growth of parliamentary initiative. The last Parliament in 1601 was an amenable one compared with those from 1576 to 1589. The old assumption that Parliament in the monopoly dispute of 1601 was only beginning to realize its capacities is quite wrong-headed; the early Stuart Parliaments had the advantage of a long history of initiative about which we knew little prior to the work of Professor Neale.

A series of remarkable figures come to life in Neale's pages, some of them

¹Neale tentatively suggests that Martin Marprelate was not Penry, but Throckmorton, a Puritan member of the House of Commons. In type and mood the Martinist tracts show a striking similarity to three speeches written by Throckmorton which Neale discovered in the Morgan library in New York City.

recognizable precursors of Eliot and Pym. Great courtiers, men like Hatton, Burghley, Mildmay, and Walsingham, appear as skilful managers who guided the Commons from infancy to adolescence. The drama of the story as Neale unfolds it is powerfully reinforced by a quoted corpus of unconventional parliamentary prose for which every student can only be extremely grateful. The decision to include full texts of Elizabeth's speeches is entirely appropriate to a narrative in which she is the dominating figure. As Neale says about his own book, "the Parliamentary history of her reign imposes its own title—Elizabeth I and her Parliaments." This is a memorial which would have pleased her.

Elizabeth had few greater defenders of her prerogative than Sir Edward Coke, her Attorney General after 1594, whose life and times are magnificently evoked by Mrs. Bowen in *The Lion and the Throne*. This is the third of Mrs. Bowen's biographies of great legal figures. The subject occurred to her when she was writing on John Adams and Oliver Wendell Holmes, both of whom were strongly influenced by the legal writings of Coke (as was every American lawyer for more than two hundred years after Coke's death). Coke's great battle for what he considered to be the proper interpretation of the law, though it had to be confirmed amid the sound of battle and reinterpreted in other times and places, left an enduring heritage not only to England, but to states yet unborn in his time, or only just born. Mrs. Bowen's intimate knowledge of American as well as English legal history enables her to place Coke's career in the widest possible context. This would be an outstanding achievement in itself, but she also undertakes to portray Coke as a living human being, a task which defeated the few biographers in the past who made the attempt. It is adequate tribute to Mrs. Bowen's effort to say that she has succeeded where all her predecessors have failed.

Mere competence in research would not have permitted Mrs. Bowen to achieve a triumph so great, although there is nothing of consequence she missed in the sources, either primary or secondary, printed or manuscript, all of them long available to scholars. She found no new material and she undertook no new interpretation of Coke's career. She attempted a narrative, not an exposition, and she achieved it not only by her masterly command of the materials, but also by her own imaginative vitality. She visited nearly all the places still in existence where Coke lived and worked, and from her sources reconstructed in her own mind an image of those places which no longer exist. People, places, institutions, and issues all came alive in her work; her greatest genius is her power of evocation, and few reputations could profit more than Coke's by virtue of it.

Coke was a forceful man, even fierce, and his aggressive ambition was sufficient to leave to posterity an unpleasant memory of him. No reader can follow Mrs. Bowen's account of Coke's career as Attorney General from 1594 to 1606, the first part of the biography, without sharing the intense dislike which the victims of his cruel political prosecutions must have felt for him. His relentless behaviour as the guardian of the Crown's prerogative is presented by the author without unnecessary censure or inhibition, and she clearly establishes that he proceeded against his victims according to the rules of evidence current in his time.

It is apparent in the second and third parts of the book that Coke's stubbornness and devotion to the law were equally serviceable when changing times compelled him to change his point of view. Since Stuart prerogative was

not Tudor prerogative, he was able to resist James' prerogative as obstinately as he had supported Elizabeth's. As Chief Justice of Common Pleas and then of King's Bench he battled for a full decade to define in Common Law the bounds of Stuart prerogative. His fixed convictions led inevitably to the ruination of his judicial career, but by 1616 he had become the "oracle amongst the people," and in all but one of the Parliaments between 1621 and 1628 he turned his massive legal knowledge to the championship of the liberty of the subject. He inspired both the Protestation of 1621 and the monopoly legislation of 1625, and at the age of seventy-two he triumphantly witnessed Charles I's second and parliamentary assent to the Petition of Right. It was his last public act and he immediately retired to Stoke House to complete his legal writings and to manage his enormous estates.

He was an acquisitive man as well as a vigorous one. During his career he amassed estates worth £100,000 a year, and he was an expert in estate management. He had to be, for he married twice and had twelve children to support as well as the dignity of his great public estate covering forty eventful years. The personal history of Coke and his family is both compelling and moving as told by Mrs. Bowen. Every reader will be strongly affected by the profound affection Coke and his first wife, Bridget Paston, felt for each other until her death in 1598; and astonished at the lapse of judgment which led him to marry Lady Hatton, a flamboyant creature who was more than a match for him, and who made him appear the fool in public as well as in private. Their quarrels were a gross scandal in a scandal-ridden society. If Lady Hatton was a constant trial to him in his middle and old age, their daughter, Frances, whose spectacular career brought her twice before High Commission on charges of adultery, was his greatest consolation during his years of retirement. His affection for his four surviving sons never dimmed, although they were all persistently wayward, and mysteriously ran through thousands of their father's pounds. His family, his writings, and his nostalgia for Norfolk dominated his thoughts at Stoke House after 1628, and when he died in 1634 at the age of eighty-two his body was carried to Tittleshall in Norfolk and buried in St. Mary's Church. So ended the life of a man who was great in his own time and whose ideas history happened gloriously to vindicate. Mrs. Bowen at long last has vindicated him as a human being, whose incorruptible integrity outweighed all his other virtues and vices, personal and public.

A contemporary of Coke, Arbella Stuart, has been successfully rehabilitated in a new biography by Miss P. M. Handover. All of the four nineteenth-century women who attempted the earlier biographies of Arbella could not avoid interpreting her in terms of their interest in female education and emancipation, and they all betrayed an incapacity to cope with the moral atmosphere of Elizabethan and Jacobean England. From such preoccupations Miss Handover is entirely free, and she clearly possesses the imaginative power and scholarly ability to place the life of Arbella Stuart in its proper historical perspective.

The plain fact is that Arbella herself was not a very interesting person; she was an important historical figure because she was an heir to the throne through the Lennox line of Henry VII's daughter Margaret. Arbella's whole life was relentlessly dominated by the succession struggles in the reigns of Elizabeth and James, and the inability, for political reasons, of either sovereign to permit Arbella to marry and enjoy a normal life. At the age of twelve she knew of the fate of Mary Queen of Scots, for the grandmother who reared

Arbella was Elizabeth Cavendish, Countess of Shrewsbury, and the Countess' husband had been Mary's gaoler for some years. Arbella was twenty-eight when she sat as a spectator in the court at Winchester and heard Coke accuse Raleigh of complicity in the Main Plot to put Arbella on the throne. Although she avoided implication in the succession issue for the greater part of her life, Arbella's personality was embittered by her long dependence on her overbearing grandmother, and by the deprivation to which James subjected her when she moved to the court in 1603. In 1610, her Stuart obstinacy and defective judgment made her throw off her submissive past and rebel when it was too late to do so effectively. Secretly, at the age of thirty-five, she married William Seymour, who was in the royal line through the Grey family. James instantly ordered her arrest, and in 1615 she died in the Tower because she had altogether lost the will to live.

Arbella's life prior to her entry into the court was so obscure that she was not a figure of very much interest to contemporaries, and Miss Handover quite properly devotes her attention in the first part of the biography to the history of the Tudor succession question in which Arbella's life was inextricably mixed. The main characters in the narrative are the great figures of the last quarter of the sixteenth century, not Arbella. In the second part of the biography, however, Arbella's precarious position in court and her own emotional difficulties are carefully explored, and she clearly emerges as a living and tragic personality. Miss Handover writes with enough literary skill to insure the reader's close interest in the narrative, and her knowledge of the general history of the period is secure.

The succession issue was only one aspect of the intense political and religious struggle which animated Elizabethan and early Stuart England. By the reign of James I the interest of the politically conscious classes turned to an examination of the fundamental nature of English political institutions. The scholars of the time were also interested in that question, and the foundations of historical research were laid by men like Seldon, Twysden, Spelman, and Dugdale. The systematic study of sixteenth and seventeenth century historical scholarship has only just begun, and the task still remains to ascertain accurately its value to us. The publication of *English Historical Scholarship in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, a collection of seven papers read recently before the Dugdale Society, is another evidence of the continuing interest in Tudor and Stuart historiography. The collection possesses no unity whatever, but three of the essays have some general interest. Professor Wernham of Oxford gives an informative survey of the organization of the public records under the Tudors and Stuarts, and Professor Cronin of Birmingham admirably shows how the work of Spelman and Dugdale revealed to contemporaries the existence of enormous collections of historical sources. The best essay in the volume is a critical analysis, by Philip Styles, of the historical scholarship of Twysden, Spelman, and Coke.

The career of Sir John Eliot was one of political action rather than legal or scholarly effort and we at last have a presentable biography in Professor Hulme's new *Life of Sir John Eliot*. Eliot sat in five of the Stuart Parliaments between 1614 and 1629, was an active member in four, and became a prominent leader of the opposition. His political thinking was actuated by an ideal of harmonious relations between Crown and Parliament—an inappropriate ideal for the 1620's. His career achieved tragic proportions owing to his inability to recognize the difficulties which Charles I's views raised with

respect to the Crown's relations with Parliament. Eliot never thought of himself as a revolutionary, but his views on the privileges of Parliament were irreconcilable with Charles', and nearly a decade before the English Revolution reached its climatic stages, he died a martyr to the ideal of free speech.

We have never had a reliable account of Eliot's life and career. Forster's two volume biography of 1865 presented Eliot as the perfect Whig who achieved the highest peak of statesmanship, and the account is seriously marred by inaccuracies and inventions. Fortunately, Gardiner gave us a much more sensible view of Eliot, but it must be hunted down in bits and pieces scattered through the enormous ten volume *History of England*. Professor Hulme agrees in general with Gardiner's estimate, but Eliot's career itself is filled out in much greater detail by Hulme with admirable material from the twelve unpublished parliamentary diaries now at Yale University. Moreover, Hulme analyses Eliot's character and ability in far greater detail than Gardiner undertook to do in his general history.

The conception of Eliot which emerges from this biography makes him a man of moderate ability (perhaps even too moderate), of slovenly thinking, and conventional spiritual depth. In his relations with his patron, Buckingham, and in the discharge of his duties as Vice-Admiral of Devon, Hulme finds him ambitious, vain, selfish, and opportunistic; but he gives Eliot full credit as an intense political idealist and effective Commons orator, even though he was manifestly not the greatest of the opposition leaders in the House. The pity is that this biography, seventeen years in the making, valuable as it must be as the only good account, fails to evoke a lively portrait of Eliot himself. The style is concise and plain, so much so that the reader craves the relief of a coloured passage or a convincing visual image, or any legitimate device which will elicit greater involvement of the reader. Forster's biography has now been displaced, but a life-like account of Eliot still remains to be attempted.

The Three Resolutions which Eliot read to the Commons at that famous concluding session in 1629 clearly reflected the vigorous spirit of an anti-clerical, Protestant nationalism which resented the policies of the early Stuarts at home and abroad. None but the crudest Marxists will deny that religion was an essential ingredient of early Stuart politics, but interest has in the past centred mainly on the development of conflicting religious ideas and on the bearing that process had on the ecclesiastical and political dissensions which erupted in the Long Parliament—that is, on the struggle between Puritanism and episcopacy over questions of theology and polity, civil as well as ecclesiastical. Except for Usher's work on the Elizabethan Church and Shaw's on the Church during the Revolution, no one has troubled to examine the workings of the Church as an institution. This conspicuous gap has now successfully been filled by Christopher Hill's *Economic Problems of the Church, from Whitgift to the Long Parliament*.

Hill is concerned in this volume solely with the workings of the Church as an *economic* institution, not on the Marxist ground that economic analysis provides the only right explanation of events, but because historians have for the most part ignored the Church as an important economic institution. Tawney, in his work on religion and capitalism, was as much interested in Puritan ideas as in economic forces, and not at all in the functioning of the Church as an institution. Recent well-known investigations of the economic problems of the landholding classes prior to 1640 have not touched on the Church as an important landholder. Hill claims that contemporaries knew

better than we that there were economic reasons for attacking the Church as well as political and religious reasons; his aim, therefore, is to analyse the economic organizations of the Church, to explain how the economic changes of the age created problems for it, and to show how the efforts to solve these problems helped to align sides in the Revolution after 1640. In short, Hill concerns himself from a very novel angle, with the ever-fascinating question of the rôle of religion in the English Revolution. The conclusions he reaches make a fundamental contribution toward a clearer understanding of that important but vexatious issue.

Hill lucidly shows that the Reformation and the economic changes of Tudor and early Stuart times permanently upset the mediaeval ecclesiastical order. The hierarchy became the dependents of the Crown and propertied classes, and the wealth of the Church was largely diverted by the Crown, the propertied classes and the prelates themselves, to their own uses. Lay control of patronage rights, impropriation of parochial tithes, encroachment on glebe lands by inclosure or extortion, the difficulties of increasing the revenue from customary parochial fees, and the disproportionate share of taxation which the clergy bore—all these (each of which receives a full chapter from Hill) impoverished the Church, enriched the governing classes and contributed to the low social, economic, and educational level of the clergy. The breakdown of the fiscal system thus made it impossible to recruit a competent clergy at a time when an influential part of the laity, better educated and well-off financially, oftentimes at the expense of the Church, demanded higher clerical standards in all things than had ever before been demanded. The challenge to the Church was enormous and it was not met successfully.

A drastic reorganization of ecclesiastical finance was needed, but the hierarchy lacked the power to undertake it. Men like Grindel and Abbott were incapable of making the attempt, but Whitgift started to arrest the spoliation, Bancroft stopped it and Laud counter-attacked in the hope of reviving lapsed parochial fees, collecting and extending tithes, recovering glebe lands, and repurchasing inappropriate livings—thus restoring the Church's pre-Reformation position at the expense of virtually every significant secular element in society. His programme insured the implacable opposition of property to the hierarchy and to the Crown. If we add to this the intensification of the conflict between the ecclesiastical and common law courts, the hostility of Puritan opinion to Laudian theology and liturgy, the disaster of royal foreign policy and the conflict between Crown and Parliament, it is apparent why revolution eventually was precipitated.

The propertied classes prevented the hierarchy from reorganizing ecclesiastical finance, but the hierarchy, up to 1640, tried to prevent the Puritan opposition from attempting its own voluntary solutions to the problem. The schemes of voluntary lay associations, mercantile bodies, municipal corporations, and individual parishes to repurchase inappropriate livings or to augment the income of incumbents of their own selection, were all discouraged as threats to episcopal disciplinary power. Hill suggests that this voluntarism during the generation preceding the Revolution was the source of that vigorous growth of Independency which followed the destruction of the hierarchy. Nevertheless, the propertied classes retained their control over the wealth of the Church during the Revolution, whether of the Presbyterian or the Independent establishments, and nothing short of the abolition of tithes, as demanded

by the Levellers and the Quakers, would have broken their hold. Hill maintains that in ecclesiastical matters as in all else, the propertied classes emerged triumphant from the Revolution, for the system which was restored in 1660 was not democratic congregationalism, but a hierarchical establishment conclusively shorn of the independent authority it had struggled to maintain before the Revolution.

There are many points about this volume, quite apart from the perceptiveness of its thesis, which could be cited to illustrate its merit, but I would like to mention three specifically. The first is Hill's apparent desire not to exaggerate the importance of economic issues at the expense of other issues current in the epoch. He does not insist, for example, that economic factors offer the explanation of the religious differences of the age, but only an explanation, and one that has never been investigated properly. This acknowledgment, and others like it throughout the book, will go far to revise the impression some people have had that Hill is more interested in his theories of history than in the evidence of the documents. It is a pleasure to note his common-sense argument that mere economic reflex is an inadequate explanation of how Puritanism became the great historical force it clearly was.

The second point involves Hill's view of Laud. In *The Good Old Cause*, a book of documents which Hill and Edmund Dell edited in 1949, Laud was described as a "superstitious and rather silly old man." In the present volume Laud emerges as the formidable figure he in reality was—virtuous, conscientious, industrious, and idealistic. No one else in that court was industrious, not even Charles I, and no one but Charles was as virtuous. Hill correctly points out that Laud's ideals were noble, but irrelevant, a century out of date, incapable of realization, but unfortunately, capable of revealing all the contradictions inherent in the post-Reformation ecclesiastical order. The conclusion is an appropriate re-appraisal of Laud's significance in English history.

Although Hill's work successfully establishes the existence of the Church's economic problems, it calls to our attention a whole set of questions which need investigation before an accurate picture can finally be drawn. It is necessary to know more about ecclesiastical estate management and the circumstances of the ecclesiastical tenantry. What precisely was the difference between the actual rents of ecclesiastical estates and the improved rental values by 1640, and to what extent was the difference bridged by increased entry fees? Is there any connection between the "rising" or the "declining" gentry and the spoliation of the Church? The assumption that improved agriculture and industrial development were impeded by ecclesiastical estate holding has never been adequately documented, and vast diocesan records on all classes of tithes remain to be examined systematically. Neither the significance of lay nor corporation patronage rights on the growth of the Puritan and Arminian parties within the clergy have been analysed. Hill's consideration of augmentations prior to 1640 is inconclusive and the question after 1660 has not been touched at all. Future research on any of these questions will not be likely to revise the general outlines of Hill's pioneer investigation, but much which, at present, is general or even confusing will probably be defined in greater detail and more clearly.

Perry Miller looks more to intellectual than to economic factors in explaining the meaning of Puritanism in history, especially as it developed in the North American colonies. He has never subscribed to the approach of the social historians; rather, he has turned to Puritan theology itself. Throughout his

career he has been fascinated by the problem of what drove the first migrants to North America, and by the enigma of what happened to the English mind when it began to be something other than English, that is, when its errand proved to be a fool's errand. This familiar quest, implicit in all Miller's superb if prolix and rather abstract works on New England's intellectual history, appears again in *Errand into the Wilderness*, a collection of ten essays selected from the whole corpus of a quarter-century of productive scholarship. Some of the pieces here reprinted are the original statements of his more noteworthy theses, and short prefaces identify the date and place of original publication as well as provide interesting comments on his own earlier work. The title, taken from the first essay in the volume, came originally from a Massachusetts election sermon of 1670. It aptly expresses the unifying idea of a collection which begins with the purpose of the seventeenth-century Puritan migration and ends with a speculation on the meaning of America's traditional apocalyptic vision for the twentieth century. Between these, Miller places his famous refutation of Parrington on Hooker's Connecticut, his theory of the development of covenantal political theory in England and the colonies during the seventeenth century, and several essays on later American intellectual history. This collection provides an excellent summary of Miller's main ideas, and it ought to be useful to third and fourth year undergraduates and to graduate students.

Not all the regenerate saints undertook an "errand into the wilderness." Some stayed home and attempted to establish a holy community in England. In the effort they became rebels and undertook a crusade which eventually shattered itself by its own contradictions. By 1660 it was clear that their vision of a holy community had been lost, and they meekly abdicated their political power in the forlorn hope that the new government would adopt a policy of religious toleration. Mr. G. R. Cragg, in *Puritanism in the Period of the Great Persecution, 1660-88*, attempts to show how Puritanism was affected by the persecution which characterized Restoration policy. He has based his effort on very careful study of an enormous mass of contemporary sectarian records and literature.

To establish the proper frame of reference for his account Mr. Cragg adequately summarizes the well-known narrative of the political backgrounds and motives for persecution between 1660 and 1688. The body of his book is taken up with the interesting story of how the dissenting sects attempted to consolidate their spiritual and their physical resources to meet the test of persecution. The author convincingly demonstrates that the whole outlook of Puritanism became less a matter of theology and more a matter of life, a point of view which strongly emphasized evangelical worship, reliance on the idea of the gathered church, stern discipline, and education. Despite the best efforts, however, it is clear that persecution severely strained the inner resources of dissent at a time when the whole intellectual outlook of society was becoming increasingly hostile to Puritan religious zeal. Mr. Cragg's account of the horrors and effects of Restoration judicial and prison administration, the best section of the book, establishes precisely what the "great persecution" meant in human terms, and it is not in the least surprising that dissent gradually lost some of its vigour.

Although the Puritan abdication in 1660 augured ill for the former adherents of the Revolution, it was a joyful event for those who had energetically resisted political Puritanism, especially for those "great delinquents" who were

able at long last to return from penurious exile. One of those "great delinquents," the Marquis of Newcastle, was, incidentally, a grandson of that same Countess of Shrewsbury who was also the grandmother of Arbella Stuart. After fifteen years of exile the Duke finally returned to England, and shortly after him came his Duchess, "the thrice noble, chaste, and virtuous, but again somewhat fantastical, and original-brain'd generous Margaret Newcastle," as Charles Lamb described her. This extraordinary creature, notorious in the mid-seventeenth century as a rather mad poetess, dramatist, fiction writer, and philosopher, is the subject of a new biography, *Margaret the First*, by Douglas Grant. This is the first time that the life and writings of the Duchess have ever received a full-scale study.

No past biographer has been more sympathetic to Margaret than Professor Grant, but even he finds it difficult to make her a respected rather than a fantastic figure. Her contribution to natural philosophy was not really assessable, for it is impossible to unravel what she actually meant in most of her philosophical and scientific speculations. Her ability to deal with abstract intellectual propositions was limited, but Professor Grant skilfully shows that she was sometimes able to write with considerable effect when she allowed her imagination to dominate her efforts, as in *Poems, and Fancies* (1653), and CCXI. *Sociable Letters* (1664). She is best remembered for the biography of her husband, and as far as the historian is concerned, the main virtue of her biography is the light it throws on the life of the royalists in exile. The main flaw in Douglas Grant's biography, as far as the historian is concerned, is the failure to present Margaret's life and work against a richer historical background. Nevertheless, she comes irresistibly alive in this delightful volume, a genuinely enchanting personality.

The Newcastles were a great royalist family whose influence after the Revolution was greatly diminished, but the royalist Churchills, who were only a minor Dorset family during the Revolution, began to make their fortunes during the Restoration era. The first Sir Winston Churchill (1620-88) was the first member of the family of whom it is possible to write a biography. His story is the point of departure for A. L. Rowse in his history of *The Early Churchills*. Sir Winston, a student at St. John's (Oxford) and Lincoln's Inn just before the first Civil War, served with the royal cavalry in the West until 1645. In 1643 he married Elizabeth Drake of the prominent Devon family, and by the Restoration most of their famous children had been born.

Sir Winston's career after 1660, as a commissioner under the Irish Settlement Act, a minor court official and court member of Parliament, except during the exclusion crisis, was competent if undistinguished. However it put his children in the way of better opportunities, which they magnificently used to make the family's fortunes. Arabella, for a decade the only mistress of the Duke of York, and by him mother of the future Duke of Berwick, began her career as a lady-in-waiting to York's wife, Anne Hyde. John, the future Duke of Marlborough, began his career under Charles II's patronage as an ensign in the Grenadier Guards. His affair with Lady Castlemaine, one of Charles II's mistresses, enabled him to begin the founding of the family fortune, and his marriage to Sarah Jennings, the favorite of York's daughter, Anne, insured a future to him. So the family began the long ascent which led to the familiar and dazzling years of greatness early in the eighteenth century.

The first Sir Winston has never before been treated fully; Arabella's career is given in much more detail than ever before, and Sir Winston's other two

prominent children, Admiral George and General Charles, are rescued from both oblivion and obloquy. In this, as in his approach to the Marlboroughs themselves, Rowse places the family history in an intelligent framework of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century history. In only two respects can his general history be criticized. The conventional use of the old Tory and Whig labels does not help to make his account of post-Revolution politics as clear as it ought to be; moreover, he explains the Duke's fall in 1711 too much in terms of Sarah's quarrel with Queen Anne, and not enough as the consequence of the Duke's opinions on war policy. Rowse does not tell us anything new about Marlborough's rôle in politics and war after 1689, but he superbly summarizes what is already known. His sympathetic and detailed account of the building of Blenheim Palace, especially of the attitudes of the Duke and the Duchess toward it, is one of the high points of the book.

On the whole this volume owes its success as much to the qualities of Rowse himself as to the fabulous Churchill history. Like his other writings, this family history sparkles and entertains by virtue of his own romantic predilections. Great names in history appeal to him, especially if they represent "Whiggish" opinions in politics and religion. The force of his hatred for James II is pungent and overwhelming. Rejecting the idea that James II's incompetence can be accounted for by disease, he writes: "I do not think we need go so far to account for a humourless fool." Mr. Rowse may sometimes carry his pungency a bit far, even to the edge of vulgarity, especially in his long and amply documented accounts of the intimate private life of nearly all the prominent characters in his large cast of characters. There is nothing vulgar, however, in his superlative treatment of those two remarkable women, Duchess Sarah and Queen Anne. Sarah, a fascinating near-lunatic during her long old age, receives from an admiring author all that can possibly be due her, and Anne is acknowledged, quite properly, as a competent political personality.

Marlborough has often been accused of gross self-interest for abandoning James II, whose patronage had raised the Churchills from insignificance. Nevertheless, political realists like the Duke could do nothing else but abandon James, whose flight into exile served as the last of many proofs of his ruinous political incompetence. The humiliating spectacle of his flight and recapture at Faversham is recalled to us by the concluding documents in *They Saw It Happen*, a new collection of eye-witness accounts chosen from the years 1485 to 1688. Mr. Routh, the editor, has gathered in this modest volume almost a hundred interesting passages, mainly from letters printed in sources too obscure to be readily accessible to undergraduate students. Descriptions of places, events, and people are included in this anthology, many of them written by observant foreign travellers. This collection will serve a useful purpose, and except for one glaring misprint in the fifth entry of the Table of Contents, it is accurately edited. The introduction to each selection clearly identifies the source and gives a brief background of the circumstances into which the passage should be fitted. References to related primary and secondary sources on the same subject are frequently given in the hope that students will appreciate the importance of comparative study.

The epoch in the history of English art which closed with the construction of Marlborough's Palace of Blenheim, opened with the visit of Rubens to England in 1629, whose perceptive testimony on the state of English art at the time is included in Mr. Routh's anthology. The names themselves, Blenheim and Rubens, signify the outstanding fact of seventeenth-century art history.

Every creative architectural genius during that period was an Englishman and all the prominent painters but one were aliens. All of them, native and alien, are comprehensively treated in *English Art, 1625-1714*, by M. Whinney and O. Miller, volume VIII of the Oxford History of Art.

Seventeenth-century architecture has been thoroughly studied in the past, but the chapters on it in this volume are full of fresh observations. Inigo Jones in the early part of the century is given full credit as the first professional English architect. His derivative and conservative work amounted, in a sense, to innovation, for he introduced the high Renaissance style of Italy into England. John Webb, in the middle years of the century, although a decidedly lesser figure, maintained an architectural tradition which reached its greatest heights after the Restoration. Wren's Baroque style, English in its restraint, but derived from French and Dutch sources, was a magnificent departure from the rather severe classicism of Jones. The culmination came in the work of Vanbrugh and Hawksmoor at the end of the century—a Baroque style, but heroic, monumental, a remarkable anticipation of the Romantic movement later in the eighteenth century.

Rubens and Van Dyck both acknowledged the importance of Charles I, Buckingham, and Arundell as patrons of the arts, but in their times and throughout the century, patronage never succeeded in establishing a first-rate school of English painters. The authors of this volume conscientiously catalogue the names and works of obscure native painters, but only Thornhill, at the end of the period, had sufficient genius to secure a place among the greater names of contemporary European art. The Civil War extinguished the Caroline interest in painting, and after 1660 foreigners alone dominated the scene—Lily, Kneller, Verrio, and May, none of them of the first rank. They popularized painting among their fashionable clients in the propertied classes, however, and the ground was being prepared for the great achievements of the eighteenth century. Mr. Miller, Surveyor of the Queen's Pictures, manages to write in a stimulating manner about works which do not rank high in the history of art, and he covers the much neglected formative stages of landscape and decorative painting, as well as the better known portrait work.

The authors also survey the other arts in which the achievements were relatively insignificant. Tomb sculpture, of which there was a vast amount, most of it ordinary, is treated here for the first time. The minor arts, among them furniture-making, metal-working, and book production, are covered systematically but briefly, owing to the large existing literature on them, and the great museum collections of the objects themselves. In these lesser areas, as well as in architecture and painting, the authors maintain a high level of scholarship, and the amount of information they include in the volume is truly astonishing. Thus it will be valuable as a text for students of art history and as a standard reference work. It may well be, however, that those special readers who possess an intimate first-hand knowledge of seventeenth-century art will find the book disappointing in the way of interpretation, for, as its title makes clear, its method is essentially narrative art history, not critical aesthetic analysis. All readers ought to notice in detail the ninety-five photographic plates at the end of the volume; they are exquisitely reproduced and admirably illustrate every phase of English art discussed in the text.

The National Portrait Gallery has recently issued a volume of reproductions from its collection to commemorate the centenary of the Gallery's foundation. The collection now contains over 4,000 historical portraits and almost one-tenth

of them are included in this volume, from the earliest, a fine portrait of Henry IV by an unknown artist, to one of the most recent, a hideous group picture of George VI and his family, by H. J. Gunn. The quality of the reproductions is superb, but it is regrettable that there are only twenty of full page size. Nearly half of the total number are very small and are relegated to pages with two, three, and four plates to the page, and in one instance, five to the page. Some of the portraits have great artistic merit, but the volume shows that the Gallery has no choice but to take what it can get in order to insure a complete historical record. The biographical notes in the second half of the book are more often than not ludicrously inappropriate and badly written. The author of them is not identified. Neither is the person who made the selection of portraits for the volume.

A little known aspect of later seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century literary history has been capably documented by Professor Wiles of McMaster University. His book, *Serial Publications in England before 1750*, began as an introductory essay to a short-title catalogue of serials, but it ended as a full-scale volume on the development of a new method of producing books in a society which had developed a taste for books even among those ranks which could not easily afford to purchase them regularly. Wiles first discusses the early eighteenth-century habit of printing books in serial form in the growing newspaper and periodical press, and from that he goes on to show how publishers in the 1730's conceived and forwarded the method of printing large editions of books in instalment fascicules, to which readers subscribed on a weekly basis. The great virtue of this book is that Prof. Wiles does not allow himself to exaggerate the importance of his subject. He admits that most of the "number books" had "more bulk than merit," though a few still have value today. He quite properly treats the whole subject as a footnote to the larger history of periodical publication, and he often presents his material with a delightfully humorous touch. There is a complete Short-Title Catalogue of fascicules at the end of the volume, and also a list of publishers and booksellers who engaged in the trade.

Literary history, like every other kind of history at the turn of the seventeenth century, bears witness to the rapidly changing structure of British society. By the mid-eighteenth century, after a long and turbulent political and social revolution, the implications of the behaviour of Elizabeth's Parliaments had very nearly run their course. The world of George II was vastly different from Elizabeth's, and the Parliament of 1741, John Owen's starting point in *The Rise of the Pelhams*, bears little resemblance to Professor Neale's adolescent institution of 1601. In the story of the development of modern British politics, those two works, Neale's and Owen's, effectively delineate the whole meaning of political events during the Stuart era. The mixed constitution which emerged from the Revolution of 1689 could operate effectively only when a way of maintaining harmony between Crown and Parliament could be found. Walpole filled that function for a full generation, but a successor had to be found. It is Owen's contention that Henry Pelham was that successor, and the process by which the succession occurred is the subject of Owen's book.

The author applies the methods of Namier to the limited period between the break up of Walpole's administration in 1741 and the Pelham triumph in the elections of 1747. The period was a critical one marked by rebellion, constitutional crisis, and a war which Carlyle characterized as "an unintel-

ligible, huge English-and-foreign Delirium." The politics of this decade were extremely intricate and the competition among the political personages of the time was intense. Walpole was in retirement until his death in 1745, but Carteret, Newcastle, Pitt, and Pelham, to mention only the great, assiduously sought the means to power. Carteret made a brilliant effort, but he never managed to find more support than the confidence of George II, and his reputation in Owen's volume suffers a great decline from that accorded to him by Basil Williams. Pitt's behaviour in these years was less erratic than it had been in the 1730's, but he could not progress on his own merits owing to George II's intense dislike of him. Newcastle in this work is not at all the fool he has usually been credited with being, but he was by temperament incapable of achieving statesmanship. Only Pelham, the hero of this volume, realized that if Walpole's system was to be reconstructed it would first be necessary to rebuild the ministry's position in the Commons, by the use of patronage and by the absorption of part of the opposition. Then it would be necessary to displace Carteret in the King's confidence. From 1743 to 1747 he struggled to achieve both parts of the programme, and his efforts were entirely successful.

To tell this complicated story Owen analyses the rôle of every member of the Parliament of 1741-7. His knowledge of the subject is complete, and with it he is able to reconstruct the politics of the period with incredible detail. Fortunately, he does not lose sight of the main outlines of his story and his sound conclusions emerge forcefully. The outstanding characteristic of the mid-eighteenth-century Parliament, which Owen carefully establishes at many points in his story, was its essential independence; influence could rarely control more than two hundred members. Owen shows that a ministry could not long survive in Parliament on the basis of influence alone, nor was influence the sole adhesive which bound a ministry to internal agreement on policy. He denies that the "reversionary" focus was the only acceptable basis of opposition, and indicates with convincing evidence that a formed opposition quite independent of the "reversionary" circle was functioning in practice. Owen contends that in the constitutional crisis of 1745-6 the struggle was not between the King and his ministers, but between the King and Parliament; George II was compelled to withhold his confidence from a minister who had become unacceptable to the Commons. The King could have prevented this limitation of his authority by avoiding open conflict on the issue.

If George II was not a "king in toils," the dependent creature of a coterie of powerful ministers, his authority was limited by political circumstances for which traditional constitutional theory provided no answer. At any rate, Pelham, who had succeeded in 1742 to Walpole's position as leader of the Old Corps in the House, could not easily maintain his leadership until the King had been deprived of Carteret's advice. Once that had been accomplished Pelham was able to build an invincible majority in Commons by uniting with the Cobham-Pitt faction of the opposition. Deprived of the Carteret interest, George was loath to give his confidence to the factions he hated most of all, the Prince's circle and the remaining opposition, and he finally accepted Pelham's coalition of Old Corps, New Whigs, and New Allies. Thus Pelham at last succeeded Walpole as the "premier," that is, as the "minister for the King in the Commons" and the "minister for the Commons in the closet." George II, knowing he was in good hands, settled down happily with a govern-

ment as stable as it had been under Walpole's leadership. On Pelham's death in 1754, the King knew from experience what he was talking about when he wistfully said: "I shall now have no more peace". Students ought to be very nearly as grateful to Owen for explaining how the "peace of 1747-54" was achieved as George II was to Pelham for actually achieving it.

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REVIEWS OF BOOKS

La Guerre de la conquête. By GUY FRÉGULT. Montreal et Paris: Fides. 1955. Pp. 517, maps.

DURING the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the major problem of North American history was that of the co-existence of French Canada and English America, cheek by jowl, upon the same continent. To this problem there appeared to be no solution save the judgment of the sword. Just two hundred years ago, the war which followed was entering its last phase. 1758! the year of Louisbourg, Carillon, and Fort Frontenac, with the capitulations of Quebec and Montreal but a year and two to go. And yet how very remote these events appear to Canadians of the present generation. This very fact makes the appearance of a comprehensive study of this most decisive war in North American history a timely event, and one all the more significant because it is penned by an author who is rightly regarded as one of French Canada's foremost historians.

This book, which deals with the causes, events, and results of the Seven Years' War in North America, is rich in documentation. In this respect it follows the pattern which we have learned to expect from M. Frégault, whose earlier works on Vaudreuil and François Bigot have established him as the leading authority in this period of our history. He has consulted the transcripts from the archives of France and Great Britain which are to be found in Ottawa and Washington. He has also made extensive use of contemporary newspapers and pamphlets, many of them published in the Thirteen Colonies.

Let it be clear from the outset that M. Frégault has not written a treatise on strategy or an essay on tactics. He expressly disclaims any intention of so doing. After all, this has been done by previous writers. What M. Frégault has in mind is to analyse the motives, policies, and personalities of the war. That is not to say that the author does not discuss military manoeuvres. He does, and at times in considerable detail. But his main purpose is to establish the thesis that the Seven Years' War (he prefers *The War of the Conquest* as being a more accurate title) was the death blow to French Canada as a living society. The surrender of Canada in 1763 was more than a military defeat. It was a political, economic, social, and cultural annihilation. French Canada came to its bitter end, never to rise again. Those Canadians to whom Quebec is a living reality will be disposed to agree with Canon Groulx's remark that M. Frégault's book has "something of the tone and doubtful savour of a funeral oration."

Upon this thesis there will be no unanimity of opinion on the part of historians in Canada, be they French- or English-speaking. Nevertheless, writing as he does with such obvious sincerity and conviction, the author cannot but present a strong argument. Even so, this reader, for one, without in any way seeking to minimize the crippling effects of the War of the Conquest upon the emerging, national society of French Canada, is unable to accept M. Frégault's conclusion that the conquest was that society's death warrant. That French Canada did receive a terrific shock in 1763 will readily

be admitted; but French Canada did not succumb. Its strength was to be found in its deep roots on this continent. Its survival was not dependent upon an umbilical cord holding it to its mother, France. Canada was no puping colonial babe. As a matter of fact, M. Frégault himself points out the extent to which Canada—French by tradition and North American by geography—had developed its own sense of national identity by the middle of the eighteenth century. If the colonial Englishman had become an American, the colonial Frenchman had certainly become a Canadian. It was the strength of this national consciousness which made survival possible. French Canada would never have continued in being without it; and without such continuance, M. Frégault would have written his books in English rather than in French.

If there are those who will disagree with the general thesis which M. Frégault presents, there will be others who will disagree with his assessments of the principal personalities of the war. There is no doubt that, ever since the day of Thomas Chapais, the Marquis de Vaudreuil has had a very bad press, and that the two regular, general officers of France and Great Britain, the Marquis de Montcalm and James Wolfe, have enjoyed the historical front page. The time is overdue for a re-appraisal of Vaudreuil; and M. Frégault has done a pretty fair job of polishing up the much tarnished figure of the Governor of Canada, while at the same time scraping off some of the gilt with which historians have so liberally coated Montcalm and Wolfe. This is all to the good. One does get a bit tired of the constant disparagement of the Canadian to the glorification of the Frenchman and the Englishman, especially when neither was in the forefront of his profession. After all, Vaudreuil's failure to appreciate the regulars was matched by the inability of Montcalm and Wolfe to understand and make the best use of the militia. M. Frégault still has some distance to go, however, before he will obtain complete acceptance, on the part of the historical and military fraternities, of his views regarding the relative merits of the three principal figures of the war. By way of footnote, it strikes this reviewer as just a little odd that François Xavier Carneau, whose *Histoire du Canada* placed Vaudreuil in the best possible light, does not appear in M. Frégault's bibliography, although Thomas Chapais, whose biography of Montcalm placed him in the worst, does.

Because of its author's keen desire to rehabilitate Vaudreuil, M. Frégault's book seems to lack a certain sense of proportion, especially when the significance of the various military encounters of the war is taken into consideration. Much space is devoted to the siege of Oswego (including a six page note on the part taken by Rigaud in the operation), while the defence of Louisbourg and of Carillon receive relatively short shrift. There is scarcely mention of the Indian massacre after the capture of Fort William Henry and not a word of explanation. Such shortcomings might be of little consequence in a work of lesser merit; they are all the more noticeable because of the careful examination of sources, the obvious industry, and the high quality of writing which have gone into the making of this book.

La Guerre de la conquête is a book to be read, to be studied, and to be read again. It is a fresh, challenging, and intensely interesting approach to an old and familiar subject. It deserves to be translated into English in order that it might reach that larger audience which, while living in Canada, lives beyond the reach of French Canada. And if this reviewer, despite his

respect for M. Frégault's work, is unable to go all the way in agreement with M. Frégault's conclusions, it simply means that the book contains ideas as well as facts.

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The French in North America: A Bibliographical Guide to French Archives, Reproductions and Research Missions. By HENRY PUTNEY BEERS. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1957. Pp. xii, 413. \$12.50.

Le dernier volume du Dr Beers, *The French in North America*, rend compte des enquêtes faites dans les Archives de France, depuis le début du 19^e siècle, par les groupements scientifiques nord-américains. Au cours de son étude, l'Auteur a essayé de dégager les raisons qui ont motivé les entreprises faites dans les Archives françaises par les historiens et les institutions canadiennes. A cette fin, il a montré que la désintégration assez poussée des Archives de la Nouvelle-France et de la Louisiane française nécessitait un recours systématique aux *Fonds* et aux *Collections* d'Archives conservés dans les dépôts parisiens. En effet ceux-ci sont le produit des relations qui se sont établies entre les autorités françaises et les organismes coloniaux qui en dépendaient. Les fonctionnaires coloniaux entretenaient une correspondance continue avec le Ministre de la Marine et plusieurs autres fonctionnaires métropolitains et, particulièrement, les officiers des ports. De même ils étaient tenus de transmettre régulièrement des rapports sur tous les problèmes qui se posaient dans leurs colonies respectives. De plus les administrateurs français, surtout à partir de Colbert, gardaient une copie des documents envoyés dans les colonies. L'importance du lien colonial a fortement contribué à rendre les rapports France-Amérique plus nombreux. Il en est résulté une documentation révélatrice de la plupart des aspects de la vie coloniale mais qui, objectivement considérée, ne saurait remplacer totalement les Archives des organismes coloniaux: le Bureau de l'Intendant, les Bureaux des Contrôleur et Commissaire de la Marine, les Magasins du Roi, le Bureau du Domaine, L'Amirauté et le Bureau du Gouverneur.

Dans cette perspective, nous assistons, au cours du 19^e siècle, à un effort, du côté canadien, en vue d'obtenir des copies de documents conservés à Paris. Cet effort a porté dans deux directions. Les abbés Holmes, Ferland, Casgrain, et Verreau se sont surtout intéressés aux documents relatifs à l'histoire religieuse. De son côté, la *Société littéraire et historique de Québec* a supporté, grâce à l'appui financier de l'Etat, plusieurs missions de recherches. Le Dr Beers signale celles de L.-J. Papineau, Margry, Faribault, et P.-L. Morin. Il indique aussi les déficiences importantes de ces premiers travaux: leur caractère sélectif et le manque de préparation scientifique des copistes. Le choix des documents à transcrire était fait selon des normes tout à fait personnelles. De plus les textes étaient souvent reproduits d'une façon inexacte. Enfin les références n'étaient pas toujours données.

A partir de la fin du 19^e siècle, la transcription des documents français a été poursuivie grâce aux fonds octroyés par le gouvernement fédéral. Les travaux faits par Marmette, Richard, Doughty, Biggar, Ganong, et J.-E. Roy sont plus valables dans leur ensemble. Les copies sont améliorées et, surtout, les enquêteurs réussissent à mettre au point un certain nombre d'inventaires.

Cependant, depuis quelques années, on semble avoir compris la nécessité d'un dépouillement systématique. Les procédés photographiques ont permis de combler certaines lacunes inhérentes aux copies manuscrites. Nous nous permettons ici de signaler quelques erreurs et omissions qui se sont glissées dans le travail du Dr Beers. (1) Les copies faites sous la direction de la *Société littéraire et historique de Québec* sont actuellement conservées aux Archives de la Province de Québec et non au Morrin College (p. 228). (2) Il en est de même des copies de documents faites par L.-J. Papineau, pour usage personnel, durant son exil. Elles font partie de la *Collection Papineau-Bourassa*. Un de ces documents a été publié par la *Société historique de Montréal*. (3) M. Robert de Rocquebrune, représentant en France des Archives fédérales, a aussi publié dans la *Revue Nova Francia* les lettres de l'ambassadeur Pontois. Ces documents conservés aux Archives des Affaires étrangères à Paris concernent la Rébellion de 1837. (4) M. Claude de Bonnault, depuis plusieurs années, est le représentant en France des Archives de la Province de Québec. Il conduit ses enquêtes dans les dépôts parisiens et dans les Archives départementales.

Les Archives françaises prenaient une signification différente pour l'histoire des Etats-Unis. Certains Etats américains, comme la Louisiane, le Missouri, le Mississippi, le Wisconsin, l'Illinois, le Minnesota, l'Indiana et le Michigan, ont fait partie de l'empire colonial français. Les historiens et les sociétés historiques de ces Etats se sont très tôt intéressés à l'histoire de la période française et, spécialement, au commerce des fourrures et aux explorations. D'autres Etats, tels le New-York, la Pensylvanie, le Massachusetts, la Virginie et la Floride, se sont développés parallèlement à la Nouvelle-France. Leurs enquêtes ont surtout porté sur les documents significatifs de leur rivalité commerciale et militaire et des problèmes de frontières. Enfin plusieurs historiens américains, White, Cass, Parkman, Thwaites, Shea, Margry, ont orienté leurs recherches sur l'histoire même de la Nouvelle-France. Ces études les ont amenés à recourir d'une façon intensive aux Archives françaises.

Les Archives de France prenaient aussi une importance considérable pour l'histoire diplomatique des Etats-Unis. La participation de la France à la Révolution américaine de même que les relations diplomatiques et commerciales qui l'ont suivie trouvaient leur écho dans les Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères à Paris, dans celles de plusieurs services administratifs et dans un certain nombre de collections privées. Bancroft, Adams, Stevens, Doniol, Durand, et Meng y ont puisé abondamment. En dernier lieu, le Dr Beers indique la contribution apportée à cet effort de transcription des Archives françaises par deux grandes institutions américaines : la bibliothèque du Congrès et le Carnegie.

Au cours de son étude, le Dr Beers ne se contente pas de décrire fidèlement les séries de documents parcourues par les diverses missions américaines. Il met l'accent sur les techniques employées et sur les déficiences. Pendant longtemps le travail a été fait sur une base personnelle et sélective. L'absence de collaboration entre les institutions a amené, dans plusieurs cas, une duplication des efforts. De même certaines faiblesses techniques ont nécessité la reprise de travaux. A partir de la fin du 19^e siècle, on commence à éprouver le besoin d'une entente entre les groupements intéressés. Plusieurs missions ont alors procédé à un travail d'inventaire et de catalogue. Dès cette époque, on assiste aussi à l'utilisation des procédés photographiques pour la reproduction des documents.

Le volume du Dr Beers nous met en présence de la contribution essentielle apportée par les institutions et par les historiens américains à la connaissance du rôle de la France en Amérique du Nord. En même temps qu'il analyse le travail accompli du côté américain, l'Auteur montre les possibilités nouvelles d'investigation. Du côté canadien, nous voudrions signaler la nécessité de retracer en France les Archives des organismes coloniaux. Sans ces Archives, il nous paraît impossible de construire une histoire économique vraiment explicative.

A ces divers points de vue, le volume du Dr Beers est un instrument indispensable pour les historiens et les institutions de recherches.

FERNAND OUELLET

Archives de la Province de Québec

The Government of Nova Scotia By J. MURRAY BECK. Canadian Government Series, R. MACG. DAWSON, Editor, no. 8. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1957. Pp. xii, 372. \$5.50.

GOVERNMENT in Nova Scotia is conducted on a scale sufficiently small to have once elicited from Dickens the comment that to see it in operation was "like looking at Westminster through the wrong end of a telescope." No one, however, has ever proposed to solve its problems by threatening, as McGee once did with Prince Edward Island, to "send down a little tug boat and draw you up into one of our lakes." (Although the Gordon Commission proposal for mass migration from the Maritimes may be only a slightly revised version of McGee's ideal!) Perhaps it is no accident that, spurred by such haughty Upper Canadian observations, native sons from two of the smallest representatives of our federal community have produced the first full-scale studies of our provincial governments. Frank Mackinnon pioneered with his study of Prince Edward Island (the fifth contribution to R. MacG. Dawson's *Government of Canada Series*); and now we have Professor Beck's scholarly, definitive study of Nova Scotia.

Although government in Nova Scotia is not on the lilliputian scale so admirably depicted in Mackinnon's study of the Island, there are many resemblances between the two. We find, for example, the same heavy imprint of historical forces on contemporary institutions and political practices; the same domination of the provincial assembly by parish politics—roads and bridges nepotism rather than gas and water socialism; the same proud insistence on preserving the full, expensive apparatus of monarchical forms and British institutions; the same rigidity in public revenues derived from an inadequate local tax base and a corresponding dependence on federal hand-outs; and, finally, an even more pronounced record of one-party dominance.

Over one-third of Professor Beck's study is historical, giving further support to the claim that if you scratch a political scientist you find the historian. In this instance, however, there is every justification for the historical approach. The constitution and governmental apparatus of Nova Scotia were all founded on the royal prerogative and their development requires a careful study of how conventions and customs of the British constitution were transferred to a colonial setting (Part I of Beck's book) and were then adapted to the emergent needs of a self-governing community (Part II, 1830-67). Frequently political scientists—even some historians—have been disposed to portray such

developments as having occurred without human intervention. Professor Beck early in his study corrects this myopia by treating us to skilful thumbnail sketches of the "actors on the governmental stage." One finds throughout this careful historical treatment such a thorough sifting and sure handling of old newspapers and documents that one has every confidence that no stray precedent or startling institutional vagary has escaped Professor Beck's scrutiny. However, in the interests of registering a sense of movement and evolution perhaps it was unwise to subdivide the time period and carve up the chapters on each branch of government into brief episodes.

Building on this solid foundation, Part III of this study goes on to cover the post-Confederation developments in the governmental apparatus. The chapters on the Executive Council, on that anachronistic second chamber, the Legislative Council (to whose final expiration in the "Feast of Belshazzar" the author does splendid justice), and on the procedure of the House of Assembly contain much new material that can now be related to the larger stock of information we have on corresponding institutions at the federal level. Some of the explanation for the financial plight of Nova Scotia administrations is to be found in the informative discussion of local government (Chapter 19). Despite early pressure from New England immigrants, municipal institutions developed tardily in the province, and as a result it has had to bear a much larger share of the burden of combined services (65.9 per cent) than other provinces have had to accept.

The rest of the financial predicament is explained in the final chapter on Nova Scotia in Canadian Federation. Even to this familiar story of Better Terms agitations Professor Beck brings fresh information and insights. In this chapter alone do we detect a note of "Bluenose bias" in the author's otherwise impeccable professional detachment. Yet even as he decries the domination of the Maritimes' destiny by the St. Lawrence Valley he is careful to admit that such colonial bondage has been, in part, the fault of local politicians too much concerned with that one great milch cow in Ottawa. Professor Beck aptly captures this sentiment when, speaking of the overloaded local magistrates and the virtually unemployed judges he remarks: "The one thing which may be safely inferred is that Nova Scotia will not set a precedent by reducing the number of judges who are paid by another authority" (p. 297).

Professor Beck apparently shares with his fellow maritimers, Mackinnon and Dawson, the belief that all readers possess their knowledge of localities, regions, and vital statistics of the Maritimes. It is probably greedy to ask for more when so much has been given, but for this reviewer, at least, discussion of such topics as political parties, representation, and local government would have been more illuminating had maps and a quick verbal traversing of this terrain been added.

J. E. HODGETTS

Queen's University

Guy Carleton, Lord Dorchester, 1724-1818: Revised Version. By A. L. BURT
Canadian Historical Association Booklets, 5. Ottawa: The Association. 1955.
Pp. 16. 25¢.

The Making of the Maritime Provinces, 1713-1784. By W. S. MACNUTT.
Canadian Historical Association Booklets, 4. Ottawa: The Association. 1955.
Pp. 20. 25¢.

The Department of External Affairs and Canadian Autonomy, 1899-1939. By F. H. SOWARD. Canadian Historical Association Booklets, 7. Ottawa: The Association. 1956. Pp. 20. 25¢.

The Seigneurial Régime. By MARCEL TRUDEL. Canadian Historical Association Booklets, 6. Ottawa: The Association. 1956. Pp. 20. 25¢.

Canadian Political Parties. By F. H. UNDERHILL. Canadian Historical Association Booklets, 8. 1957. Pp. 20. 25¢.

THESE five additions to the series of pamphlets being produced by the Canadian Historical Association fulfil admirably the purposes for which they are intended. They satisfy a specific need in the teaching and study of Canadian history. The history of the United States unrolls itself logically according to the fundamental pattern of the frontier movement westward. As the intellectual history of the eighteenth century gives coherence to the ideas of the revolutionary leaders of the Thirteen Colonies, so the factors of geography and economic resources provide a relatively clear and easily ascertainable set of drives and motivations in terms of which various phases of American development can be understood. This is not the case with the history of Canada. There is no such self-evident pattern in Canadian history. Canada emerges from widely disparate origins which in their early phases have little or no relationship—culturally or economically or even geographically—with each other. Confederation was brought about in defiance of those very factors which give to the history of the United States its unity, almost its inevitability. There may well be some over-all concept or formula which will show us the logic behind Canadian development but so far it seems to have eluded Canadian historians possibly because of the rigid compartmentalization of our history, still persisting, into its French and English components. One result of this is that whereas specialist monographs clarify American history, they very often confuse still further the history of Canada. A paper on the rice industry in Louisiana between 1840 and 1865 will elucidate, probably unnecessarily, the primary rationale behind American history. A like paper on a Canadian theme can only too often obscure factors which are very difficult to isolate and grasp in the first place. It is in this sense that these pamphlets are of the utmost value. Canada's diverse origins, unrelated to each other though they may be, must nevertheless be clearly understood. Their very unrelatedness must be clearly understood, for perhaps it is in this unrelatedness that a key to our national history can be found. There is no unifying "dis-sidence of dissent" here such as was the case with the New England colonies. The task of the historian would be easier if there were such a theme. Perhaps this is why most texts of Canadian history unconsciously (or sometimes consciously) imply an underlying unifying idea which, at least until Confederation, is not there. This series of studies successfully avoids both detail for its own sake and unreal generalization. It presents in all their stark and meaningful incongruity the elements out of which Canada was shaped.

Professor Soward's lucid and able account of the Department of External Affairs has to do of course with twentieth-century Canada and deals with an aspect of Canadian history which is subsequent to the setting of the original problem. Still, read in a certain way, it is not isolated from the other four studies but is connected with them. A formula to contain and explain the history of Canada has yet to be discovered. Nevertheless Canadian history has certain definite characteristics which can most fruitfully be explored. Some

kind of pattern is bound to assert itself in the primary task of selecting subjects for a series such as this. The topics selected are the seigneurial régime, the making of the Maritime provinces, Guy Carleton, and Canadian political parties. The editors have chosen topics which are essential to an understanding of Canadian history. Unintentionally they have also chosen topics which illustrate the conservatism which is at the heart of the Canadian historical experience. As M. Trudel points out (p. 17), the seigneurial system was ended in Quebec in 1854. Yet by this time the system had shaped the social outlook of the people of Quebec. December 18, 1854, marked its withering away rather than its rejection. Professor Burt's excellent account of Carleton emphasizes once again that Canada's transition from French to British suzerainty was carried out, perhaps could only have been carried out successfully, under Tory auspices. Professor MacNutt, dealing with what is the most complicated part of Canada's origins, the Maritime provinces, tells us that "too much, perhaps, has been written of Loyalist authoritarianism and not enough of Loyalist democracy (p. 18)." This is certainly true. Yet the authoritarianism was there. Professor MacNutt is surely incorrect, at least in terms of political theory, in saying that the merchant legislators who battled with Governor Legge "represented the cause which posterity has vindicated, the sovereignty of the people (p. 14)." At the time of writing this review the sovereignty of the Crown is still an unquestioned postulate of the Canadian constitution. Professor Underhill makes this clear when he writes "British Americans, French as well as English, rejected the Jacksonian democracy, with its manhood suffrage. They accepted the leadership of moderate Whigs or Tories on the model of Great Britain, where manhood suffrage and complete Chartist democracy were rejected at the time (p. 12)." It is in this sense that Professor Soward's examination of the Department of External Affairs is consistent with the other four studies. The Department illustrates, both in its origins and in its functioning today that pragmatic and non-ideological outlook which is characteristic of the history of Canada and, for lack of a less misleading word, must be called "conservative." As can be observed from an examination of the United States this detached and expert dealing with diplomatic problems would hardly be possible had Canada accepted whole-heartedly in the nineteenth century the philosophy of popular sovereignty. Like so many Canadian institutions and practices the Department of External Affairs is an example, as these four booklets are documentation, of the scepticism and realism which run through the history of Canada. Conservatism, in its non-party meaning and contrary to the argument now going on in American intellectual circles, is not an ideology in rivalry with other ideologies, but a scepticism about them all.

JOHN CONWAY

Harvard University

Goldwin Smith: Victorian Liberal. By ELISABETH WALLACE. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1957. Pp. xii, 297, illus. \$5.00.

OF the Victorian intellectuals who established themselves in the New World, the migration of Goldwin Smith seems, on the surface, less explicable than most. His career in England had been almost embarrassingly successful. He had served with distinction, along with A. P. Stanley, as joint secretary of the

Oxford University Commission (1850), and as secretary of the committee which put into effect the Oxford University Act of 1854. His work as secretary of the Royal (Newcastle) Commission on Popular Education added to his reputation as an educational reformer, and at the age of thirty-five he found himself Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford, an eminence which most scholars, including professedly Smith himself, would have regarded as "the summit of my limited ambition." He was on easy terms with the greats, political and intellectual, of the Victorian world.

What changed the direction of Goldwin Smith's life was partly a series of personal accidents and partly, I suspect, a recognition, perhaps not wholly conscious, of a certain incompatibility between himself and the British academic world. Only seven years after his inaugural he resigned the professorship to nurse an ailing father, whose death by suicide made him welcome Andrew D. White's invitation to join the faculty of Cornell University, which had just opened its doors to students. Smith's marriage to the widow of a Toronto friend and his taking up residence at the Grange meant that henceforth Canada would be his main base and England only the scene of occasional visits.

But these incidents do not tell the whole story. Smith was neither a systematic thinker nor a scholar, and in the rôle of university professor he was a bit miscast. That he should have been so casually handed the Regius Professorship reveals more about the Victorian conception of the historian's trade than about Smith's professional attainments. (Still, his successor in the Professorship was Bishop Stubbs.) Goldwin Smith's gifts, as Miss Wallace emphasizes, were those of the journalist, and his incomparable talent for controversy, though hardly a virtue in the world of scholarship, was an unquestionable asset in an age of personal journalism. One can hardly dissent from the verdict implied by the *Concise D.N.B.* when it lists him "SMITH, GOLDWIN (1823-1910), controversialist." Moreover, he had some of the restlessness and relish for new experiences that is part of the equipment of the good journalist. He was repelled by certain features of Victorian society—the Established Church, for example, and the aristocracy ("an august nullity . . . a thing of feudal shreds and patches"). Not only was he much drawn to the democratic institutions of the United States, but a dominating conviction in his life was that the destiny of the world lay in the hands of the English-speaking peoples. All of these things predisposed him to come to the New World for what he assumed would be a stay of a few years but which turned out to be more than half of a normal lifetime.

We have waited too long for a biography of this Victorian who was at once so typical and so individual. But Miss Wallace's admirable study has removed any further ground for complaint. She has not only worked through the Goldwin Smith papers in the Cornell University Library but has consulted such collections as the Gladstone and Cobden papers in the British Museum, the Bryce papers at the Bodleian, and others, and has made use of items from manuscript collections as widely separated as Cape Town, Sydney, and Durham. The result is a solidly-grounded, workmanlike volume, in which the sometimes ill-assorted views of Goldwin Smith are thoroughly explored. Since Miss Wallace's chief concern is with his mind, she has elected to deal with the biographical material and the ideas in separate sections. In the latter and somewhat longer part, chronology is disregarded in favor of a topical organization. Smith's views on liberalism, the state and the individual, imperialism,

religion, and Canadian politics are carefully and perceptively analysed in individual chapters. Notwithstanding the range and mass of material on which the study is based, there is nothing diffuse about it; this is a taut, well-articulated book. Indeed, the biographical section is perhaps a little over-compressed. Goldwin Smith may have held that "the actions of literary and scientific men are their works," but his was a not uneventful life.

Conceivably Miss Wallace, whose prose is clear and serviceable rather than vivid, does not quite succeed in conveying the full flavour of his personality. But her judgments command confidence throughout. She makes no attempt to magnify the virtues of her subject, nor to transform the brilliant journalist into a scholar, sage, or philosopher. His writings, she points out, were not contributions to the literature of political thought or history, but were mostly tracts for the times, *ad hoc* statements on contemporary issues. To reduce this *mélange* of ideas, occasionally inconsistent and even contradictory, into moderately systematic form was no small achievement, for Smith lends himself readily to misrepresentation. Although, on the whole, his outlook was controlled by his individualism, this was an individualism so independent and genuine as to reject some of the *clichés* that we conventionally associate with the Victorian credo. Although a dedicated Cobdenite, he did not urge free trade as a universal prescription, nor would his general belief in *laissez-faire* require of him an unquestioning adherence to undiluted *Manchesterism*. Yet he did, of course, view the late-century trend to collectivism with profound apprehensiveness, as a phenomenon only slightly less alarming than the emergence of a blustering imperialism.

Goldwin Smith's opinions were always invigorating, even when moderately perverse. As a resident of Toronto, he took special pleasure in shooting at sacred cows, often with less than accurate aim. His curious failure to appreciate the temper of Canadian nationalism and his inability to divest himself of his preconceptions when considering Canada's problems—for example, the romanticized view of American democracy which he had brought from England—such blind spots impaired the value of his judgments, and certainly cost him influence with his adopted countrymen. With advancing age, as Smith seemed to lose touch with the newer currents, his reiteration of the old dogmas became, if anything, more emphatic, and increasingly he fell a victim to the classic vice of the Victorian liberal of acting as though public problems could be solved simply by the assertion of unexceptionable principles. Goldwin Smith, in the large, was an immensely wholesome force in both the New and the Old World, but his usefulness would have been enhanced if for a small fraction of his eloquence and moral indignation had been substituted some capacity for self-criticism.

DAVID OWEN

Harvard University

Canada in World Affairs, 1949 to 1950. By W. E. C. HARRISON. Issued under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1957. Pp. viii, 374. \$4.00.

In his notable contribution to a series which has now an assured place on the shelves of libraries throughout the English-speaking world covering international or Commonwealth affairs, Professor Harrison has an eventful period

to survey. While his volume may lack somewhat in reflective quality it is outstandingly successful in recapturing the hopes and anxieties of the times and in relating decisions to their contemporary background. The outcome is a book in which the exact sequence of events is kept steadily before the reader so that he may consider problems in the form and complexity in which they appeared to government and people at the time. In itself this provides a wholesome corrective to easy indulgence in *ex post facto* judgments, though Mr. Dulles' critics may have to exercise some restraint when they are reminded (p. 260) of his address to the National Assembly at Seoul on June 19, 1950, with its hopeful assurance to South Korean representatives that "as you establish here in South Korea a wholesome society of steadily expanding well-being, you will set up peaceful influences which will disintegrate the hold of Soviet Communism on your fellows to the North and irresistibly draw them into unity with you."

Professor Harrison's book, with its good narrative sense, is rarely, if ever, tedious to read despite the necessarily artificial two year limit imposed upon it. The chief criticisms to be made—and they derive at root from Professor Harrison's method and manner of presentation—are on the score of a certain lack of discrimination in judgment and a tendency to overwriting. On the first Professor Harrison might very reasonably retort that the purpose of the volume is to present a coherent and reliable interim report and not to attempt to anticipate the verdicts of history and on the second, that this is very much a matter of personal predilection and that on such questions North American and English tastes are unlikely to coincide. On this, however, your reviewer is bound to record the fact that he does not care for political issues to be described in such imagery as—"Official Ottawa was aware of the uneasy condition of that country [Korea], a bisected political baby which two sets of armed masters would spring to war to put together again and apply to the pap of their own defensive and ideological nurture" (p. 253)—partly indeed because he is none too clear about its meaning.

Professor Harrison's volume treats of very important events, chief among them the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the admission of a republican India to Commonwealth membership, the devaluation of sterling and the outbreak and early phases of the Korean War with its repercussions, economic as well as political. As is proper in such a series, these momentous events are looked at from the point of view of Canadian aims and interests. Broadly stated their nature was not in doubt—security and an expanding multilateral trading system. But as Professor Harrison justly observes with particular reference to the United Nations, Canada could pursue these aims only within the limiting context of power. "If patience and ingenuity could make the devices of the United Nations effective, no delegation was more willing to be patient or ingenious than the Canadian. But lesser powers are not determining agents" (p. 2). That however is not tantamount to saying, as Professor Harrison's later narrative makes clear, that lesser powers cannot and do not exert influence or that even in the most discouraging situations patience and ingenuity normally receive no reward. Much of this book is indeed a record of the rewards the Canadian government secured largely by such means. Here the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty, Canadian reactions to which are recorded in some of the most illuminating pages of this book, offers the outstanding example. It constitutes also a reminder of

the extent to which Canadian policy in 1949 rested upon the assumption that the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty would bring into being a decisive preponderance of organized power on the side of the Western World. It is presumption less easily entertained today. Throughout history, however, over-confidence in the effectiveness of a particular remedy has often led statesmen to conclusions which on balance have proved beneficial to their peoples.

On one point, admittedly of secondary importance in the context of this book, Professor Harrison would seem to labour under some misapprehension. He writes of Irish secession from the Commonwealth (pp. 41-2) in 1949 as though Mr. Costello was thereby bringing Mr. de Valera's policy of external association to its logical conclusion. In fact he was discarding it.

NICHOLAS MANSERGH

St. John's College, Cambridge

Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903. By CHARLES S. CAMPBELL, JR.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957. Pp. 385. \$5.50.

Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903 is a good book, admirably documented, and written in a lively manner. Professor Campbell has used for this study unpublished State Department material, Colonial Office and Foreign Office documents, and the Salisbury Papers, recently made available.

The author discusses at length such Anglo-American issues and difficulties as the Spanish-American War, the condominium in Samoa, the Administration's support of Britain during the Boer War, and the Anglo-German interference in Venezuela in 1902-3. The two principal difficulties, both of which concerned Canada, were the construction of an Isthmian Canal and the settlement of disputes with Canada, especially the Alaska boundary. Canada wished to trade British rights enjoyed under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty for an Alaska boundary agreement on terms favourable to Canada. Professor Campbell clearly shows that until 1900 Britain supported Canada's contentions against the advice of her well informed ambassador to Washington—Sir Julian Pauncefote. Britain ceased doing so when it became evident that Congress was prepared to construct a canal regardless of treaty right and when the Boer War demonstrated that Britain could no longer resist the United States in the Western Hemisphere.

But before 1900, Britain upheld the Dominion's interests at the Joint High Commission of 1898-9—especially her ambitions in Alaska. The author has written the clearest and fullest account of the Commission's deliberations. Lord Herschell, the leader of the British delegation, however, was not the mouthpiece of the British Government to the degree that the author suggests, but rather the brilliant counsel for Canadian interests and policies. In fact, a weakness of this book is an insufficient knowledge of the Canadian background.

The author adds little to the history of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal of 1903, either in fact or in interpretation. Although the principal American documents are now available, the British records after 1902 are still closed. Already, however, there is evidence to indicate a greater degree of Canadian responsibility for the humiliation of 1903 than has usually been assigned. On

the one hand, Canadian intransigence on the boundary question, particularly in 1898 and 1899, exasperated the United States; and Laurier admitted in 1902 to J. H. Choate, the American Ambassador to Britain, that Canada had no claims on the Lynn Canal. On the other hand, the wonted awareness of the American political scene deserted Canadians between 1898 and 1903. They were blinded to the decline of British strength and the growth of American power and exasperation at the Dominion's Alaska policy. They seemed to forget, too, that the American Senate was the "graveyard of treaties." These considerations suggest that historians in future might stop taking Canada's outcry in 1903 completely at its face value.

Thus although Professor Campbell scarcely considers the influences of the underlying mood and inflexibility of democratic imperialism and jingoism rampant in the Western World during the era, nevertheless he has written a valuable account of the background and the nature of the issues leading to the growth of Anglo-American understanding.

NORMAN PENLINGTON

Michigan State University

Canada's Immigration Policy: A Critique. By DAVID C. CORBETT. Published under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1957. Pp. xiv, 215. \$4.00.

Two features of this study of our national immigration policy make it specially interesting and valuable. One is the analysis of what policy actually is, as laid down by legislation and carried out by government officials. Professor Corbett's discussion of the various interest groups whose pressure operates to restrict or to expand the number of immigrants that we are willing to accept from time to time contains matter with which most interested readers would be fairly familiar. But they are likely to come across some surprising information when he describes the working of the official machinery. He makes clear how much arbitrary discretion as to what groups shall be admitted and what rejected rests in the hands of the Cabinet or of officials over whom Parliament and the public have little real control. His book should do much to dissipate the atmosphere of secretiveness with which immigration policy has hitherto been surrounded.

The other main feature of the book is an optimistic economic analysis of the effects which immigration and population growth have had upon our economy and our standard of living. A layman who has been reading the controversies about immigration policy over the past generation is apt to conclude that economists write optimistic treatises on this subject when times are good, as in the 1950's, and pessimistic treatises when times are bad, as in the 1930's; and that their parade of economic theory does nothing to relieve the practical statesman from the necessity of making pragmatic *ad hoc* judgments as to policy at any given moment. No doubt it is unjust to harbour such suspicions. But one reader at least of Professor Corbett's Chapters 4 and 5 is still not clear whether population growth is a cause or an effect of economic progress.

Professor Corbett announces at the beginning that his book does not adhere to strict scholarly standards of detachment and reserve. Presumably

he does this to appease the professional economists among his readers who still labour under the delusion that scholars do not make value judgments. Historians, who are emancipated from this academic myth, will think all the better of him for his frankness. But the value judgments to which he commits himself in his last chapter go far beyond anything which the mean sensual Canadian citizen is as yet ready to accept—as he himself recognizes. “It seems to me that we are compelled to treat our resources as a trust, to be administered not in our own interest alone but for the benefit of humanity in general. . . . It would be pleasant to keep Canada as a natural park, for the enjoyment of a favoured few, but I do not see how it could be justified from an ethical standpoint.”

The limitation of the book is that it tends to treat Canadians too exclusively as economic animals. I wish that Professor Corbett, with his admirable willingness to make value judgments, had gone on to consider some of the effects of immigration which cannot be measured in economic statistical tables: the glorious possibility, for instance, that the new Canadians may liberate Toronto from its Anglican stuffiness and its Methodist piety, and that they may eventually bring to Ottawa something more creative than the distillation of our Canadian quality of “moderation.”

FRANK H. UNDERHILL

Laurier House, Ottawa

The Valley of the Trent. Edited by E. C. GUILLET. The Champlain Society, Ontario Series, I. For the Government of Ontario. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1957. Pp. lviii, 474. \$5.00.

THIS is the first volume to appear in the new series of regional documentary histories of Ontario prepared by the Champlain Society in conjunction with the provincial Government. The editor, well-known for his writings on the local history of Ontario, is confronted in *The Valley of the Trent* with one of the historically less interesting areas of the “front” of Upper Canada. Apart from its recently rediscovered mineral resources the area’s chief claim to historical fame is as the adopted home of that remarkable literary group, the “Otonabee Pioneers.”

In the Foreword, Prime Minister Leslie M. Frost states that the purpose of the series is to make available “a representative selection of the more interesting and significant records of the past.” It is not intended to be “history of the conventional sort, but rather a collection of primary sources.” Almost half of the volume consists of extracts from printed works, the remainder being composed of manuscript sources and the editor’s commentaries. Over a quarter of the book is devoted to the history of transportation, and this almost exclusively the Trent Canal. Eighty-five pages are devoted to reprinting descriptions of the region, which at times verges on repetition. Together these chapters on transportation and description fill almost half of the book. But only nine pages are allowed to education, wherein there is not one reference to either Victoria University or the Cobourg Diocesan Theological College.

In the chapter on religion, with the exception of a hymn and one excerpt from Anson Green’s autobiography, all the extracts concern the Church of England. The editor cannot have looked very far or he would have found

extensive and interesting material on other denominations, including the Baptists, and the Primitive Methodists.

Forty pages are filled with the "poetic productions" of the inhabitants of the area, the longest piece—"The Ojibway Conquest"—taking up half of the chapter. None of the poems exhibit high literary ability, however typical they may be, and the inclusion of the "Elegy" to a dead cat is hard to justify even by the criterion of comic relief. In sum, the chapter of "poetical productions" seems of most dubious historical value—very low-grade grist for the historians' mill.

The photographs of persons, places, and things Trentiana are numerous and excellently reproduced—some of them have already appeared in other books by the editor. But the reproduction of the text figures—line drawings and manuscripts—which are not printed on calendared stock, is so poorly done as to be a useless detraction from the physical appearance of the book.

Even allowing that the Trent Valley offers the editor very limited materials in contrast with some other regions, the book has left this reviewer with the impression of uneven quality of contents, of uneven emphasis by subjects, of an uncritical approach to resources, and of a work produced without the most thorough, rigorous and extensive searching for the most significant records in the history of the Trent Valley.

JOHN S. MOIR

Carleton University

The British Empire before the American Revolution. IX. The Triumphant Empire: New Responsibilities within the Enlarged Empire, 1763-1766.

By LAWRENCE HENRY GIPSON. New York; Alfred A. Knopf [Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Limited]. 1956. Pp. xlv, 346, xlv, maps. \$8.50.

THE appearance of the ninth volume in Professor Gipson's distinguished study of the British Empire before the American Revolution is to be welcomed. Its predecessors covered the history of the Empire through the Seven Years' War and now Professor Gipson has turned his attention to the new and enlarged Empire of 1763. His study begins with a brief survey of political institutions and affairs in Great Britain and the Empire in 1763. The author then moves on to analyse the Proclamation of 1763 and to tell the story of both the Cherokee War of 1759-61 and the Indian uprising of 1763. He next examines the "transformation" of Nova Scotia and the establishment of Canada as a British province; he continues by studying East and West Florida and the ceded islands of the West Indies; and concludes his volume with chapters on Bengal and the rise of the East India Company as a political power.

The question that Professor Gipson has foremost in his mind in dealing with these topics is how effectively Britain met the challenge of the new responsibilities which the fruits of war had thrust upon her. In the main, it is his view that Britain's record is creditable and that the policies which she pursued were generally wise and humane. It might easily have been otherwise, for the complicated problems which confronted her were not subject to easy solution. The Proclamation of 1763 provides an admirable illustration of this fact. British expansion in North America was hampered, Professor Gipson observes, by the fact that much of the Great Lakes region was in

the hands of hostile Indians. It was complicated by the existence in Canada of a large and newly conquered population "alien" in thought to the British way of life—a population which had to have a "settled form" of government to replace the military rule under which it lived. It was made more difficult by the necessity of enforcing wise security measures to ensure that France would not and could not regain her lost provinces. And finally it had to take into account the fact that certain colonies had claims to territory that Indians might well consider their own. The Proclamation of 1763 was Britain's answer to this situation. And while it was not a perfect one, it was nevertheless designed to best serve the interests of every party involved.

Professor Gipson's careful analysis of this problem is characteristic of the entire volume. Each situation is studied in depth and in detail. Indeed, if there is a fault with his book, it is that Professor Gipson has examined the period in too much detail. For while there are few who would quarrel with the judgments he has made there are some who would wish that he had been more ruthless in selecting his material. Although much of the detail is illuminating, the weight of it sometimes interrupts the even flow of Professor Gipson's narrative. This, however, does not detract from the value of this study which sets the stage for the next volumes which will deal with the coming of the American Revolution.

PATRICK C. T. WHITE

The University of Toronto

Benjamin Cronyn: First Bishop of Huron. By ALFRED HENCHMAN CROWFOOT.

London: The Incorporated Synod of the Diocese of Huron. 1957. Pp. 142. illus. \$3.00.

BENJAMIN CRONYN (1802-1871) was born in Kilkenny, Ireland and educated at Trinity College, Dublin. He was ordained in 1827, and in 1832 set sail for Canada. He had intended to become rector of Adelaide in the western part of Upper Canada; but having reached London, was persuaded by the people to remain there as rector. His whole subsequent career was spent in London. Elected first Bishop of Huron in 1857, he presided over the diocese during its formative stage between 1857 and the year of his death, 1871.

Mr. Crowfoot traces the events of Bishop Cronyn's life with great sympathy and charm. Despite a paucity of private Cronyn letters he contrives to give some vivid glimpses of Cronyn's character and personality. The volume presents a picture of the Church of England in western Ontario as a frontier church. Under the vigorous leadership of Cronyn and his colleagues the Church of England regained much of the ground it had previously lost to the Methodists in the Ontario countryside. In his missionary activities in the London area Cronyn was almost a circuit rider. In reference to the early stages of Cronyn's ministry Mr. Crowfoot writes (p. 32) that "Most of his time was spent on horseback discovering new settlements, and bringing the ministrations of religion to many who had almost abandoned hope of seeing a clergyman of their own church." During Cronyn's episcopacy a hundred and one new churches were opened in his diocese.

Cronyn is described by Mr. Crowfoot as an "ardent Evangelical." Indeed the volume makes clear the powerful influence which Irish Evangelicals

exerted on the development of the Canadian Church. When the Cronyns sailed in 1832 they were accompanied by Mrs. Dominic Blake and her children. The Cronyns and the Blakes were the mainspring of Anglican Evangelicalism in Canada. Cronyn was responsible for the coming to Canada of the famous "three musketeers": Edward Sullivan, John Philip Du Moulin and James Carmichael. All three became Bishops in Canada. Many of the clergy of Huron Diocese were Irish Evangelicals and graduates of Trinity College, Dublin. Mr. Crowfoot remarks drily that when Bishop Cronyn appointed two Archdeacons and seven Rural Deans in 1860, "The majority of the clergymen thus honoured were graduates of Trinity College, Dublin."

The author describes the important incidents of Cronyn's career with great skill. In addition there are many delightful touches in his work such as the details of Cronyn's early life in Ireland, the excitement of his children over the Rebellion of 1837, the sensible behaviour of Cronyn and of Chief Justice John Beverley Robinson when an alarm of fire threatened panic among the congregation during morning prayer in 1845. One of the highlights of the book is the description of Cronyn's visitation to the northern part of his diocese in 1865. Mr. Crowfoot's volume is a valuable addition to the literature on the Church of England in Canada during its formative stage.

D. C. MASTERS

Bishop's University

SHORTER NOTICES

Les Cahiers des Dix, no 21. Montréal: Librairie Ducharme Limitée. 1956. Pp. 256, illus.

THE twenty-first edition of the *Cahiers des Dix* contains the usual miscellany of articles and essays, of varying quality. Some of them do not lend themselves to critical comment. Jacques Rousseau, however, always has something interesting to say; this time he discusses Indian words adopted by the Canadians, and conversely, French words borrowed by the Indians. Raymond Douville contributes an interesting article on the Gannes house in Trois-Rivières, with a brief biographical account of its builder, George de Gannes, *chevalier de St. Louis*. Included is a transcript of a muster order for the local militia dated January 17, 1753, which contains some useful information. Albert Tessier gives a character sketch of Benjamin Sulte, using the letters written by Sulte to two of his cousins, sisters of the Ursuline order. The striking personality of this prodigious worker in early Canadian history is brought vividly to light in a most sympathetic manner.

Victor Morin continues his series, *Propos de bibliophile*; this time he has written an informative essay on books, book collectors, and book collections, based largely on his own experiences. He closes with a brief discourse on Christian apologetics. In his article on Jacques Cartier's first voyage to Montreal, Gérard Malchelosse maintains that the explorer must have landed on the north side of the island. He also gives some interesting details on the surviving manuscripts and published accounts of Cartier's voyages. Léo-Paul Desrosiers' article deals, of course, with the Iroquois; this time with their negotiations for peace with the French in the 1690's. M. Desrosiers has made a close study of the original source material and it is his contention that the

winter raid by the French on the Mohawks in 1693 broke the Iroquois resistance and that by the following year they earnestly desired peace. They did, however, renew their attacks on the colony in 1695 and it was not until 1701 that a durable peace with the Five Nations was finally negotiated. There is an excellent index, prepared by Gérard Malchelosse, and a very useful list of all the articles that have appeared in the first twenty *Cahiers* (1935-55).

W. J. ECCLES

The University of Alberta

American Indian and White Relations to 1830: Needs and Opportunities for Study. By W. N. FENTON. Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1957. Pp. xii, 138. \$3.00.

THIS is an essay revised for publication by the author, who originally delivered it as a paper to the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, in 1953. It is a plea for the integration of the historical and ethnological (or anthropological) approaches to the problem of the relations of the Whites and the Indians. The purpose of such integration is the use of the ethnological present in order to throw light upon the historic past. "Upstreaming" is the term which the author applies to the ethno-historical method of study. He argues that the major cultural patterns remain stable over long periods of time, producing repeated uniformities, and that these patterns can best be seen by proceeding from the known ethnological present to the unknown historic past, using recent sources first and then the earlier sources. His proposals are worthy of attention: although the historian will be not a little wary of any suggestion that the past can be accurately inferred from the present. The ethno-historical Bunyan will find the path which he must tread beset by the Giant of Assumed Stability to say nothing of the Apollyon of Assumed Acculturation.

Following his talk Mr. Fenton supplied L. H. Butterfield, the director of the Institute, with a number of bibliographical cards listing various ethnological and historical works on the subject of the American Indian. This bibliography was revised and expanded and is published with Mr. Fenton's essay. There are some references in it of specifically Canadian interest, but the editors had their eyes largely upon the American scene. The historian or ethno-historian interested in the problem of cultural conflict in Canada between the Indians and Whites will find this bibliography useful, but not indispensable.

GEORGE F. G. STANLEY

The Royal Military College of Canada

Peter Pond, Fur-trader and Explorer. By HENRY R. WAGNER. Western Historical Series, No. 2; published on the Ellsworth Eliot Fund for Research. New Haven: Yale University Library. 1955. Pp. iv, 104, maps. \$5.00.

PETER POND is one of the most important, as well as one of the most intriguing, figures in the early history of the Canadian West. It is over a quarter of a century since the late Professor H. A. Innis's memorable monograph on Peter Pond appeared; and since that time new evidence has come to light. Some

of this new material has been incorporated by Mr. Wagner in his rather brief Introduction to the present volume; and two or three of the seven documents which he prints have not appeared in print before. But there is some new material that he has missed—for example, the evidence in Dr. J. B. Tyrrell's *Journals of Hearne and Turnor* regarding the murder of John Ross in 1787 by one of Peter Pond's men.

A valuable feature of the book is the reproduction of copies of three of Pond's maps on the Northwest, though it must be regretted that the scale on which they are reproduced is such that one can read them only through a magnifying glass, and it must also be regretted that they have not been either bound with the volume, or placed in a pocket at the back. They have been placed in a separate folder, which is boxed with the volume, and might easily be lost. I imagine, however, that since the edition is limited to five hundred copies, the book is intended to be a collector's item, and this perhaps explains its rather unusual format.

W. S. WALLACE

Toronto

Le Moyen Age: l'expansion de l'Orient et la naissance de la civilisation occidentale. By EDOUARD PERROY, with the collaboration of T. AUBOYER, C. CAHEN, G. DUBY, and M. MOLLAT. *Histoire générale des Civilisations*, III. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1955. Pp. 681.

THE chief distinction in this latest in the impressive list of French *œuvres de synthèse* is that its eminent authors take universal history seriously. In the English-speaking world such histories are the work either of cranks (Wells or Toynbee) or of professors writing for semi-literate first year students. This series is less tendentious than the former and more satisfying than the latter. Previous French collections, such as those of Glotz or *Peuples et Civilisations*, have paved the way, but have not sought like this one to elicit a convincing pattern for the whole of world history.

The division of the mediaeval period (unadventurously dated from c. 500 to c. 1500) is threefold. First, there is a period of Eastern expansion at the expense of the West, lasting till about 1000 A.D. There follows the revival and counterthrust of the West, and the Mongol empire, to about 1300 A.D. Third, and finally, there is a period of crisis in the West and of severed communications with the East lasting till mid-fifteenth century. Expansion and renewal come in a last minute burst at the end of that century, ushering in the modern era with almost as much suddenness as an old-fashioned text book.

Because it is written by experts—of that aggressive and agile kind with whom France seems especially blessed—there is little forced unity to the book. Possibly only a common inspiration by some rigid philosophy of history could have produced a really unified pattern. A certain loose unity, however, is provided by the stress given to broad economic changes and population movements as the starting-points of cycles of growth and decline. There is unity, too, in the central idea of a distinctive mediaeval society whose morphology is a legitimate subject of study. From this conception, it may be added, spring most of the book's errors. Continuity is overstressed at the beginning of the period and seriously underestimated at its close. The picture of decline painted by M. Mollat is fashionable, but overdrawn. Nevertheless, this book

is probably the best single volume introduction to the period yet to have been written.

M. R. POWICKE

The University of Toronto

Les Relations de ce qui s'est passé au pays des Hurons (1635-1648). Par SAINT JEAN de BRÉBEUF. Textes littéraires français, no 72, publiés par THEODORE BESTERMANN. Genève: Librairie E. Droz. 1957. Pp. xxviii, 229.

IN 1937 the Cockerell Press of London published a *de luxe* edition in English of the Jesuit *Relations* of 1635 and 1636 written by St. Jean de Brébeuf, along with part of the *Relation* of 1640 derived from him, his advice to missionaries, and six letters to the General of the Jesuits in Rome, edited by Theodore Besterman. This was a work worthy of its subject for the bibliophile, the historian, and the religious reader.

We now have a French copy of the same work, literally translated along with its historical introduction, Huron glossary, and bibliographical appendix. The text however is in the seventeenth-century French of the author. It lacks only the exquisite title-page and not-so-useful end maps of the English original. The new book is in pocket size, with paper cover, well printed, and set out on good paper.

Perhaps, however, for the many readers of this continent a sentence might have been added to the bibliographical note. The expansion, exposition, and confirmation of the subject and its text made in the past decade by Dr. and Mrs. Jury in archaeology, by Dr. Fox in regard to St. Ignace, by the late Father Talbot in popularized but reliable history, by Professor Hunt and his critics in the Huron background might be called to attention. What archaeological and historical work has added can find almost all its roots in what the saint has recorded or mentioned or suggested. He must surely be one of those martyrs who had most assiduously pursued the martyr's fate just short of the sin he saw glimmering before him: spiritual pride in holding towards so great an end. But what all can also see, and can find confirmed by later knowledge, is an intelligent greatness in the wisdom and ways of men among men. He was a notable fortifier of the hearts of men, a practical organizer of trade, of military defence, of a pioneer outpost.

These Norman characteristics are supplemented by an ironical understanding not always evident among martyrs. A passionate and sympathetic lover of his bizarre barbarians, he was a subtle contact between them and civilization, even if not very successful. The Feast of the Dead, held every twelve years, presented some revolting physical problems but also some subtle theological ones. As perhaps the first baptized man to die in that country was the unspeakable Etienne Brûlé, Brébeuf appreciated the difficulty in asking for separate Christian burial lest it suggest that "le vray moyen de se faire passer avec les Français estait de fendre la teste de quelqu'un." The shadows of epidemic, of the Iroquois, of national demoralization are cast over the later letters, which also reveal characteristic loyalty and sensible administrative suggestions. It is good to have the most famous of Canadian Jesuits so accessible in his own lucid words.

H. M. THOMAS

The University of Western Ontario

RECENT PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO CANADA

PREPARED IN THE EDITORIAL OFFICE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS

By CONSTANCE PATTULLO

Notice in this bibliography does not preclude a later and more extended review.

The following abbreviations are used: *B.R.H.*—*Bulletin des recherches historiques*; *C.H.R.*—*Canadian Historical Review*; *C.J.E.P.S.*—*Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*; *R.H.A.F.*—*Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française*.

See also *Canadiana*, a monthly list of Canadian publications prepared by the National Library, Ottawa, *External Affairs*, published monthly by the Department of External Affairs, and, in the *University of Toronto Quarterly*, "Letters in Canada," published in the July issue.

Sections of the bibliography omitted from this issue for reasons of space will be included in later issues.

I. CANADA'S RELATIONS WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH

BRAINE, BERNARD. Some Aspects of Commonwealth Development (*United Empire*, XLVIII (5), Sept.-Oct., 1957, 202-6). The Inaugural Address of the Royal Empire Society Summer School, held at Oxford last August.

COHEN, MAXWELL. Canada, Britain and the Common Market (*Saturday Night*, LXXII (22), Oct. 26, 1957, 14-15, 42-3).

GALLAGHER, Mrs. E. S. New Commonwealth and NATO films (*Echoes*, No. 229, Christmas, 1957, 22). Titles of the National Film Board Series on the Commonwealth of Nations, narrated by Edgar McInnis.

KATZ, SAMUEL I. *Two Approaches to the Exchange-Rate Problem: The United Kingdom and Canada*. Essays in International Finance, no. 26. Princeton: Department of Economics and Sociology, International Finance Section. August, 1956. Pp. ii, 19. Free.

MARSHALL, GEOFFREY. *Parliamentary Sovereignty in the Commonwealth*. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press [Toronto: Oxford University Press]. 1957. Pp. xii, 277. \$5.25. To be reviewed later.

NYE, Sir ARCHIBALD. Canada (*United Empire*, XLVIII (5), Sept.-Oct., 1957, 206-10). One of a series of lectures given at the Royal Empire Society's Summer School at Oxford.

PARIZEAU, JACQUES. La Politique commerciale canadienne et les dilemmes de l'Angleterre (*Actualité économique*, XXXIII (2), juillet-sept. 1957, 335-43).

II. CANADA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AITCHISON, J. H. Canadian Foreign Policy in the House and on the Hustings (*International Journal*, XII (4), autumn, 1957, 273-87). Parliamentary debate since November, 1956, and the June election campaign.

BRITNELL, G. E. Under-Developed Countries in the World Economy (*C.J.E.P.S.*, XXIII (4), Nov., 1957, 453-66). The author discusses the problems in the light of Canadian experience.

COHEN, MAXWELL. Partnership Problems for Canada and the U.S. (*Saturday Night*, LXXIII (1), No. 3304, Jan. 4, 1958, 12-13, 36-7). The author sees the major problems as those of security and defence, boundaries, economics, the Arctic, and the High Seas.

- McINNIS, EDGAR. The English-Speaking Triangle: Some Considerations (*International Journal*, XII (4), autumn, 1957, 243-9). Problems of defence and prosperity.
- PEARSON, LESTER B. Where Do We Go from Here (*Reporter*, XVII (10), Dec. 12, 1957, 10-13). Tension and fear and the threat of nuclear war necessitate our finding a new path to international peace and understanding.
- SINCLAIR, SOL. Canada and Wheat in International Trade (*International Journal*, XII (4), autumn, 1957, 288-99).
- SWAYZE, WALTER E. An Offence unto Charity: Personal Reflections on a National Attitude (*Queen's Quarterly*, LXIV (3), autumn, 1957, 326-37). A discussion of some anti-American attitudes in Canada.
- WATKINS, ERNEST. The Columbia River: A Gordian Knot (*International Journal*, XII (4), autumn, 1957, 250-61).
- WOOD, H. F. Adventure in North Russia (*Canadian Army Journal*, XI (4), Oct., 1957, 112-24). The Canadians' part in the Expeditionary Force to northern Russia, 1919.

III. HISTORY OF CANADA

(1) General History

- L'Académie canadienne-française. *Cahiers*. II. *Histoire*. Montréal: 535, av. Viger. 1957. Pp. 188. \$3.00. Essays by Lionel Groulx, Marcel Trudel, Guy Frégault, Michel Brunet, Claude Galarneau, Victor Barbeau, and Jean Bruchesi. See p. 83.
- The Beaver*, outfit 288. Winnipeg: Hudson's Bay Company. Winter, 1957. Pp. 66, illus. York Factory issue. Articles are listed separately in this bibliography.
- BARBEAU, MARIUS. Our Beaver Emblem (*Canadian Geographical Journal*, LV (6), Dec., 1957, 244-50). Reproductions of various beaver emblems, past and present.
- BISSELL, C. T., ed. *Our Living Tradition*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, in association with Carleton University. 1957. Pp. x, 149. \$3.50. To be reviewed later.
- Encyclopedia Canadiana*, vol. I. Ten volumes. Ottawa: The Canadiana Company (The Grolier Society of Canada Limited). 1957. Pp. xxxii, 33-412. To be reviewed later.
- GLUEK, ALVIN C. The Fading Glory (*Beaver*, outfit 288, winter, 1957, 50-5). After the merger of the Hudson's Bay and North West Companies, York Factory became the central depot for the Northern Department of Rupert's Land, but by the end of the 1830's the American Fur Company's Red River route was cutting into the Company's trade at Fort York.
- LOWER, ARTHUR R. M. *Colony to Nation: A History of Canada*. Third edition. With Maps by T. W. McLEAN. Toronto, London: Longmans, Green & Company. 1957. Pp. xxxii, 600, maps. \$5.00. A new prologue carries the history to 1956. See p. 91.
- PRESTON, R. A. Is Local History Really History? (*Saskatchewan History*, X (3), autumn, 1957, 97-103). Based on an address delivered at the Congress of Local Historical Societies, July, 1957.
- SAYWELL, JOHN T. *The Office of Lieutenant-Governor*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1957. Pp. xii, 302. \$5.50. To be reviewed later.

(3) New France

- COSSETTE, JOSEPH. Jean Talon, champion au Canada du gallicanisme royal, 1665-1672 (*R.H.A.F.*, XI (3), déc. 1957, 327-52). D'après sa correspondance avec la Cour de France.
- FAUCHER de SAINT-MAURICE. *L'Îlet au massacre*. Montréal: Editions Fides. 1956. Pp. 61, illus. 65¢. The history commences with the arrival of Jacques Cartier in Canada and describes the Iroquois-Micmac-Maléchite struggle.

- HERRIDGE, A. J. Famous Fur-Trading Route (*Sylva*, XIII (6), Nov.-Dec., 1957, 13-18). Two centuries ago, a trans-Ontario highway linked Lake Superior to Hudson Bay.
- LANGLAIS, ANTONIO. Le Conseil souverain de Québec: mal cadu et mariage (*Revue de l'Université Laval*, XII (2), oct. 1957, 174). A brief extract from the deliberations of the Council in 1664 illustrates its broad powers.
- Messieurs de Saint-Sulpice devant le Conseil Souverain en 1667 (*R.H.A.F.*, XI (3), déc. 1957, 393-9). Le récit d'un procès important à confirmer les titres des Messieurs de Saint-Sulpice à la propriété de toute l'île de Montréal.
- LE BLANT, ROBERT. Les Arrêts du Parlement de Rouen du 25 juin 1633 et les premières compagnies du Canada (*Revue des Sociétés savantes de Haute-Normandie*, Lettres, no 3, 1956, 41-55). The Arrêts shed light on the rivalries of the various French trading companies of the period, and on the Voyages of Champlain.
- MÉDÉRIC, PAUL. Contemporain du Grand Roi: Biographie de Noël Simard dit Lombrette, 1637-1715. Publications de la Société historique du Saguenay, no 16. Chicoutimi: La Société. 1957. Pp. 183. \$2.00.
- NUTE, GRACE LEE. The French on the Bay (*Beaver*, outfit 288, winter, 1957, 32-7). English-French rivalry in the Hudson Bay area began, unofficially, in 1682-3 and continued intermittently until the end of the American Revolution.
- SOSIN, JACK M. Louisbourg and the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748 (*William and Mary Quarterly*, XIV (4), Oct., 1957, 516-35). The author supports the Palfrey-Walpole thesis on the reasons for the return of Louisbourg to the French.
- VACHON, ANDRÉ. Inventaire critique des notaires royaux des gouvernements de Québec, Montréal et Trois-Rivières (1663-1764), (*R.H.A.F.*, IX (3), déc. 1955, 423-38; IX (4), mars 1956, 546-61; X (1), juin 1956, 93-103; X (2), sept. 1956, 257-62; X (3), déc. 1956, 381-90; XI (1), juin 1957, 93-106; XI (2), sept. 1957, 270-6; XI (3), déc. 1957, 400-6).
- (4) British North America before 1867
- COOPER, J. I. Thomas d'Arcy McGee, McGill's Father of Confederation (*McGill News*, XXXVIII (4), autumn, 1957, 15, 32-4). McGee's career at McGill.
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IX. ARTS AND SCIENCES

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(2) Science and Agriculture

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(3) Geography, Transportation, and Migration

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- BROWN, ROBERT R. Canadian Locomotives: Champlain and St. Lawrence Railroad "Dorchester" (*Canadian Railroad Historical Association News Report*, no. 74, Jan., 1957, 6-11). The "Dorchester" arrived in Canada in 1836.
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- TAYLOR, GEORGE R. and NEU, IRENE D. *The American Railroad Network*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press [Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders & Co. Ltd.]. 1956. Pp. viii, 113, maps. \$4.95. The maps show the railroads in the United States and Canada in 1861.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Colony to Nation

The third edition of Professor A. R. M. Lower's *Colony to Nation: A History of Canada* (Longmans, Green & Company, \$4.00) has recently appeared. The body of this standard text has not been altered, but Professor Lower has added a twenty page prologue in which he discusses recent developments in Canadian history and government. As always the author is lucid and provocative. The passage of time does not appear to have altered his basic approach to Canadian problems. Extensive work has been done by author and publisher to bring the many charts and diagrams up to date.

Bibliography of Pennsylvania History

The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission has recently published a second edition of its *Bibliography of Pennsylvania History*, compiled by N. B. Wilkinson. For students of local history the volume would appear to be extremely valuable and might well serve as a guide and stimulus for local history societies in Canada. A twelve page section on "Conflict on the Upper Ohio, 1753-1765" contains items useful for the historian of New France and British North America before the American Revolution.

ARCHIVAL MANAGEMENT

Radcliffe College, with the co-sponsorship of the Department of History of Harvard University, has announced that its fifth annual summer Institute on Historical and Archival Management will be held from June 23 to August 1, 1958. "Students will devote full time to the study of archival and historical resources and their relation to the interpretation of history." The class will be limited to fifteen and will be open to college graduates who are interested in a career in archival, museum, and historical society work, as well as employees of institutions in these related fields. Two full-tuition scholarships of \$200 are available. Inquiries should be addressed to the Institute, 10 Garden Street, Cambridge 38, Mass.

ANGLO-AMERICAN CONFERENCE

At the Plenary Anglo-American Conference of Historians held at the Institute of Historical Research last summer, dates for the normal annual Conference were fixed for July 10-12, 1958. Canadian scholars who expect to be in England at that time are asked to write for particulars to the Secretary, Institute of Historical Research, University of London, Senate House, London, W.C.1.

GLENBOW FOUNDATION

The Glenbow Foundation of Calgary, "a charitable foundation interested in the collection, preservation, display and use of culture material having to do with the Canadian West," has announced the appointment of Clifford P. Wilson of Winnipeg as Director of its Western Canadian Division. For the past

eighteen years Mr. Wilson has been historian for the Hudson's Bay Company in Canada, editor of *The Beaver*, and director of its historical and ethnological museum.

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